Just two quickies (ha!) about Jim's long post: [Me, now:] A "proposition" requires a proposer, a sentient being. . . . propositions can�t exist without minds. Which was my point. Propositions involves some kind of _understanding_, something that cannot be done without a sentient mind.
* * * Jim takes the other side (from me) of a debate in philosophy of mind and language that was hot when I was in grad school. Paul Boghossian and Lynne Baker have argued for versions of the claims he states, maintaining that it is somehow incoherent to have truths without minds, propositions without someone to entertain them. There are really serious arguments for this idea, but I think it is wrong. I go with Rorty and Feyerabend and Quinw (who, to be sure, did not addressthis point directly) for the other view: indeed, I will go beyond what I have said and state that I think that it is possible (though not true in this world) that _we_ don't have minds, that eliminative materialism is true -- if so, the propositions "there are no minds," or "Jim has no mind" are true, although there is ipso facto no one to entertain them. Anyway this all gets into deep waters, and is kind of off the topic of economics. I wrote a bit of my diss on this (addressing Baker but not Boghossian, whose papers came out later), and might be able to find e-versions of that ancient doc, or have the relevant pages PDF'd, and email them to anyone who is actually interested. Do you believe I used to do this stuff for a living? [I wrote:] >>Now we _can_ say that (after the Big Bang, at least), some propositions that we _now_ think about were empirically true. I'd bet that "E = m c squared" fit empirical reality before Einstein thought it up -- and before sentient beings arose that were able to think about such matters. << JKS writes:> So far so good.< JKS now:> No, I'm just not prejudiced about my realism. I'm a pragmatist, so I'm happy to posit whatever's useful. Do we need abstract entities? Sure, then let's help ourselves to them. What about unobservables? No problem. Angels and cherubs? Well, whatever for? No thanks. But not because their weird, rather because they do no work.< Jim: I�m all in favor of pragmatism, but the idea that propositions (mental states) exist independent of proposers (sentient critters) is idealism. Jim, call it whatever you like. Given my definition of realism, which is that realism about X means that X exists independent of the mind, it is realism about propositions. I think you mean it is not materialistic or physicalistic. Actually it is neutral on whether propositions can in some sense be reduced to something physical, although I rather doubt that they can. I'm not a physicalist if that is someone who thinks that the only things there are physical ones. If that makes me an "idealist," well, I'm in good company. jks __________________________________________________ Do You Yahoo!? Tired of spam? Yahoo! Mail has the best spam protection around http://mail.yahoo.com
