certain matters have precluded my usual regular posting to pen-l and
discussions have, no doubt, been the worse for it....
hahahahaha, just a joke (at least regular posting part)...
re. pen-l thread several weeks re. hegemony to which i'd intended to
post comment...
not sure how many, if any, other poli sci folks on list but....
hegemony is international relations is posited as holding by one state
of preponderance of power in international system
such that it can single-handedly dominate rules & arrangements by which
political & economic relations are conducted...
above state is called 'hegemon' (generally in reference to world
domination but can be regional)...
some ir scholars (Charles Kindleberger, Robert Keohane, Robert Gilpin,
among others) argue that international system is most effective when
power is most concentrated - when hegemon exists to maintain order,
theory is called 'hegemonic stability theory'...
most studies of hegemony point to 2 examples: 19th century britain &
post-ww2 u.s...
former followed defeat of france in napoleonic wars, both world trade
and naval capabilities in british hands...latter followed destruction of
war, u.s. gdp was more than 50% of world's total, u.s. vessels carried
majority of world's shipping, u.s. had greatest military power & had
nuclear monopoly (albeit, for brief time), u.s. industry led in
technology & productivity, u.s. had highest (unequal, of course) living
standards...
according to theory, post-ww2 commercial cooperation leading to
unprecedented economic growth was facilitated by security system
established by u.s. power as well as international economic arrangements
made at end of war ('bretton woods' system)...
ir scholars point to hegemonic decline resulting as extreme power
disparities stemming from major war diminish over time (states rebuild
over years & decades) & as hegemons overextend themselves with costly
military commitments...
kindleberger was among ir scholars who thought that post-ww2 framework
for international trade & monetary relations would collapse once u.s.
was no longer able to enforce rules of that regime (i.e., diminished
u.s. power in 1970s evident in loss of vietnam war, rise of opec,
malaise of u.s. economy)...
according to keohane, above didn't happen because once cooperation is
attained, incentives remain to continue it in absence of hegemon because
established regimes offer predictability & information to members...
a few ir analysts do have gramscian-like take in referring to complex
of ideas that rulers use to gain consent for legitimacy and to keep
subjects in line (hegemony of ideas such as 'democratic' capitalism,
global predominance of u.s. culture)...
of course, while force may be reduced by such hegemony, force always
remains tools of coercion re. those who do not accept 'norms' or who
aspire to create different arrangements... michael hoover
