On Mar 7, 2015, at 7:08 AM, Hinrich Kuhls <[email protected]> wrote: > As far as ECB's "rope on the neck" and further thumbscrews of other financial > actors (by the way, both ECB and EU are not "external" actors to Greece) are > concerned I think the outcome is not as straightforward as you assume: Next > round of negotiations next Monday.
My thought also. In any negotiation, the parties can never be certain of the outcome (unlike many interested onlookers from outside who often project that impression). If there is to be a compromise, it will reveal itself only in the course of negotiations. I doubt if the either the Greek or German-led eurozone negotiators can say with any real assurance at this stage whether the talks will break down or succeed. My guess is that some form of debt relief will be offered to Greece and the peripheral states because economic recovery and political stability demand it, although how much relief and how it will be structured will be decided through negotiation, and reflect the respective bargaining power of parties involved. In Greece’s case, it’s often overlooked that any relief can occur equally outside of the eurozone as within it, provided a Grexit is a negotiated and orderly one which cushions the transition to the new arrangements. We know a Grexit has been carefully weighed in Athens, Berlin, Brussels, Frankfurt, and Washington, and it could move to the forefront of negotiations if the obstacles to a compromise within the eurozone prove to be insurmountable. Or one or the other or both sides could miscalculate, collapsing negotiations and triggering dire unintended consequences. All of which is to say that I expect that the range of possibilities is presently far wider than the impression often communicated in the mainstream and social media, which take the unyielding public statements of the negotiators on both sides for good coin. _______________________________________________ pen-l mailing list [email protected] https://lists.csuchico.edu/mailman/listinfo/pen-l
