He's always been right-wing soc dem. I don't think he's changed an iota. Some of his work is substantive and of interest, but this column was surreal.
mbs ----- Original Message ----- From: "Devine, James" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Thursday, November 06, 2003 11:13 PM Subject: Re: cronysm? What cronyism? > He's the author of Push Comes to Shove: The Escalation of Student Protest, a book that criticized the SDS and other student radicals. He was a member of the Young People's Socialist League, the youth group of the Socialist Party-USA. Though some of his critique was on the mark, he clearly went right-wing or at least nuts. > Jim > > -----Original Message----- > From: Max B. Sawicky [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] > Sent: Thu 11/6/2003 7:31 PM > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Cc: > Subject: Re: [PEN-L] cronysm? What cronyism? > > > > I want the drugs this guy is using. > > > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "Eubulides" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Sent: Thursday, November 06, 2003 9:33 PM > Subject: cronysm? What cronyism? > > > > washingtonpost.com > > No 'Cronyism' in Iraq > > By Steven Kelman > > Thursday, November 6, 2003; Page A33 > > > > > > There has been a series of allegations and innuendos recently to the > > effect that government contracts for work in Iraq and Afghanistan are > > being awarded in an atmosphere redolent with the "stench of political > > favoritism and cronyism," to use the description in a report put out by > > the Center for Public Integrity on campaign contributions by companies > > doing work in those two countries. > > > > One would be hard-pressed to discover anyone with a working knowledge of > > how federal contracts are awarded -- whether a career civil servant > > working on procurement or an independent academic expert -- who doesn't > > regard these allegations as being somewhere between highly improbable and > > utterly absurd. > > > > The premise of the accusations is completely contrary to the way > > government contracting works, both in theory and in practice. Most > > contract award decisions are made by career civil servants, with no > > involvement by political appointees or elected officials. In some > > agencies, the "source selection official" (final decision-maker) on large > > contracts may be a political appointee, but such decisions are preceded by > > such a torrent of evaluation and other backup material prepared by career > > civil servants that it would be difficult to change a decision from the > > one indicated by the career employees' evaluation. > > > > Having served as a senior procurement policymaker in the Clinton > > administration, I found these charges (for which no direct evidence has > > been provided) implausible. To assure myself I wasn't being naive, I asked > > two colleagues, each with 25 years-plus experience as career civil > > servants in contracting (and both now out of government), whether they > > ever ran into situations where a political appointee tried to get work > > awarded to a political supporter or crony. "Never did any senior official > > put pressure on me to give a contract to a particular firm," answered one. > > The other said: "This did happen to me once in the early '70s. The net > > effect, as could be expected, was that this 'friend' lost any chance of > > winning fair and square. In other words, the system recoiled and prevented > > this firm from even being considered." Certainly government sometimes > > makes poor contracting decisions, but they're generally because of > > sloppiness or other human failings, not political interference. > > > > Many people are also under the impression that contractors take the > > government to the cleaners. In fact, government keeps a watchful eye on > > contractor profits -- and government work has low profit margins compared > > with the commercial work the same companies perform. Look at the annual > > reports of information technology companies with extensive government and > > nongovernment business, such as EDS Corp. or Computer Sciences Corp. You > > will see that margins for their government customers are regularly below > > those for commercial ones. As for the much-maligned Halliburton, a few > > days ago the company disclosed, as part of its third-quarter earnings > > report, operating income from its Iraq contracts of $34 million on revenue > > of $900 million -- a return on sales of 3.7 percent, hardly the stuff of > > plunder. > > > > It is legitimate to ask why these contractors gave money to political > > campaigns if not to influence contract awards. First, of course, companies > > have interests in numerous political battles whose outcomes are determined > > by elected officials, battles involving tax, trade and regulatory and > > economic policy -- and having nothing to do with contract awards. Even if > > General Electric (the largest contributor on the Center for Public > > Integrity's list) had no government contracts -- and in fact, government > > work is only a small fraction of GE's business -- it would have ample > > reason to influence congressional or presidential decisions. > > > > Second, though campaign contributions have no effect on decisions about > > who gets a contract, decisions about whether to appropriate money to one > > project as opposed to another are made by elected officials and influenced > > by political appointees, and these can affect the prospects of companies > > that already hold contracts or are well-positioned to win them, in areas > > that the appropriations fund. So contractors working for the U.S. > > Education Department's direct-loan program for college students indeed > > lobby against the program's being eliminated, and contractors working on > > the Joint Strike Fighter lobby to seek more funds for that plane. > > > > The whiff of scandal manufactured around contracting for Iraq obviously > > has been part of the political battle against the administration's > > policies there (by the way, I count myself as rather unsympathetic to > > these policies). But this political campaign has created extensive > > collateral damage. It undermines public trust in public institutions, for > > reasons that have no basis in fact. It insults the career civil servants > > who run our procurement system. > > > > Perhaps most tragically, it could cause mismanagement of the procurement > > system. Over the past decade we have tried to make procurement more > > oriented toward delivering mission results for agencies and taxpayers, > > rather than focusing on compliance with detailed bureaucratic process > > requirements. The charges of Iraq cronyism encourage the system to revert > > to wasting time, energy and people on redundant, unnecessary rules to > > document the nonexistence of a nonproblem. > > > > If Iraqi contracting fails, it will be because of poorly structured > > contracts or lack of good contract management -- not because of cronyism > > in the awarding process. By taking the attention of the procurement system > > away from necessary attention to the structuring and management of > > contracts, the current exercise in barking up the wrong tree threatens the > > wise expenditure of taxpayer dollars the critics state they seek to > > promote. > > > > The writer is a professor of public management at Harvard University. He > > served from 1993 to 1997 as administrator of the Office of Federal > > Procurement Policy. He will answer questions about this column during a > > Live Online discussion at 2 p.m. today at www.washingtonpost.com. > > >
