On Sep 26, 2014, at 5:25 PM, Robert Naiman <[email protected]> wrote:
> If I'm the USG, I don't see these developments as a problem at all; maybe I > see them as good. > > A key longstanding goal of the USG is to isolate and marginalize ISIL and > Nusra from other Syrian rebel groups. This has been controversial among many > rebel groups; past attempts by the USG to marginalize Nusra from other groups > have met with strong resistance, leading some of these groups to affirm > solidarity with Nusra instead. > > If Nusra gets closer to ISIL, it's harder for other rebel groups to resist > the US campaign to force them to cut their ties to Nusra. > > From the US point of view, any flavor of Al Qaeda is pretty much the same; > people that it's way OK to bomb. Whether Al Qaeda types become even more > extreme Al Qaeda types is not on their list of things to worry about; indeed, > it strengthens the USG cause, just like the beheadings and other horrible > things done by ISIL, looped on TV, have strengthened the USG cause. With what implications for the course of the uprising against the Assad regime and prospects for a negotiated settlement? The situation strikes me as extraordinarily fluid and confused with a lot of sorting out still to be done among the many players. _______________________________________________ pen-l mailing list [email protected] https://lists.csuchico.edu/mailman/listinfo/pen-l
