<http://politics.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,9115,1500035,00.html>

The week the monster turned on its creators

Eurocrats had a vision of integration that would never work. But now
there is a chance to rewrite the script

Larry Elliott
Monday June 6, 2005
Guardian

The dream is over. For the past 17 years, large parts of the left and
centre-left in Britain have believed in the vision presented by
Jacques Delors at the TUC conference back in 1988. Fed up with
Thatcherism, Delors said to the assembled brothers and sisters: do you
want an alternative to mass unemployment and attacks on the working
class? Then sign up to my vision of Europe.

What might be called the "sensible left" duly signed up. It liked the
talk of solidarity and internationalism, but there was more to it than
that. The Delors vision also appealed to some of the less attractive
traits of the left - the worship of power, the notion that there is
always a big solution to the smallest of problems, and the feeling,
identified by Orwell long ago, that there is something unseemly about
loving your own country.

Ever since, it has been urging that Britain fulfil its destiny and
whole-heartedly back the "project". It has berated Gordon Brown for
allowing the Treasury to put economic obstacles in the way of
political engagement. It has turned a blind eye to sky-high levels of
unemployment, seen simply as transitional costs on the way to the
promised land. It has contented itself with the comforting thought
that euro-scepticism, fanned by the Murdoch press, is something
peculiar to Britain.

The events of the past week have shattered this cosy little fantasy.
In France and the Netherlands, opposition to the constitution was
strongest among the poor, the young and the excluded. Even with
Europe's political class scuttling around looking for scapegoats,
nobody had the chutzpah to claim that it was the Sun - by some kind of
cross-Channel infection - "wot lost it".

The vote in France could just about have been shrugged off as the last
roar of a nation of luddites against the inevitability of
globalisation. But the Dutch? For these model Europeans to vote by
almost 2-1 against the constitution was a hammer blow. The Netherlands
is one of the countries the British left has always admired: liberal,
tolerant, prosperous, generous. And now in open revolt against its
political masters.

The response from Brussels and the European capitals last week was to
pretend that nothing had really changed. It was all a bit reminiscent
of Eric Honecker hailing the brave socialist dawn as the Trabbies
spluttered their way towards the iron curtain in the last days of East
Germany.

Some big lessons now need to be learned. The first is to understand
how it was that in France and the Netherlands last week, and in Sweden
in 2003, a big initial lead for the yes camp was turned into a
resounding no vote by polling day. The reason is that those making the
case for the euro and ever-closer union do so with the arguments and
language of management consultancy. They talk of "the project" making
markets more efficient. The "no" camp does not talk of "projects". It
taps into the things that matter to people: the urge for security,
identity, a sense of belonging. Like it or not, people love their own
country more than they love the abstract notion of the European Union.

A second lesson is that unless the prime minister is a secret
masochist, there will be no referendum on the constitution in Britain.
If the government were stupid enough to hold one, it would be lost by
a landslide dwarfing that in the Netherlands. The odds on Britain
joining the euro are longer than the odds on monetary union
collapsing.

The sensible left should stop whingeing about that and admit that
Brown did us all an enormous favour when he came up with the
Treasury's five economic tests. His argument has been vindicated by
the anti-euro sentiment evident in the Netherlands last week. The
chancellor said that joining the single currency when the economics
were not right would foster a massive backlash when things went wrong,
as they assuredly would. If voters in the loyally pro-European
Netherlands have turned against the single currency and the European
Central Bank, just imagine what it would be like here if the economic
brown stuff hit the fan.

Thirdly, the left has to wake up to the fundamental reason for the
unpopularity of Europe. It is that the Delors model was perhaps
appropriate for the Europe of the 1940s but not the Europe of the 21st
century. Europe's social model, which was rightly envied from this
side of the Channel in the 1980s, was only affordable if there was
strong enough growth to generate the tax revenues to pay for the
welfare state. Delors, with his rigid, inflexible command and control
model, ensured that unemployment would be high, growth low and the
costs of the social model unaffordable.

Europe today is only socialist to the extent that the Soviet Union in
the last years of Brezhnev was socialist. This, lest it be forgotten,
is what the Keynesians, the greens and the anti-globalisers have long
predicted.

The non-sensible left has always had its doubts about the "project".
The Keynesians said that the euro, far from leading to stronger
growth, would actually become a job-destruction machine. Setting up a
central bank with an inbuilt bias towards price stability in a world
of low inflation would be like the British guns at Singapore in 1942 -
powerful weapons pointing out to sea when the enemy was closing in
from the opposite direction.

The greens said forcing the pace of integration from the top down was
not only economically daft but also anti-democratic. It would, they
said, lead to political disengagement. The argument of the
anti-globalisers was that despite all the talk of creating a social
Europe, monetary union was actually a Trojan horse that would be used
as a means of spreading neo-liberal ideas and big business values
across the continent.

The events of the past four years, culminating in the no votes of the
past week, suggest that the Keynesians, the greens and the
anti-globalisers were right. Europe has not grown; it has stagnated.
Unable to see the damage wrought by the Frankenstein's monster they
have created, Europe's elite argues that the solution to the problem
of mass unemployment is for people to work longer hours and accept
less generous benefits. Those on the receiving end have hoarded their
money and nurtured their resentment.

Finally, the left needs to realise that the priority now is a set of
policies that will raise Europe's derisory growth rate. There is a lot
of talk about Britain taking over the leadership of Europe, much of
which sits oddly with a £5bn a month visible trade deficit and the
loss of a million jobs in manufacturing since 1997.

In macro-economic policy, however, there is no doubt that the British
model is superior. Take Italy, which would be far better off outside
the eurozone, with the flexibility to set its own inflation target and
a floating currency to compensate for its lack of competitiveness. It
turns out that there was a point to all those small currencies after
all. They were the shock absorbers that allowed countries that were
structurally very different to rub along together.

Expansionary macro-economic policies should be combined with active
labour market policies that have been shown to work in keeping the
jobless total down in countries such as Denmark, Sweden and, until
recently, the Netherlands. But that means accepting European countries
should be able to pursue the goals of full employment and prosperity
in their own way, rather than submit to a catch-all blueprint that
lacks economic sense and political legitimacy.

Those who say a retreat from the integrationist approach would mean
Europe failed to punch its weight globally could not be more wrong.
Influence is a function of success, not size. The only time Europe has
had a real impact on American policy was in the 1960s, when Lyndon
Johnson's Great Society was a homage to the generous welfare state
made possible by rapid post-war growth in the nation states of western
Europe.

Europe will only wield influence once more when it gets its economy
right. It now has the chance to do just that.

[EMAIL PROTECTED]


-- 
"Life sure is weird but what else am I to know?" [Jason Pierce]

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