Of course the imperialists wanted Hitler to mop up those troublesome commies; of course the imperialists had no objection to Hitler's building a SLAVe camp in the east...that goes without saying.
The problem has more to do with our very different views of Stalin. And, I suspect these views are irreconcilable; I started out as a socialist/Trotskyist and seem to be growing into a socialist-anarchist. That's if a label is necessary.
So. Other than that I find your writing very interesting and I suspect that relative to more contemporary goings on we have a lot more in common.
Best,
Joanna
At 05:36 PM 11/06/2002 -0500, you wrote:
Hi Joanne: I know, I know - I said I would not try to reply to all your points! But in amongst all the recent & extraordinary mud-slinging - I had overlooked your dump on the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Well, none of this will convince you, But at least it is off my chest! I will argue here, that the diplomatic history of the period shows that the USSR tried BLOODY hard to get an anti-fascist front, but that the imperialists were trying to shove Hitler East. See for instance "Documents Relating to the Eve of the 2nd WW"; International Publishers; New York; 1948; or; Axell A: "Stalin's War Through the Eyes of His Commanders"; London 1997; or "Grand Delusion: Stalin & The German Invasion of Russia"; Gabriel Gorodetsky; Yale 1999. They butress my following precis of the argument drawn from an anlysis by the alte W.B.Bland, at our web-site. All of these (& many other books) more or less project the following scenario: 1) that the USSR was being set up for attack, & that this was the "function" of the infamous Munich appeasement sessions. The "set-up" of the USSR had started in the Spanish Civil War (which I note you have commented on also, & I would contend that Stalin was aiding the Republicans & that the USSR was being sabotaged in this also: see: http://www22.brinkster.com/harikumar/CommunistLeague/Compass123-Spain1996.htm ).2) The secret diplomacy of the pre-SWW shows clearly the collusion of the imperialists with the German fascists. e.g.: "British Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax is on record as telling Hitler in November 1937 that: "he and other members of the British Government were well aware that the Fuehrer had attained a great deal. . . . Having destroyed Communism in his country, he had barred the road of the latter to Western Europe and Germany was therefore entitled to be regarded as a bulwark of the West against Bolshevism. . When the ground has been prepared for an Anglo-German rapprochement, the four great West European Powers must jointly set up the foundation of lasting peace in Europe". ('Documents on German Foreign Policy: 1918-1945', Series D, Volume 1; London; 1954; p. 55)." See: http://www22.brinkster.com/harikumar/AllianceIssues/WBBJVSNaziPact.htm 3) The onset of moves agisnt Poland by fascist Germany provoked Lloyd George to set up talks with the USSR. However, the Anglo-French delegation did not exactly set off to the USSR in a hurry - nor empowered to actually take substantive steps: : "On 23 July the British and French governments finally agreed to begin military discussions before the political treaty of alliance had been finalised, and a British naval officer with the quadruple-barreled name of Admiral Reginald Plunkett-Ernie-Erle-Drax was appointed to head the British delegation. No one, apparently, had informed the British government that the aeroplane had been invented, and the delegation left Tilbury by a slow boat to Leningrad, from where they proceeded by train to Moscow. When the delegation finally arrived in Moscow on 11 August, the Soviet side discovered that it had no powers to negotiate, only to 'hold talks'. Furthermore, the British delegation was officially instructed to: "Go very slowly with the conversations"; ('Documents on British Foreign Policy;', 3rd Series, Volume 6; London; 1953; Appendix 5; p. 763). http://www22.brinkster.com/harikumar/CommunistLeague/Compass123-Spain1996.htm 4) The US Ambassador to the USSR (Joseph Davies) made clear that these (one of many) filibusters of the imperialists, was exasperating the USSR: On 11 March 1939 Joseph Davies, the former US Ambassador in Moscow, now posted to Brussels, wrote in his diary about Stalin's speech to the 18th Congress of the CPSU a few days before: "It is a most significant statement. It bears the earmarks of a definite warning to the British and French governments that the Soviets are getting tired of 'non-realistic' opposition to the aggressors. . . It certainly is the most significant danger signal that I have yet seen". (J. E. Davies: 'Mission to Moscow'; London; 1942; p. 279-80). http://www22.brinkster.com/harikumar/CommunistLeague/Compass123-Spain1996.htm 5) The Soviet Zhadnov made public the increasing urgency and the continuing dilemma: On 29 June the leading Soviet Marxist-Leninist Andrei Zhdanov published an article in 'Pravda' which, most unusually, revealed that there were differences in the leadership of the CPSU on whether the British and French governments were sincere in saying that they wished for a genuine treaty of mutual assistance: "the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations on the conclusion of an effective pact of mutual assistance against aggression have reached a deadlock. . . . I permit myself to express my personal opinion in this matter, although my friends do not share it. They still think that when beginning the negotiations with the USSR, the English and French Governments had serious intentions of creating a powerful barrier against aggression in Europe. I believe, and shall try to prove it by facts, that the English and French Governments have no wish for a treaty . . . to which a self-respecting State can agree. . The Soviet Government took 16 days in preparing answers to the various English projects and proposals, while the remaining 59 days have been consumed by delays and procrastinations on the part of the English and French. . Not long ago . . . the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Beck, declared unequivocally that Poland neither demanded nor requested from the USSR anything in the sense of granting her any guarantee whatever.....However, this does not prevent England and France from demanding from the USSR guarantees . . . for Poland. . . It seems to me that the English and French desire not a real treaty accepable to the USSR, but only talks about a treaty in order to speculate before the public opinion in their countries on the allegedly unyielding attitude of the USSR, and thus make easier for themselves the road to a deal with the aggressors. The next few days must show whether this is so or not." (A. Zhdanov: Article in 'Pravda', 29 June 1939, in: J. Degras (Ed.): 'Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy'; London; 1953; p. 352, 353, 354). http://www22.brinkster.com/harikumar/CommunistLeague/Compass123-Spain1996.htm (6) Even many bourgeois commentators of note agree with the general interpretation offered above: Take E.H.Carr: "Even such anti-Soviet writers as Edward Carr agree that the Soviet government's decision to sign the non-aggression pact with Germany was an enforced second choice, which was taken only with extreme reluctance: "The most striking feature of the Soviet-German negotiations . . . is the extreme caution with which they were conducted from the Soviet side, and the prolonged Soviet resistance to close the doors on the Western negotiations". (E. H. Carr: 'From Munich to Moscow: II', in: 'Soviet Studies', Volume 1, No. 12 (October 1949); p. 104)." http://www22.brinkster.com/harikumar/AllianceIssues/WBBJVSNaziPact.htm (7) E.H.Carrr's summation was that this pact was crucial in saving the USSR. (I will not even discuss the idiotic statement that Stalin believed that the Germans were not going to invade). Even such virulent anti-Soviet writers as Edward Carr admit that the signing of the German-Soviet non-aggression pact enabled the Soviet Union to put itself in an incomparably stronger defensive position to meet the German invasion: "The Chamberlain government ., as a defender of capitalism, refused . . . to enter into an alliance with the USSR against Germany. . . . In the pact of August 23rd, 1939, they (the Soviet government -- Ed.) secured: a) a breathing space of immunity from attack; b) German assistance in mitigating Japanese pressure in the Far East; c) German agreement to the establishment of an advanced defensive bastion beyond the existing Soviet frontiers in Eastern Europe; it was significant that this bastion was, and could only be, a line of defence against potential German attack, the eventual prospect of which was never far absent from Soviet reckonings. But what most of all was achieved by the pact was the assurance that, if the USSR had eventually to fight Hitler, the Western Powers would already be involved". (E. H. Carr: 'From Munich to Moscow: II', in: 'Soviet Studies', Volume 1, No. 2 (October 1949); p. 103). " http://www22.brinkster.com/harikumar/AllianceIssues/WBBJVSNaziPact.htm Sorry to be so long winded. H
