Most of '83 was spent convincing the Latin governments to unilaterally convert ALL of it to sovereign debt. It was a major turning point in international economic relations and tells us much about how the key actors move in historical situations. Of course, there was no hope of an orderly process for the national governments to fully 'validate' (militarize) such sums given the political situation of most of them at the time (and, turning to your interest in a general theory for such proposals, I think this points to one of several possible outcomes). Sorry not to have ready access to some primary references, although the issue was reported in the media especially the financial press (without due weight IMO). For some amusement read through the explanations of the IMF and the Bank as to why this was fiscally responsible and how this will lead to a quick resumption of growth. Not surprisingly the bankruptcy and 'debtors cartel' options get airbrushed out of the official histories of the period.
Paul
At Fred Moseley wrote:
Hi Paul, Thanks again for your comments. A couple of responses below. > Doesn't the analogy to Latin America remind you of just how > outrageous it was in the early '80s that their massive debt, largely > private or non-sovereign, was nationalized without even a bargaining > process or concessions? What cowardly and selfish leadership; how > disingenuous of the Bretton Woods institutions to help push this along.Are you sure about this? I thought that most of this earlier Latin American debt was governent debt from the beginning. Please explain further. What were the main private sectors whose debt was taken over by the government? Thanks again. Comradely, Fred
