Ian: >>> Nagarjuna was arguably the first philosopher to systematically explore and *break* with the limits of the applicability of the law of non-contradiction and the implications for ontology and epistemology.<<
me: >> so he ... embraces double-think?<<
Ian replies: >He invites us to explore that which is neither irrational nor embraces the law of non-contradiction and the law of the excluded middle. To the extent those issues make contact [with] d-t, via associative psychology, yes he would assert the need to *understand* the multiple meanings of double-think.<
please explain, with an example.
Ian>>> Leibniz flirted with, but recoiled from breaking with the law when he discussed combinatorics and incompossibilities. Hegel, while sticking with Aristotelian logic, admitted the existence of true contradictions. Marx sociologized-economized them, arguably heralding the use of fallacies of composition type arguments while breaking with the methodological individualism ...<<<
me:>> I'd agree with Marx. There aren't any true contradictions in logic
(though they do exist in illogical thinking).<<
Ian replies:>The whole field of paraconsistent logic or dialethic logic takes issue with that *axiom*. Rather than exhaust myself providing you with a monographic style exposition, you are free to choose to click on the following links.<
okay, you don't think that you can explain this "paraconsistent or dialethic logic" here, given time constraints and the like. But is it the pretty much the same as fuzzy logic? If so, all these people are saying is that the purity of Aristotle-style logic does not apply in the complexity of the empirical world. I'd totally agree. There's a clear difference between our efforts to think logically (in Aristotle's sense) and the real world.
In any event, Aristotelian logic isn't real (empirical) as much as _ideal_ (as with math and other abstract forms of reasoning). We _want_ to be logical, even though it's typically impossible to be totally so (not only because of the complexity of the external world but also because of the nature of human brains). Clearly Aristotelian logic must be complemented with other aspects of philosophy and empirical study.
This ideal is important: we should demand logical thinking where possible. Imagine that a Bushwacker spokesclown defends the war on Iraq. I say "that's illogical" so the clown responds that it's "paraconsistent or dialethic logic and you wouldn't understand it." Would I accept that? no, because if the clown wants to convince me, he or she must employ clear thinking.
>There is no sound-bite reply to Marx' assertion other than the assertion of excontradictione quodlibet -- from a contradiction every proposition may be deduced-- is not *necessarily* true.<
I don't understand this. Please explain.
<elllipsis>
>> I'd say that logical thinking is defined by the absence of contradiction. (I'm willing to be convinced otherwise, though. Do you have a clear example of a "true contradiction"?)
>> But there are economic/sociological contradictions -- social-structurally-based conflicts -- in the real world that can only
be abolished only by changing the social structure. (Class contradictions can only be abolished by getting rid of classes -- though they can be
shifted or delayed or covered up.)<<
>These, of course, are all predictions rather than necessarily logically
valid inferences. An irreducibly pluralistic social world with agents capable, at best, of paraconsistent reasoning and deliberation and coordination strategies may incessantly shift from one "bundle" of social contradictions to another. Seems utopian in the extreme to think of a world totally devoid of conflicts of interests or, if conflicts exist, only being of an innocuous sort. The idea of socialism *as a social system free of contradictions and conflict* does not seem likely to me in the least. No, that does not mean I'm a fatalist or a quietist by any means at all.<
You may have noticed that my discussion of Marx's idea of real-world contradictions was at a very high level of abstraction (in order to contrast logical contradictions with societal ones). Bringing in "irreducibly pluralistic social world with agents capable, at best, of paraconsistent reasoning and deliberation and coordination strategies" (as the pluralist sociologists such as Lipset did during the 1950s) shifts the discussion to a much lower level of abstraction. That's okay, since the all-important empirical world is clearly at a lower level of abstraction, but it may result in missing the point or avoiding the question, i.e., the nature of contradiction in Marx's theory.
In my missive I explicitly rejected the idea that contradictions and conflicts will go away with (democratic) socialism. Rather, the vertical "antagonistic" contradictions will give way to the horizontal "non-antagonistic" contradiction (that liberal thinking sees as the only kind), i.e., the public goods problem and similar general interest vs. special interest conflicts. (In some ways, the successful rise of socialism is a realization of the liberal vision of society, something that can't be done in a class-ridden society such as capitalism.)
me>> The fallacy of composition refers to the micro vs. macro problem:
while if one person stands up to get a better view at a football game he or she will get a better view, if everyone at the game stands up to get a better view, the average person doesn't get one and in fact may lose due to the fatigue resulting from standing. There's a coordination problem: people need to figure out how to get everyone to sit down.<<
Ian: >I know what the fallacies of composition-compossibility are.<
I only brought it up in order to contrast it with a contradiction of the sort that Marx pointed to (the next paragraph). More importantly, I always write e-mails on pen-l not only for the person I'm dialoguing with but also for the people who read them who might be interested. I also explain things to myself, to clarify my own thinking. (In my head, I'm writing a textbook, though it will probably never be realized.)
>>On the other hand, more of a Marx-style contradiction would occur if
there weren't enough seats in the stadium for all the people, so that
there's an inherent conflict over the distribution of seats that can't be solved via "why can't we just get along?" (i.e., figuring out how to coordinate). The only way to solve it is to change the structure. In this case, it would involve either adding seats or getting rid of people.<<
>Ecologically, I see a possible parable of the heap problem here.......<
yup.
Jim
