Russia Profile
www.russiaprofile.org
November 29, 2004
The Politics of Pipelines
Economics Takes a Back Seat in Project Decisions
By Vasily Zubkov

A slowdown in throughput in recent months has meant
that
Transneft, the Russian pipeline monopoly, has surplus
export capacity for the first time in years. While
officials at the pipeline major say that this surplus
is
likely to last at least for the short term, studies by
the
Siberian branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences
suggest
that the long-term forecast for oil production may be
even
more bleak.

But, despite a report from the academy saying that
about
60 percent of all proven reserves in Western Siberia,
Russia's prime oil-producing region, were near
depletion,
talk of new pipeline-construction projects continues
to
swirl around the industry and through government
circles.

Part of the reason for this is the obvious importance
that
the presidential administration continues to attach to

monitoring conditions in the energy sector in general.
In
a system that is sometimes described by analysts as
"state
capitalism," the government has dramatically increased
its
involvement in oil and gas questions, as well as those

related to the generation of electricity. The Kremlin
believes that greater state control is the only way to

make the energy sector more effective and viable, end
the
virtual theft of natural resources, rein in the
oligarchs
and, in the final analysis, reform the entire economy.

One element of the Kremlin's energy strategy is the
expansion of the pipeline infrastructure. But
available
funds are limited, so the order in which the new lines

will be built has become a point of debate - a debate
that
has often focused more on Moscow's global priorities
than
on purely economic motives.

A State Matter

This geopolitical factor lies behind repeated
statements
by both President Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister
Mikhail Fradkov that the new pipelines will remain
state
property and that there are no plans to allow private
players - foreign or domestic - entrance into the
transportation of oil or natural gas.

The critics of the Transneft system within the oil
industry have been joined by liberal economists both
inside and outside Russia, who say that the monopoly's

infrastructure is inadequate to deal with growing
export
volumes. But, despite the fact that the oil industry
set a
new post-Soviet production record, pumping out 9.4
million
barrels in one day in September, the Ministry of
Industry
and Energy says that the country's pipeline system
currently has had enough excess capacity to handle all
of
the oil being produced in Kazakhstan. The ministry
says
that the system will be able to pump 4.77 million
barrels
of oil by the end of the year, almost double the
capacity
it could offer as recently as 1999.

Transneft has been doing just fine under the present
conditions, with its profits this year projected to
reach
$5 billion. But the company's monopoly position
continues
to be an irritant for the oil companies, who have
brought
their lobbyists into play both in the State Duma and
in
discussions with the presidential administration.
Yukos,
with its proposal for a line running to Daqing, China,
was
one of the first, but the battle in which the
company's
leadership is embroiled with the courts, the tax
ministry
and the government has almost certainly signaled its
demise.

A second suggestion, coming from a consortium of
companies, was for a joint venture that would
construct a
line ending at the major northern port of Murmansk.
Both
proposals ended in defeat for the private companies
and
Transneft retained its sole position as coordinator
and
operator of the sector.

Transneft may be the pipeline monopoly, but it is
clear
that the Kremlin makes decisions for further
development
in relation to the company. As this edition was going
to
press in mid-November, the ball remained fully in the
Kremlin's court with regard to choosing between three
pipeline projects on the table: expansion of the
Baltic
Pipeline System (BTS); construction of the Eastern
Siberian Oil Pipeline (Taishet-Nakhodka); or of the
Western Siberia-North pipeline.

New Path to the Baltic

The BTS has a current capacity of just over 350
million
barrels per year, which are shipped to the port of
Primorsk, on the Gulf of Finland, from the
Timano-Pechora
field in Western Siberia and from Kazakhstan. A
proposal
has been made to expand the system's capacity by
another
90 million barrels per year. The project, which would
involve the construction of one new branch of the line

from Yaroslavl to Kirishina, in the Leningrad Region,
and
another from Kirishina to the existing port at
Primorsk,
would take 16 months to complete and carry a price tag
of
$1.4 billion.

The BTS has run into opposition, ostensibly over
environmental concerns, from a number of states around
the
Baltic Sea, particularly Latvia and Estonia. The
opening
of the existing part of the pipeline removed the
necessity
for the Russian oil industry to ship via the two
Baltic
states. Ventspils, Latvia had been the largest port
used
by the Soviet Union for the export of oil, but it was
shut
down eighteen months ago, following the opening of the

BTS. There is also a modern port for oil transport
presently sitting idle in Tallinn, Estonia.

Both Estonia and Latvia have been vociferous in their
complaints in the European Parliament over the
environmental degradation that they maintain will be
caused by the BTS, particularly if it is to be
expanded.
The Russian government has replied with charges that
the
complaints are simply sour grapes over the lost
revenues
as a result of the new transport route, and that the
complaints would quickly dry up were Russia to open
its
Baltic state taps again.

Regardless of the nature of the complaints, the BTS is

believed to have the best chance of being selected, as
it
is the least expensive and time-consuming project
under
consideration.

The Eastern Siberian Pipeline

The plan to build a pipeline that will run to markets
in
the east already has a rocky history. Yukos initiated
such
a project by signing a supply agreement with China for
5.1
billion barrels of oil, to be delivered over the span
of
25 years. A feasibility study had already been
completed
and the details agreed upon with the Chinese
government
when the project was sidelined, officially because the

pipeline ran along the southern shore of Lake Baikal,
which is the largest freshwater body in the world and
is
protected by UN environmental agreements.

Experts believe, however, that the decision to shelve
the
project had more to do with geopolitical than
environmental considerations. Focus on the East has
returned to a Pacific outlet, which would allow Russia

access to more markets. The government also appeared
uncomfortable with the dependence on the Chinese
market
that the original plan could create. Much of the
2,400-kilometer pipeline currently being discussed
would
follow the Baikal-Amur railroad line and pass north of
the
lake, ending at the Pacific port of Nakhodka.

A variant of this plan has emerged that would involve
adding a branch running to the town of Skovorodino,
near
the Chinese border in the Amur region. Semyon
Vainshtok,
the president of Transneft, recently announced that
such a
variant would take three and a half years to build and

would carry 175 million barrels of oil annually from
Western Siberia, part of which would be destined for
China, with the remainder transported via Nakhdoka.
The
exact breakdown proposed with regard to the level of
shipments to each destination has yet to be announced.

The most complicated aspect of this project is not the

intended route, but whether there will actually be
enough
oil available for transport to justify the project.
East
Siberian proven reserves will have to total at least
590
million barrels for the proposal to be worthwhile and
the
necessary exploration of existing reserves will cost
$3
billion to $4 billion.

This price tag is beyond the reach of private oil
companies, particularly given the fact that the
Natural
Resources Ministry says that the total amount spent on

geological surveys for the whole country last year was
$3
billion. The expected cost of the whole project has
been
put at $12 billion, meaning that the period to recoup
the
original investment will be long. As a result, the
government will likely opt for a long and careful
analysis
before any chance of it giving the green light.

Murmansk or Bust?

The proposal to build a pipeline to the ice-free
Barents
Sea port of Murmansk has been on the table from a
consortium of five Russian oil companies for two
years.
The consortium has already applied to the federal
government for the go-ahead and Transneft has received
the
nod as the general contractor. A decision on the
proposal,
however, will have to wait until next August, when
Transneft is due to present its feasibility study on
what
is being labeled as the "northern" pipeline.

The government is considering two routes for the
pipeline.
One runs from the northern Urals Mountains to the
Arctic
Circle through the city of Ufa, carrying oil from
Western
Siberia, the polar Urals deposits and the
Timano-Pechora
oil and gas fields. Of the one million barrels of oil
that
will be carried per day, approximately 60 percent of
the
oil will be Siberian. Each plan involves a pipeline
2,000
kilometers in length.

No Room at the Inn

In a bid to ease some of the tension that has been
generated by the extended nature of the debate around
the
future of the northern-pipeline plan, Transneft's
Vainshtok has said that it would be pointless to rush
the
launch of the project as the U.S. market, the intended

destination for much of the oil, is currently unable
to
handle the volume of oil shipments about which the
Russian
firms are talking, as the Marathon Oil terminals on
the
U.S. east coast can only handle 110 million barrels of

Russia's Urals or Siberian grade oil per year.

Despite this, the route through Mur-mansk appears to
pose
the fewest difficulties of the available options. Any
increase in throughput volumes via the BTS will
exacerbate
the problems tankers also face in navigating the
narrow
Danish Straits, while the exploration and development
involved in bringing the Eastern Siberian project on
line
will require a huge investment.

The strange paradox is that with the possibility that
the
present slowdown in shipments could turn into a
long-term
development, one or more new pipelines might do
little, if
anything, to increase export volumes. The recent
pipeline
has allowed Russian firms to cut transport costs,
while
simultaneously increasing the state's revenues from
exports. Perhaps most importantly, they have
underpinned a
rise in Russia's geopolitical influence, the
consideration
that may have the greatest bearing on decisions about
further construction.



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Nu, zayats, pogodi!



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