re-posted from ISML list _______________________________________ > THE STRATFOR WEEKLY > 03 April 2003 > > by Dr. George Friedman > > Baghdad > > Summary > > >From the beginning of the war-planning process, Baghdad posed the > greatest challenge. The United States does not want to fight an > urban battle, but the conquest of Iraq cannot be complete without > the fall of Baghdad. The initial U.S. action -- trying to kill > Saddam Hussein -- was designed to trigger a political > capitulation that would make a battle for Baghdad unnecessary; it > didn't. Iraqi resistance may collapse simply out from attacks and > internal weakness. But if this doesn't happen, three war-fighting > models will be available. One is the fall of Paris in 1944 -- the > favored U.S. strategy. The second is the siege of Budapest in > 1944-45 -- six weeks of encirclement and bombardment, with > civilian casualties. The third is the fall of Berlin in 1945, > with the attackers losing almost 80,000 men in three days. Berlin > is out of the question. Paris is the model the United States > wants, but the danger is that it will slip into a Budapest mode. > > Analysis > > Any discussion of the war in Iraq has always turned on the > conquest of Baghdad. The capital city is the heart of Iraq. It is > the country's political, administrative and structural center. > The fall of Baghdad does not necessarily mean that all resistance > will immediately end in the rest of Iraq. However, without the > fall of Baghdad, this war cannot end. The fall of Baghdad has > always been the central challenge facing U.S. war planners. > > Baghdad is a world-class city in terms of size and population, > with more than 5 million people. The U.S. Army has never taken a > city of this size in the face of significant opposition. Few > armies have done so. In direct assault, capturing a large city > against resistance tends to cause large casualties among the > attacking forces. In 1945, the Red Army had Berlin completely > surrounded; it had complete air superiority and massed artillery. > The city was held by the defeated remnants of the German army, > including large contingents of young boys and old men poorly > armed and ill-trained. The Soviets were battle-hardened veterans. > Moreover, the Soviets had no compunctions about nor political > liabilities attached to causing massive casualties among the > civilian population. They controlled the pattern and tempo of the > offensive. Nevertheless, in the direct assault on Berlin, the > experienced Soviet forces suffered nearly 80,000 dead and close > to a quarter-million wounded in about three days of fighting. > > There are other strategies for subduing large cities. In 1944-45, > the Red Army surrounded Budapest for six weeks, pounding it with > artillery fire and aerial bombardment, before entering the city. > By the time Soviet forces entered the heart of the city, > resistance had collapsed. The siege took weeks and cost countless > civilian lives, but Soviet losses were relatively light, compared > to other battles fought. > > Other battles for cities ended poorly for the attacker: The > Germans failed to take either Leningrad or Stalingrad after > investing heavily in both battles. The point is that urban > warfare is one of the most difficult exercises in warfare, and > most armies avoid direct assaults on cities, since these are > risky operations and almost invariably carry high casualty rates. > This is particularly true in large cities. Moreover, in a war in > which civilian casualties represent a significant political > consideration, an assault on a city is generally to be avoided. > > The United States did take one world-class city in its history: > Paris in 1944. It took the city with very light casualties to > either its forces or to the civilian population, despite the fact > that German troops had garrisoned the city. The key was > political, not military. The German high command had ordered that > troops resist and that they carry out a scorched-earth policy, in > which defeat would mean the catastrophic destruction of the city. > The local German commanders neither resisted nor carried out the > order. Rather, they capitulated. The United States was able to > occupy the city without assaulting it. Indeed, if an assault had > been necessary, Eisenhower would have insisted on bypassing > Paris. He was not about to engage in high-intensity conflict in a > city the size of Paris. > > Paris was as much about politics as about warfare. The German > commanders in Paris command were disaffected with the German > political leadership. They were certain that the war was lost. > Neither the commanders nor the troops were eager to die for a > hopeless cause, and the commanders were aware that not only would > the Allies hold them accountable for the destruction of Paris, > but that a peaceful capitulation of Paris would put them in an > excellent position in a postwar world dominated by the United > States and its allies. The negotiations that occurred took place > not between the Allied high command and the German commanders, > but between resistance leaders in Paris and the garrison > commander. However, the key decision was made autonomously by the > local German command: Officers calculated their own interests and > decided not to resist. The negotiations were more about the > script of surrender than the surrender itself. > > Gen. Tommy Franks is no more eager to go into Baghdad than > Eisenhower was to go into Paris in 1944. Like Eisenhower, he does > not want to put his forces into a potential urban meat-grinder. > Like Eisenhower, he is under heavy political pressure to solve > the problem without massive civilian casualties or the > destruction of the city. Like Eisenhower, he has no appealing > choices: Direct combat, starving the city to surrender, unlimited > bombardment or a combination of the three are all unacceptable > options. > > For the United States, the ideal solution in Baghdad would be for > Iraqi troops to choose not to resist. Thus far, Iraqi forces have > demonstrated minimal competence. They have not been completely > incompetent, as some had forecast, nor have they been highly > competent. They have executed no effective counterattacks by > cutting supply lines or isolating U.S. forces. They have not once > taken the strategic or operational initiative away from the > coalition. What they have done is demonstrated that, under > certain circumstances, some units -- particularly in urban > settings -- will hold their positions and return fire. In urban > warfare, this minimal competence is sufficient to pose serious > challenges to taking and pacifying a city like Baghdad. > > This is why the United States has been obsessed from the > beginning with reaching a political solution. For Washington, > avoiding resistance in Baghdad has always been a primary > consideration. The decapitation strike against Saddam Hussein on > the first night of the war was intended to trigger a political > evolution in which the Iraqis would choose not to fight anywhere, > but in particular would choose not to fight in Baghdad. The > attempt failed but was certainly worth making, given what is now > at stake. > > The United States is facing the very real possibility that there > will be resistance in Baghdad. Given that the troops in Baghdad - > - the Special Republican Guard -- are reputed to be highly > motivated and that they are being joined by other army and > Republican Guard units, a direct assault on Baghdad would appear > to violate just about every requirement in the U.S. war goals: > > 1. It could result in heavy coalition casualties. > > 2. It could result in massive civilian casualties. > > 3. It could result in massive damage to Baghdad's infrastructure, > up to and including rendering the city uninhabitable for a period > of time. > > None of these are acceptable outcomes, given what appear to be > the parameters that have been laid down for the war. > > For the United States, therefore, the Paris solution remains the > most attractive option -- if it is available. The problem is that > Paris was hundreds of miles from Berlin, and the local commanders > were not collocated with the political leadership. Baghdad is > more like Berlin than Paris: The ability of regional commanders > to decide not to fight is limited by the power of the political > personalities that are located only a few miles away from them. > The simple geography of power makes the Paris option difficult to > execute, even if Iraqi commanders wanted to try it. > > If there is any hope of the Paris strategy working, it is > essential that the direct commanders of Iraqi divisions and > brigades -- and their troops -- conclude that defeat is certain. > So long as they retain anywhere in their minds the idea that the > United States will, in the end, negotiate a cease-fire with the > existing regime, no Paris solution is conceivable. Every > commander will know that holding back would mean his own death. > The commanders must believe that their choice is between certain > defeat and death, and managed defeat and life. > > It becomes even more difficult: It is essential that the > commanders reach this conclusion by themselves, without an > internal conspiracy or communications with the coalition. > Hussein's counterintelligence and security apparatus appears to > be functioning extremely well. Any commander will have to assume > that all conspiracies will be penetrated. In Paris, what little > negotiation that occurred went on with the local resistance. More > important, some Gestapo officials in Paris had reached the same > conclusion as the military commanders and also were trying to > find exit strategies. With the security apparatus in the hands of > Hussein's son, however, that is unlikely to happen in Baghdad. > > The possibility that the Iraqi president is dead appears to be > irrelevant. If he is alive, he remains a dangerous figure to > those around him. If he is dead, his son has taken over and is in > effective control. Therefore, in order for capitulation without > resistance to occur, it is essential that the security apparatus > be dismantled. That is obviously being tried, with the air > assault focusing on this apparatus -- but as we have learned, the > Iraqi infrastructure is more robust and resilient than it was in > 1991. > > At this moment, there is no reason to believe that there will be > no resistance in Baghdad. Undoubtedly, CENCTOM and the CIA are > working intensely to cripple the security apparatus and to > provide military commanders enough room to maneuver so that they > might save themselves. But it is not clear that this will work -- > and it is not clear that if it does work, the field commanders > would opt for a Paris solution. > > One of the factors on the U.S. side is time. From a military > standpoint -- and really from a political standpoint as well now > -- the United States is not under heavy pressure to end the > conflict quickly. The coalition has time to bring up forces, > continue to attack Baghdad's infrastructure and to create the > sense of doom and inevitability that was the foundation of the > capitulation of Paris. Whatever the mood is in Baghdad now, it > will evolve. > > However, the United States must be careful not to slip from a > Paris strategy to a Budapest strategy. Siege and bombardment > achieved a Soviet victory, but it was in an environment in which > the political consequences of massive civilian casualties and > massive infrastructure damage were not a consideration. If U.S. > commanders slide into a Budapest strategy, they will, at the very > least, have to accept a humanitarian disaster. A Budapest > strategy is a slippery slope that could even slide into the > ultimate unacceptable outcome: a Berlin strategy. > > Now, it is possible that the Iraqis are so delicately balanced > that a sudden attack by airborne, airmobile and armored groups -- > coupled with actions by covert forces already in Baghdad -- will > bring the regime and the military crashing down. However, unless > there is some unique intelligence in Washington pointing to > underlying weakness in Baghdad, a "Hail Mary" pass designed to > bring the war to a rapid conclusion is something for which > CENTCOM at least has no real appetite. It could result in the > airborne forces being chewed up along with now-revealed covert > forces, while armor is blocked. The risk would be worth it if > time were not on the coalition's side, but since it is, there is > no need. > > Therefore, although coalition forces are certainly on the > doorstep of Baghdad, it is a pretty high step. At the very least, > the coalition will want to lay the groundwork for any offensive > into Baghdad. In fact, the last thing that the coalition wants is > such an offensive: One look at the British forces in Basra will > reveal coalition feelings about urban fighting, even in a much > smaller city. > > The United States therefore has a difficult problem. In order to > create a sense of inevitable doom, it must convince elements in > Baghdad that the coalition is prepared to go to any lengths to > secure victory. At the very least, it must completely surround > and cut Baghdad off from the world. On the other hand, it cannot > impose a Budapest-type blockade and choke off the city. It is not > clear how the United States will balance between appearing to be > utterly ferocious without creating a humanitarian crisis. And > without that humanitarian crisis, it is not clear how it will > convince Iraqi field commanders that managed capitulation will > not be signing their own death warrants. > > The United States badly wants Paris and not Berlin to be the > model in Baghdad's fall. The military might have a way to assault > and subdue Baghdad that does not pose the risk of bogging down in > urban warfare and does not require the political cooperation of > Iraqi commanders. Several ways are possible, but all assume that > the appetite within the Iraqi army for resistance is minimal -- > and that is simply no longer an assumption on which an operation > can be based. > > We therefore expect prudence and caution from the coalition > around Baghdad. The rush to Baghdad was well-executed and > involved well-calculated and carefully thought out risks. The war > to date has been an interesting combination of audacity and > prudence, with Franks picking the time for each. In Baghdad, the > same combination will be needed. Franks needs to know whether and > how intensely the Iraqis will resist and he, as a prudent > general, must begin by working from the worst-case scenario: > intense resistance. > > U.S. forces will probe the edges of Baghdad, trying to get a > sense of Iraqi intentions and capabilities. If weakness is > discovered, U.S. forces will advance -- never irrevocably, never > taking the chance of being trapped inside a hostile urban > environment. If resistance appears too vigorous, Franks has time > to execute at least a modified Budapest maneuver, surrounding the > city and pressuring it. The crisis will come when the city is > balanced between humanitarian disaster and the option of massive > bombardment. The Russians chose bombardment of Budapest from the > beginning. Carrying out an assault on a major city -- constrained > by rules requiring that massive civilian casualties be avoided -- > will be an enormous challenge to Franks. > > >From his point of view, Paris is a much better place to be than > Budapest.
