Smart money

Chris Petit is fascinated by the power of illegal capital, revealed in
Loretta Napoleoni's Modern Jihad and Jeffrey Robinson's The Sink

Saturday December 13, 2003
The Guardian

Modern Jihad: Tracing the Dollars Behind the Terror Networks
by Loretta Napoleoni
295pp, Pluto, £17.99

The Sink: Terror, Crime and Dirty Money in the Offshore World
by Jeffrey Robinson
382pp, Constable, £18.99

As the legal system was to the last century, money laundering is to this:
two key, secret activities that really make the world go round. The annual
return generated by the illegal economy amounts to a staggering $1.5
trillion or thereabouts (it's hard to be precise). The bulk is recycled by
western financial institutions, and the removal of this liquidity, in
Loretta Napoleoni's opinion, would probably plunge western economies into
deep recession. Dirty money is integral to the system.

The phrase money laundering was coined during Watergate. According to
Jeffrey Robinson, Meyer Lansky, the American gangster, was the first
modern criminal to grasp the benefits of financial hygiene by the simple
precaution of capital flight. Frank Sinatra famously told the Nevada
Gaming Commission, when accused of having smuggled $2 million in an
attaché case into Havana on behalf of the Mob in 1947, "Show me an attaché
case that can hold $2 million and you can have the $2 million."

The Sink offers a lively anecdotal guide to the laundry business and
related scams extending from cable piracy to internet casinos, pyramid
selling, telemarketing fraud, disguised loans, kickbacks, false end-user
certificates for everything from cigarettes to arms, to something called
death-spiralling, a scheme devised to run a company's share price into the
ground while selling to mug punters. But for human ingenuity at its most
calculated, Modern Jihad comes up with the example of opium-addicted
camels being used to carry unaccompanied contraband across the Iranian
desert, travelling from one fix to the next.

This giant, invisible game of Monopoly comes with one high card - epic
greed - involving sums rarely less than fabulous: a $3.2 million kickback
on an $8 million deal; the Duvaliers of Haiti pocketing $16 million of a
$22 million IMF loan that wound up in the Channel Islands; Marcos's 1,241
tons of gold stashed at Zurich airport. This taste for wholesale, tax-free
acquisition is accompanied by a talent for brass-neck denial, best of
which comes from a prime minister of Antigua: "The big hurricane destroyed
those documents"; always a useful call in off-shore Caribbean banking.

One of life's more useful bits of advice is "follow the money", a lesson
often ignored. Napoleoni's utterly compelling, heroically researched and
indispensible analysis follows nothing but, eschews what she calls the
"trap of politics", sets out to trace Islamist terrorism to its financial
roots and show how, as with everything else, there are grey areas. Osama
bin Laden's acquisition of the Gum Arabic Company Ltd, which supplies 80%
of world demand, gave him a monopoly in a vital ingredient that makes ink
stick to newspaper and prevents sediment forming in soft drinks. The
company fell under Clinton's 1997 sanctions against Sudan but was later
exempted when US trade giants, including the Newspaper Association of
America, protested that Gum Arabic was their only viable source. The
alternative was to buy from their main competitors, the French, at much
higher rates. Trade between Bin Laden's company and the US continued.

Napoleoni traces the rise of Islamic terrorism to the cold-war policy of
sponsored counter-insurgency developed by the USSR and US. In the 1980s,
the process became increasingly privatised and was matched by the
terrorists' search for economic independence, which turned the armed
struggle into a multimillion-dollar business and freedom fighters into
entrepreneurs. The chapter on the PLO's wealth, estimated by the CIA in
1990 at $8-$14 billion, is worth a book in itself.

The end of the cold war was seen by many Muslims as marking the decline of
the supremacy of western culture, and reading Modern Jihad it's hard to
disagree. Financial corruption fed terrorism. William Casey, Reagan's CIA
chief, used Pakistan and its BCCI bank as fronts to train Afghan rebels
against the Soviets. Covert operations required a "black network" within
the bank and its state equivalent, the notorious ISI. The bank financed
and brokered covert arms deals, complete with full laundry service. The
short and logical step from there was a BCCI/ISI/CIA move into drug
smuggling to feed the needy, and leaky, money pipeline to the Mujahedin.
The Pakistan-Afghan connection became the biggest single supplier of
heroin to the US, meeting 60% of demand, with annual profits a
stratospheric $100-$200 billion. Minus ideology, the process starts to
look like one big money-go-round, with the new war being played out in a
spectrum of failing states (Colombia), failed states (Sudan) and collapsed
states (Somalia), all offering breeding grounds for terror.

It's also payback time for the Crusades. Bin Laden's 1996 appeal to
Muslims sounds eerily similar to that made by Pope Urban II in 1095. Even
more remarkable are the similarities between the economic climate that
produced both, analysed with lucidity by Napoleoni, who emphasises that
trade, both covert and legitimate, precedes terror, with the present
conflict between "the big capital of the west and its eastern oligarchic
alliances on the one hand and the masses of the east and an emerging
merchant and banking class on the other".

Modern terrorism is about smart money, as understood by Bin Laden, aided
by the invisibility of the internet, the old hawala system - an
untraceable money flow where cash deposited in one country can be
collected in another - and cemented by the mosque network, which provides
as complex and comprehensive a web as its monetary counterpart. The
sophistication of Bin Laden's financial portfolio, and his network's
ability to manipulate the global stock market, match those of leading
capitalist corporations: the financial killing made by his people from
September 11 resulted in perhaps the biggest insider-trading operation
ever.

Modern jihad is the last act in Kipling's great game, and the economics of
oil, as usual, lie close to the surface. A murky financial network of
dynastic ties shows that little separates the Bushes from the Bin Ladens -
apart from a financial consultant and a merchant bank or two.


====================================
To this day, no one has come up with a set of rules for
originality. There aren't any. [Les Paul]

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