[This is great.  Read this mundane article in the normal fashion.   And
then laugh out loud when you come to the buried -- and disavowed -- lede.
These people at the Times have no shame.]

The New York Times In America
March 22, 2004

Delivery Delays Hurt U.S. Effort to Equip Iraqis

   By THOM SHANKER
   and ERIC SCHMITT

   B AGHDAD, Iraq, March 21 Senior American commanders in Iraq are
   publicly complaining that delays in delivering radios, body armor and
   other equipment have hobbled their ability to build an effective Iraqi
   security force that can ultimately replace United States troops here.

   The lag in supplying the equipment, because of a contract dispute, may
   even have contributed to a loss of lives among Iraqi recruits,
   commanders say. A spokesman for the company that was awarded the
   original contract said much of the equipment had already been produced
   and was waiting to be shipped to Iraq.

   The frustration had been voiced privately up the chain of command by a
   number of officers, and broke into public debate in recent days.
   Training and equipping more than 200,000 Iraqi security forces has
   been one of the top stated priorities of the Bush administration.

   Maj. Gen. Charles H. Swannack Jr., commander of the 82nd Airborne
   Division, praised the work of Iraqi security forces helping to secure
   his area of control in western Iraq, which includes the dangerous
   region around Falluja and the Syrian border. But he said the effort
   had faltered because of a lack of combat gear for the police, border
   units and the new Iraqi Civil Defense Corps.

   "Not only are the security forces bravely leading the fight against
   terrorists, they are in some cases insisting on doing it alone,"
   General Swannack said 11 days ago. "They want to defeat these enemies
   of a new and free Iraq. If we had the equipment for these brave young
   men, we would be much farther along."

   He said that in his region of western Iraq, which includes a long
   stretch of the Syrian border, foreign fighters, their money and
   weapons were suspected of entering Iraq along smugglers' routes. In
   this area, he said, "we are still short a significant amount of
   vehicles, radios and body armor to properly equip" the new Iraqi
   force.

   Commanders in other parts of Iraq have also warned of serious
   problems. "There are training, organizational and equipment shortfalls
   in the Iraqi security forces," said Brig. Gen. Carter Ham, the new
   American commander in northern Iraq. "There's no question about that."

   The American military also suffered from shortages of crucial
   equipment during the war and even into the current phase of stability
   operations. In particular, soldiers complained of an insufficient
   supply of the newest bulletproof vests and, when improvised explosives
   began taking lives, of armored Humvees. Their complaints have been
   echoed loudly by members of Congress.

   But the equipment for America's combat troops and that for Iraqi
   security services is obtained through separate contracting and
   procurement processes.

   The first batch of equipment for the Iraqis has been paid for and was
   to have been delivered under a $327 million contract to a small
   company, Nour USA Ltd., of Vienna, Va. But the Pentagon canceled that
   deal this month after protests by several competing companies led to a
   determination that Army procurement officers in Iraq botched the
   contract. Army officials found no fault with Nour.

   Sloppy contract language, staff turnover, incomplete paperwork and
   stressful combat conditions on the ground led to a badly flawed
   process, senior Army officials in Washington said. "I've seen things
   go wrong before, but I've never seen anything like this," said a
   senior Army official with 28 years' experience in government
   contracting. "We messed up."

   The Army is rushing to seek new bids for the contract, but officials
   said that could take two to three months. In the meantime, officials
   are looking to see if they can use other funds and piggyback on
   existing contracts for weapons and other equipment that federal
   agencies like the F.B.I. already have to speed the delivery of vital
   matériel to Iraq.

   "Part of it is just the magnitude of how much was needed thousands of
   police cars, hundreds of thousands of uniforms," Maj. Gen. Buford C.
   Blount III, the deputy director of operations for the Army staff in
   Washington, said in an interview. "It was just a lot harder to get
   stuff in than we anticipated."

   The $327 million contract was to supply several battalions of the new
   Iraqi security forces with rifles, uniforms, body armor and other
   equipment. The original contract, awarded in January, did not specify
   the number of troops to be supplied. Instead it identified specific
   amounts of equipment for instance, 200 trucks and 20,000 compasses.
   That contract was to be the first of several to equip the Iraqi
   forces.

   A spokesman for Nour USA, Robert R. Hoopes Jr., said the company had
   protested the Army's cancellation of the contract, saying it could
   cost $20 million to $30 million in termination cost to the company and
   its suppliers.

   Mr. Hoopes said much of the equipment in the original contract
   including radios, compasses, canteens and body armor had already been
   produced and was sitting in warehouses in the United States and
   Eastern Europe, waiting to be delivered to Iraq. "The stuff is sitting
   on the dock, ready to go," Mr. Hoopes said in a telephone interview.

   General Swannack took command of his region in September, and the
   required equipment still has not arrived as he turns over his area to
   the Marines. To help solve the problem, the general dipped into his
   commander's discretionary fund, to buy radios, body armor and vehicles
   for Iraqi security forces.

   Other commanders have also spent division financial resources to buy
   combat equipment already financed by Congress in a supplemental money
   package for Iraq.

   But those expenditures restrict the commanders' ability to spend money
   on things like rebuilding schools, mosques and hospitals, part of what
   they view as a critically important effort to stabilize the nation and
   build rapport with the Iraqis.

   American officers in Iraq responsible for local training even go so
   far as to say the slow delivery of equipment may have contributed to
   deaths among new Iraqi security forces, who did not have effective
   protection and could not radio for backup troops, who in any case may
   not have had the vehicles to speed to assist their colleagues under
   fire. "Bureaucracy kills," an American military officer in Iraq said.

   Other officers in Baghdad who are involved in creating a new Iraqi
   security architecture, but who discussed the equipment problem on the
   condition that they not be identified, described a new concern: that
   they now will be caught between a cycle of famine and feast.

   Having gone months awaiting the gear financed by Congress, they fear
   that they suddenly may be overwhelmed with equipment and money once
   the bottleneck is cleared, and that it may be difficult to manage the
   flood of matérial rushed to them haphazardly to solve the problem and
   quiet their complaints.

   One American division completing its tour in Iraq was able to avoid
   those difficulties, simply as a matter of fate.

   The First Armored Division, responsible for the security of Baghdad
   and central Iraq, took control of an area in which a number of
   military warehouses were situated. Using gear captured from the old
   Iraqi security forces, division officers were able to equip all seven
   battalions of the new Iraqi defense corps that they recruited and
   trained.

   Nour USA's president, A. Huda Farouki, is a friend of Ahmad Chalabi, a
   member of the Iraqi Governing Council who has close ties to several
   senior Pentagon officials. But Nour executives and senior Army
   officials say that relationship played no role in awarding the
   contract to Nour.

   Instead, Army officials blamed the small contracting office in
   Baghdad, which had little experience in handling contracts of this
   size, for several mistakes.

   The language used to describe the required work was "so ambiguous, we
   just couldn't defend it against the protests," said the senior Army
   official in Washington. Several important documents related to
   evaluating competing bids were never written, the official said.

   "They were overwhelmed, but that's no excuse for not having done the
   procurement according to the procurement rules," the Army official
   said. He said the new contract, which Nour can reapply for, would be
   handled by seasoned contracting officers in Washington.

   Thom Shanker reported from Baghdad for this article and Eric Schmitt
   from Washington.

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