At 6:24 PM -0700 8/13/03, michael wrote:
Doug Henwood wrote:
 > michael wrote:
 > >Business Week describes GM becoming almost entirely dependent on its
>finance unit. I recall seeing something similar about Ford.

 A few years ago, Ford was making money on its finance division and
 breaking even on cars. But the finance division was almost
 exclusively devoted to financing the purchase of Ford vehicles. So,
 they were capturing a business formerly engaged in by bankers, and
 their finance business was dependent on what they manufactured (which
 undermines the usual postindustrial story).

> Doug

Can you point me to the source, please.  I remember you mentioning
this before.  Was it in LBO?

***** The New York Times December 15, 1996, Sunday, Late Edition - Final SECTION: Section 3; Page 1; Column 3; Money and Business/Financial Desk LENGTH: 2908 words HEADLINE: Will Ford Become The New Repo Man?; Financial Powerhouse Takes Aim at Bad Credit Risks BYLINE: By ROBYN MEREDITH DATELINE: DEARBORN, Mich.

BODY: HENRY FORD famously insisted that buyers could have any color
of car they wanted, as long as it was black. But he was just as
reluctant to offer them credit. Only in 1923, two decades after he
began selling cars, did he begin to experiment, cautiously, with
financing.

Ford customers could buy a $265 Model T on layaway, paying $5 a week
for a year. Only then were they allowed to drive the shiny black car
home. (Not until four years later did Mr. Ford give in to demands for
more colors.)

Ford long ago overcame its founder's misgivings about making loans.
With Americans now financing four-fifths of all new cars, the Ford
Motor Company has earned more as a banker than as a car builder in
five of the last six years. Its banking businesses had higher profits
last year than all but two of the nation's commercial banks.

And while Ford's automotive divisions are struggling to hold up
against stiff competition worldwide, a subsidiary, the Ford Motor
Credit Company, has become the biggest auto financing company in the
world. In the third quarter, Ford Credit earned $299 million,
compared with a paltry $15 million for the company's worldwide
automotive operations.

Now Ford Credit has an ambitious plan to extend its lending reach
into an area that would have baffled Henry Ford: borrowers with
proven records of not paying back their loans on time, a group
collectively known as the subprime lending market.

The lure is the $100 billion that people with flawed credit ratings
borrow each year to buy new and used cars, and the interest rates of
18 percent and higher that Ford will be able to charge on loans to
its share of that market. That is the equivalent of paying for a car
at credit-card rates.

Ford Credit's new business is risky on two counts. First, whether a
company makes money depends on which loan applicants it decides to
trust, and how far it trusts them before sending out the repo man to
seize the collateral. Secondly, Ford's image could be damaged if the
company is seen as profiting at the expense of the poor.

Consumer advocates already say a Ford consumer lending unit, the
Associates, charges unfairly steep interest rates and fees. That
unit's target market is similar to that of the new subprime
auto-finance operation, named Fairlane Credit after Henry Ford's
gracious Fair Lane estate here.

"Ford Motor Credit doesn't want to be seen charging 40 percent
interest rates or repossessing cars," said Jordan Hymowitz, an auto
services analyst at Montgomery Securities in San Francisco. "It is a
potential public relations problem if the rates get too egregious."

But at a time when profits are down and default rates are up at Ford
Credit, the cornerstone of Ford's financial businesses, its
executives say they have studied the companies in the subprime
lending market, are proceeding cautiously and are confident they can
make good money.

Ford is also planning to move slowly to build its new business. "We
aren't going to make any big, bad boo-boos" with Fairlane, William E.
Odom, the chairman of Ford Credit, said.

But he said he expected Fairlane's returns to be more volatile than
its parent's. Fairlane must be tough enough to compete with the
dozens of scrappy, small companies that dominate subprime auto
lending. But Fairlane will be walking a tightrope, particularly on
the repossessions that come after people stop making car payments.

"If we pull the trigger too quickly on a repo, the customer is going
to be upset with us and with the Ford Motor Company," Jerry
Heimlicher, president of Fairlane, said.

Mr. Heimlicher said that Fairlane had not decided what interest rates
it would charge, but that he expected them to be in a range of 18 to
22 percent, and perhaps higher. While other subprime lenders charge
rates of 18 to 40 percent, where state laws permit, Mr. Heimlicher
said Fairlane's rates "will never get into the range of 40 percent."

He added, "We are going to charge the fairest rates that we can
charge, and still make a fair rate of profit."

Fairlane is planning to hold the line on rates because it hopes to
build loyalty to Ford vehicles. One reason Ford Credit chose the name
Fairlane is that executives want customers to think of it as "fair."

Mr. Odom said consumer groups should not fear that Fairlane will
treat poor customers unfairly. "It is not inconsistent to go into the
nonprime business and run the business on the high road," he said.

When deciding whether to approve loan applications, lenders look at
two factors: borrowers' income, and their record of repaying other
loans. They often charge higher interest rates to people they
consider less likely to pay them back. FORD CREDIT now lends
primarily to the most creditworthy borrowers, what the industry rates
as A or B credit risks, though it makes some loans to people with
very poor credit. As Fairlane starts up, Ford Credit will begin
referring the loan applicants it rejects to Fairlane, to see if they
qualify under its underwriting standards for higher-interest loans.

Ford Credit assigns A ratings to people who earn enough to meet their
bills without strain and have almost never paid a bill late, Mr. Odom
said. Borrowers with B credit have occasionally missed payments but
later paid up, and lack financial reserves to cover emergencies;
people with C credit are highly indebted and often late with bills,
but always pay up eventually.

Borrowers with D credit typically have declared bankruptcy and have
had property repossessed. They end up paying lots of late charges
because they never pay on time. "They try to juggle, but they drop
the ball when they juggle," Mr. Odom said. "The C can juggle pretty
well."

Fairlane will focus on the lower end of the scale. "Fairlane will
pick up where Ford Credit leaves off," Mr. Heimlicher said. "We would
be going into the C and D and what would be an E, if there were an E."

Customers will feel the difference when they apply for a loan. While
Ford Credit uses sophisticated computer models to approve loans
within an hour, Fairlane may take days to check the assertions made
on loan applications.

The more thorough process is intended to sort out people who have bad
credit but will repay their loans from those who are unlikely to make
payments. Fairlane's customers are likely to have bad credit because
of a one-time crisis like a layoff or a divorce, Mr. Heimlicher said.

"Our main process is to determine the why -- why did the customer
have the difficulty," he said. "These are not bums -- these are not
always people who are going to have bad luck."

Once Fairlane approves a loan, it plans to keep in close contact with
anyone who misses a payment. Mr. Heimlicher calls it "coaching": When
borrowers fall behind, the company will not simply mail overdue
notices but will call the debtors, weigh whether there are legitimate
reasons for the late payments, and then try to coax them into
promising, for example, to pay when the next paycheck arrives.

While most subprime lenders focus on used cars, Fairlane plans to
lend 20 percent of its money toward new cars, particularly to
first-time buyers like students who have had trouble paying off
credit cards or college loans.

Fairlane, based in Colorado Springs, is still hiring managers. Ford's
goal is for it to begin making loans in Colorado and nearby states by
the end of March. Expansion is planned for later.

Ford intends to tiptoe into the new lending market. "I'm not looking
for a home run in 1997," Mr. Odom said. "I'm looking for a solid
organization at the turn of the century."

But executives at other subprime auto lenders say it isn't easy to
make money. "Our job is to differentiate between bad things happening
to good people, and just bad people," said Tommy A. Moore, chief
executive of First Investors Financial Services Inc., a Houston-based
company that writes subprime auto loans in 17 states. His company
approves only one of every five applications.

Mr. Moore and other experts on subprime lending said that being
choosy in approving loans was only part of the job. Even tougher,
they said, is counseling people who are struggling to pay bills while
still moving to repossess cars as soon as it is clear that a borrower
will not be able to repay.

But subprime auto lending is a tough business. Since 1990, 24
auto-finance companies have sold stock to the public, according to
SNL Securities of Charlottesville, Va. Since their initial offerings,
shares of 11 of the companies have dropped by 15 percent or more.

Unless Fairlane fails, it is likely to dwarf its competitors within a
few years, if it follows the lead of another new Ford Credit
subsidiary, Primus Automotive Financial Services.

Ford Credit lends only to Ford customers and dealers, but Primus was
set up to lend money at rival dealerships. Just six years old, Primus
has $11.5 billion in assets. Though it is a relatively small piece of
Ford Credit's business, Primus, if freestanding, would be the
nation's 12th-largest finance company.

Fairlane won't get that big in its first five years but "it will have
some recognizable-sized profits in three, four or five years," Mr.
Odom said.

Analysts say that to make money, Ford will have to show some
ruthlessness in repossessing cars. "This is a business where you
measure your ability to collect your collateral in days or hours,"
said Maryann N. Keller, an auto analyst at Furman Selz, a New York
investment banking and brokerage firm.

Otherwise, another creditor could seize the car, or the borrower
could drive out of town with no forwarding address.

Yet the danger of ruthlessness is that it could attract the attention
of consumer groups, some of which are already unhappy with the
lending practices of the Associates, the Ford unit that makes
home-equity and personal loans.

Ford Motor "owns some finance companies that target poor people with
less than healthy loans," said Remar M. Sutton, president of the
Consumer Task Force for Automotive Issues, a nonprofit group that
works with consumer groups and state attorneys general on auto fraud
investigations.

The auto lending practices of Ford Credit and its main rivals, the
finance arms of the Chrysler and General Motors corporations, are
already under Federal scrutiny. Last year the Justice Department
began investigating whether the companies discriminated against
minority groups. "There is an investigation and I can't make any
comments about it," Mr. Odom said.

Fairlane Credit will be relying heavily on the ethics of used-car
dealers -- many of whom stand to profit from the loans -- to make
sure its customers are treated fairly.

The unscrupulous practices of some dealerships have led to trouble
for people borrowing from other auto finance companies. "It is the
people who don't have access to credit who are most at the mercy of
these people: new- and used-car dealers," said Richard N. Feferman, a
lawyer in Albuquerque, N.M., who specializes in consumer fraud issues.

WALL STREET, of course, cares about profits as well as lending
practices. And profits of the Associates have been growing steadily.
Like Ford Credit, it has watched its bad loans increase, to 2.16
percent of all loans in the third quarter, but it is growing so
quickly that its profits have also increased, to $230 million in the
third quarter, up 17 percent from a year earlier.

Analysts, however, are divided over whether Ford Credit itself, after
years as the crown jewel of the world's second-largest industrial
company, could be facing difficulties. The number of loans going bad
has nearly doubled, and in the third quarter Ford Credit's usually
stable profits fell 16.2 percent from a year earlier, to $299 million.

Most analysts say that in the long run, Ford Credit will dust itself
off and continue to contribute mightily to the parent's bottom line.
"I have no doubt about Ford Credit," Ms. Keller said. "With some
bumps in the road, they will still do just fine."

But other analysts are more concerned. "There is a big question
hanging over Ford Motor Credit right now," said Jack V. Kirnan, an
analyst at Salomon Brothers. "It is certainly disconcerting to see
the significant drop we saw in third-quarter net income."

Ford Credit's main competitors -- the finance subsidiaries of General
Motors and Chrysler -- have been going gangbusters. The Chrysler
Financial Corporation, which has $16.7 billion in assets, has set
quarterly earnings records this year. In the third quarter, it earned
$94 million. The General Motors Acceptance Corporation, which has
$106.5 billion in assets, has set profit records for the last nine
quarters, earning $307 million in the third quarter.

Counting overseas operations, Ford Credit has assets of $119 billion.

While Chrysler Financial and GMAC also make a small proportion of
loans to car buyers with spotty credit, they have avoided getting
into the business in a big way. "There is no free lunch," said James
P. Holden, the Chrysler Corporation's executive vice president for
sales and marketing. "Subprime paper is subprime for a reason."

Ford has decided to make the bet. While its banking businesses have
not always been successful, no one is suggesting that Ford Credit
will become a billion-dollar sinkhole like the First Nationwide
Financial Corporation, a savings and loan institution that Ford sold
in 1994 after nine years of ownership.

Ford's nearly bulletproof balance sheet allows it to borrow money at
lower interest rates than many of its rivals can obtain, giving it
more room to trim the rates it charges on car loans while staying
profitable. Just last month, Standard & Poor's reaffirmed its A+
rating on Ford Credit's senior debt, the best debt rating by a wide
margin among the auto financing arms of the Big Three auto makers.

The level of Ford Credit's profits is important because the unit is
the mainstay of Ford's earnings. Last year, $2.1 billion of Ford's
$4.1 billion in profit came from the banking side of the business,
and Ford Credit earned $1.4 billion of that. Most of the rest came
from the Associates.

Ford Credit's earnings have been down mostly because of rising losses
from unpaid loans. In addition to a $58 million drop in third-quarter
profits from a year earlier, profits in the second quarter fell $9
million short of the previous year's level. First-quarter profits
were just $5 million ahead of last year's pace.

Other lenders have been stepping up their efforts to woo borrowers
buying cars. Commercial banks have increasingly been willing to offer
competitive rates on auto loans as a way to develop financial
relationships with affluent borrowers, the customers the banks prefer.

"Those buyers are pretty well-heeled," Mr. Holden of Chrysler said.
"They may need other financial services."

Ford officials dismiss these worries, arguing that the banks'
interest will be fleeting. Mr. Odom said profits had temporarily
slipped because of fierce competition from commercial banks, as five
years of economic growth have helped banks to rebuild their balance
sheets and begin lending aggressively again. Ford Credit's profits
had also dropped during previous economic booms, he said, only to
recover quickly.

BY any measure, Ford Credit customers are having a harder time paying
back loans these days. Credit losses nearly doubled in the third
quarter, said David N. McCammon, the Ford Motor Company's vice
president for finance, at a mid-October briefing. He said losses
might rise, but not to the level reached in 1989 at the peak of the
last economic boom.

Ford's loan losses are usually worst when commercial banks are at
their best, he said. Many other lenders are facing rising default
rates as consumers pile on debt.

Ford Credit's loan losses jumped in the third quarter to 0.89
percent, from 0.48 percent a year earlier. Mr. Odom said the higher
losses provided "a loud wake-up call, if you didn't already get it,
but of course we already got it."

He said he had been scrutinizing credit losses since August 1995, and
"I'm pretty well satisfied that the increases have flattened out."

Ford Credit executives rely on the company to contribute more than
profits to the parent. Edsel B. Ford 2d, president of Ford Credit and
the great-grandson of Henry Ford, said in a statement this month,
"The potential to cement the relationship between Ford Credit and the
customer is tremendous during the two to five years of financing
repayment."

Still, competitors in the subprime auto-lending business said Ford
was entering the risky market in a difficult period. At a time of
record bankruptcy filings and high levels of credit card debt, "there
is a lot of money being thrown at the consumer," said Mr. Moore of
First Investors Financial Services. "From that standpoint, I guess
they are picking a bad time."

Ford officials beg to differ. "Actually, it is an opportunity," said
Mr. Heimlicher, the president of Fairlane Credit. "These are the
times when people need help -- this is the right time to be stepping
in."

Mr. Odom agrees. "It is a perfect time to start, while everybody else
might be getting nervous," he said.

William H. Ryan, a senior specialty finance analyst at Smith Barney,
said Ford's high credit rating and correspondingly low cost of
borrowing would give it an advantage. But he cautioned that just as
some Ford car designs flop, many subprime auto finance companies fail.

Fairlane Credit, he said, "could turn out to be an Edsel."

GRAPHIC: Photos: In 1923, Ford's easy-payment plan required $5 weekly
payments, in advance of purchase. Financing the lease and purchase of
cars is a lucrative business for Ford. The risks and rewards could
rise as a new unit singles out borrowers with bad credit. (pg. 1)

Charts/Graphs: "An Auto Maker and a Banker" shows percentage change
in stock prices of Ford and G.M. indexed against the S.&P. 500 from
1991 to 1996, financial indicators for Ford and net income of Ford
from 1993 to 1996.

The Financial Services Group

Ford Motor Company had total revenue of $34 billion and net income of
$686 million in the third quarter of this year. Nearly all of its
profit, or $671 million, came from the financial services group.
Here's a look at that group's components and how they did in the
latest period.

Ford Motor Credit Company Net income $299 million
The unit, with 14,800 employees and about $100 billion in total
assets, is primarily an auto lender and leasing company serving both
consumers and dealers. It has three significant subsidiaries:

Primus Automotive Financial Services Inc., with $11.5 billion in
assets, finances autos at non-Ford dealerships.

The American Road Insurance Company, with $1.2 billion in assets,
offers auto insurance to drivers and dealerships.

Fairlane Credit, scheduled to start next year, will lend at
above-market rates to people who are considered high credit risks.

The Associates Corporation of North America Net income $186 million
It is the second-biggest independent finance company in the United
States, and is owned 80.7 percent by Ford. The remainder is publicly
held. (Ford booked $186 million of the Associates' total $230 million
in net income.) The company offers a wide range of consumer products
-- home equity lines, credit cards and personal loans -- as well as
commercial finance and insurance services.

USL Capital Net income $117 million
Ford has been selling off this diversified commercial finance
business piecemeal all year. Ford sold the last piece in the third
quarter, resulting in a one-time gain of $76 million that brought the
unit's net income to $117 million.

Hertz Net income $74 million
The nation's biggest rental car company. (Although Ford owns the
nonvoting preferred stock in Budget Rent A Car, it has reportedly run
into antitrust problems in its bid to acquire all of Budget, which
has not contributed in some time to Ford's profits.)

International businesses Net income $61 million
Includes auto lending in Europe, Taiwan, Brazil and Argentina,
managed by Ford Credit, with $19 billion in assets.

Interest payments and losses Net income -$66 million
Mostly from debt payments related to its stake in The Associates and
from other, smaller businesses within the Financial Services Group.
(Sources: Bloomberg Financial Markets; Datastream; Ford Motor Company)(pg. 15)

"The Wheels of Finance" shows third quarter profits for Ford's
automotive operations and its financial services and credit losses at
Ford Credit from 1994 to 1996. (Sources: Ford Motor Company, Ford
Credit)(pg. 1)   *****

*****   The New York Times
January 6, 2002, Sunday, Late Edition - Final
SECTION: Section 3; Page 1; Column 2; Money and Business/Financial Desk
LENGTH: 2023 words
HEADLINE: All That Easy Credit Haunts Detroit Now
BYLINE:  By DANNY HAKIM
DATELINE: DETROIT

BODY: WHEN the North American International Auto Show, the Cannes
Film Festival of the auto industry, opens here today, the Ford Motor
Company will put on a display of its new vehicles. The company hopes
to make its mark with a redesigned version of its Expedition S.U.V.
and a station wagon from its Volvo unit that looks like it wants to
be an S.U.V.

But the big news will come at the end of the week, after the show
ends. That is when Ford is expected to announce a plan to return to
profitability by reversing the company's declining quality, cutting
costs and perhaps closing plants to ease overcapacity.

This year, even during a week when product has always been king,
financial matters are front and center. Concerns are growing on Wall
Street about the health of the multibillion-dollar credit operations
of Ford and, to a lesser extent, General Motors.

In 2001, total auto sales stayed at a near-record level, especially
after Sept. 11, largely because G.M. and Ford leaned heavily on their
financing businesses to pump up sales. But that burst of
interest-free financing deals was just the latest in a string of deal
making that led to swelled portfolios of leases and car loans taken
on by Ford Motor Credit and the General Motors Acceptance
Corporation, known as G.M.A.C., in the last five years.

Unlike their foreign rivals, which have developed stables of models
that buyers actually will pay more for, Ford and G.M. have relied
more on incentives like low-interest loans and cheap leases to
attract customers. The automakers have ponied up billions of dollars
to their financing units to make up the difference on the
below-market financing.

In good times, their credit businesses provided either a large part
of their earnings or covered operating losses in the automaking
business.

Now, with the economy slowing and unemployment rising, the question
is whether the credit business will aggravate the effects of the
recession instead of cushioning carmakers' bottom lines.

"More of these loans have been going bad, which is why Ford ran into
trouble," said Stephen Girsky, an analyst at Morgan Stanley.

"The fact that G.M.A.C.'s loan losses are lower than Ford's, and the
fact that their reserve ratios are higher, suggest they have more
cushion," he added. "Does that mean it's not going to go bad at
G.M.A.C.? No. I think G.M.A.C.'s earnings are going to go down this
year. But I don't think it will be as bad as Ford."

Consider Ford Motor Credit. In the first nine months of 2001, it made
nearly $1.2 billion, while Ford as a whole lost about $385 million.

G.M.A.C. is expected to have $1.2 billion in earnings in the first
nine months of this year, down slightly from $1.3 billion in the
first nine months of last year. That means G.M.A.C. is accounting for
almost all of G.M.'s operating profits.

Many analysts worry about the potential for even more write-offs as
the rate of bankruptcies rises during the recession, leading to more
defaults, and as the value of vehicles coming off leases falls
because the demand for used cars has flagged.

In the third quarter of last year, Ford Motor Credit's loan losses
rose to 1.36 percent of its total loans and leases, up from 0.87
percent in the year-earlier quarter. G.M.A.C.'s loan losses were 0.69
percent in the third quarter, up from 0.6 percent. Both companies
have recently bolstered their reserves for future losses, indicating
that loan loss rates are continuing to rise.

On one level, the nation's two independent automakers are moving in
opposite directions. Ford, previously Wall Street's consensus pick
among the Big Three, is coming off a dreadful year that brought more
disputes with Firestone and the ouster of its chief executive. The
company is expected to report its first annual loss since 1992.

General Motors, whose market share has fallen to less than 30 percent
today from 60 percent in 1960, actually gained a sliver of share last
year, for the first time since 1988. Its share rose to 28.3 percent,
a 0.03 percent increase over 2000, and G.M. will be the only one of
the Big Three to record an annual profit.

BUT both G.M. and Ford continue to have problems competing with
imports without resorting to heavy subsidies. Banks, in turn, have
been fleeing the auto financing business because it is hard to
compete with subsidized rates. As a result, Ford Motor Credit
financed more than half of the vehicles Ford Motor sold last year,
according to the company, up from 37.6 percent in 1996. G.M.A.C.
financed more than 40 percent of G.M. sales, up from about 25 percent
in 1995.

At G.M.A.C., 85 percent of loans made in 2000 had some subsidy. That
compares with about 50 percent in 1996, according to a Morgan Stanley
report.

While offering credit to more people has been shown to improve
customer loyalty and increase opportunities for marketing to a
captive audience, Wall Street analysts debate the extent of risk now
inherent in the financing businesses.

Ford's and G.M.'s credit ratings were downgraded two notches last
year by Standard & Poor's and Moody's, largely forcing the automakers
out of commercial paper and into other, more expensive forms of
funding, like turning pools of auto loans into securities. Credit
spreads between their borrowing rates and their lending rates have
narrowed greatly, further compressing how much they make by financing
car purchases.

"They have been a drain this time around," Mr. Girsky said, referring
to the credit businesses.

Both Ford and G.M. must set aside capital to shore up the balance
sheets of the credit businesses as they make more loans. At the end
of 2000, for example, G.M. contributed almost $2.5 billion of its
capital to G.M.A.C.'s balance sheet.

"Ford Credit will probably need capital" soon, Mr. Girsky said.

"If you're growing your business, it's one thing to put capital in a
company and get a return," he added. "If you're not growing, it's a
different story."

Ford and G.M. both acknowledge the diminishing returns of their
credit businesses in the contracting economy, but they say that no
surprise write-offs are in store.

"Leasing has been a negative for us; I'm not trying to paint it as
any kind of positive story," said Bill Muir, the chief financial
officer of G.M.A.C. He quickly added that "we have adequately
accounted for it and aren't facing any kind of a blowup over it."

Car loans are not the only problem. Leases have become less profitable, too.

Automakers like G.M. give themselves a cushion when valuing leased
vehicles. In 1998, Mr. Muir said, G.M.A.C. could take a car returned
at the end of a lease and sell it for an average of $1,000 more than
what they had estimated when they calculated the lease terms. That
gain fell to just $200 last year because many people who might have
considered a used car chose instead to use no-interest loans to buy
new cars.

Some analysts believe that there is a risk that carmakers could
actually start losing money on each leased car. Ford Motor Credit is
particularly at risk, they say, because of its more aggressive
lending practices.

Another problem for the financing units is the rising number of
bankruptcies and defaults.

"We are in a deteriorating economic environment and we are dealing,
as all others in the industry are, with a very, very high level of
bankruptcies of our customers," said Greg C. Smith, the president and
chief operating officer of Ford Motor Credit.

Mr. Smith was installed last month after his predecessor, Donald
Winkler, was ousted. Mr. Winkler's resignation came after Ford said
it would need to pump several hundred million dollars into Ford Motor
Credit because the financing unit had underestimated the amount it
would need for reserves, resulting in a $900 million fourth-quarter
loss for Ford Motor -- about five times greater than analysts had
expected.

Mr. Smith said Ford had tightened its standards as the economy
deteriorated, and would benefit from a rebound in the used-car market.

Some analysts said they were surprised that Ford appeared to be
suffering more than G.M. "Traditionally, we've considered them as
stronger, because they only had one business," said David Andrews, a
credit analyst at UBS Warburg.

Ford Motor Credit sticks to auto lending, while G.M.A.C. is
diversified into other businesses, like mortgages. In the past,
analysts worried that these other businesses came with their own sets
of risks that G.M. might not be prepared to handle, although last
year mortgages actually cushioned G.M.'s losses on car loans. Some
analysts worry that the outlook for mortgage lending and some of
G.M.A.C.'s other businesses are still concerns this year.

"They're really pretty much in the same boat," said John Casesa, an
analyst at Merrill Lynch. "They have the same set of problems, but
Ford Credit's are more acute right now."

He pointed to the deteriorating credit ratings of the two companies.

"Both companies are seeing their borrowing costs increase; that's the
main difficulty," he added. If the credit rating is cut enough, "the
availability of credit diminishes."

All these issues underlie the fundamental problem for Ford and G.M.:
their vehicles' overall lack of appeal has been such that they have
not been able to compete with imports.

Last year, through November, incentive costs, including subsidized
loans, rebates and warranties, rose to $2,291 a vehicle for the Big
Three, compared with $1,146 for Asian automakers, according to the
AutoData Corporation, a research firm in Woodcliff Lake, N.J. Despite
that additional spending, G.M. managed to increase its market share
just 0.03 percent last year, while Ford's share fell to 21.9 percent
from 23 percent in 2000.

The costs of those incentives add up. In 2000, Ford Motor Credit
reported pretax earnings of $2.97 billion. But that same year, Ford
Motor spent $3.4 billion to make up for those cheap loans -- a huge
expense that reflects more on the health of the auto business than
the financing business.

Ford and G.M. are likely to see their market share shrink again this
year, when overall sales are expected to fall sharply, analysts say.
The companies have little room to maneuver further on pricing while
their Japanese competitors benefit from a weaker yen, which declined
by 14.6 percent against the dollar last year.

Last week, G.M. said it would change from interest-free financing to
offering rebates of $2,002 a vehicle. The new wrinkle, meant to
energize consumers again with a deal that seems different, will not
lower incentive costs significantly. But at least it should lower the
number of deals G.M.A.C. finances.

"We haven't been a drain on resources," Mr. Muir of G.M.A.C. said.
"If you go over the past five years, G.M. has still gotten more cash
dividends out of us than equity they have put into us."

Mr. Muir believes that as rebates are used and as sales decline, the
amount of financing will slow and the need for capital will lessen.

"As the business cools off, we can still maintain our leverage and
return a lot of capital to G.M.," he said.

Still, General Motors has other problems, principally rising health
care costs and a potential multibillion-dollar deficit in its pension
fund.

THE best way to fix these problems is to make vehicles that people
will want to buy without any help. For Ford, it means striking the
right balance between cost cutting and product planning, and getting
the new products right.

G.M. has developed more momentum on the product side, but only very
recently. Rick Wagoner, the chief executive of the company, appears
to have re-energized G.M.'s design department by hiring Robert A.
Lutz, the former president of Chrysler, last year.

Mr. Lutz, the champion of vehicles like the Jeep Grand Cherokee and
the PT Cruiser, often compares Detroit to Hollywood. Companies spend
a tremendous amount of money each year to develop a few new products,
whether movies or car models. If people like enough of them, the
production executives are heroes. If they don't, the executives are
in trouble.

And that appears to be a fact that no amount of financing,
ultimately, can make disappear.

GRAPHIC: Photos: American carmakers leaned heavily on financial
incentives to help them battle a flood of hot-selling imports last
year. (Bloomberg News)(pg. 1); Donald Winkler resigned as president
of Ford's credit unit as loan losses grew. (Wieck); The chiefs of
Ford Motor and General Motors, William Clay Ford Jr., top, and Rick
Wagoner, must find ways other than subsidized loans to bring buyers
into dealers' showrooms. (Agence France-Presse, top; Bloomberg
News)(pg. 8)

Chart: "Troubling Trends"
Subsidiaries of Ford and General Motors have been lending to more
customers, but the value of the assets behind those loans has been
falling.

Figures for 2001 are as of June

Graph shows share of retail vehicle sales and leases financed by
automaker's credit subsidiary from 1995.

Graph shows the change in residual value of a sampling of vehicle
types at the end of a two-year lease from 1996.

LUXURY CARS
MINIVANS
LUXURY SPORT UTILITIES

(Source: Morgan Stanley)
(pg. 8)   *****
--
Yoshie

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