I am not a big fan of the overall "motive" debates for Iraq (it mostly distracts from the work at hand), but I think this angle sheds light on how sweeping are the changes implied by the Bush agenda in a one superpower world. Israel's main calling card has been as "the only reliable US ally" in the mid-east. The more the mid-east pot boiled (within definite limits and especially away from Israel's immediate borders!) the more Israel was seen as useful to US interests.
Should the Bush-ites ever succeed in rolling back the '60s in the 3rd world, (restoring 3rd world nations to '50s-like compliance) then why do they need Israel? At that point, those once challenging Arab nationalist states become "our" Arabs and Israel becomes more like an annoyance to "our" desire to strengthen our local rulers (a particular annoyance in the Likud-expansionist version). "US" foreign policy interests vis-a-vis Israel become more like Britain's Foreign Office view in the 50's, or at least the State Dept view in the '50s. Of course there is still a strong domestic lobby for Israel, but this now confronts, rather than seemingly confirms, the big power interests - a very different situation.
One Bush goal is to dispense with the need to cultivate and accommodate smaller states and local nationalisms. The US will assert sole superpower status and no longer need to please a Saudi Arabia, a Shah of Iran, or (implicitly) an Israel. Why should the new juggernaut need to make exceptions? (This will be cold comfort for the newly subjugated Arabs.)
For sure the Wolfowitz\Pearl crowd don't see it this way, at least in their discourse. Assuming they are not being Straussian (or just telling themselves that the gain in Israel's security is worth the loss in its status since the US will ALWAYS be faithful to its friends), I don't see why their subjective views are decisive on this point. Even the ubermensch crowd keep their human blinders, no?
Paul
