Interesting that the reporter can blithely report without even any comment that there will be future US wars obviously involving occupation of other countries! It is certainly unclear how the US could possibly create security and stability while the infrastructure and the basic needs of citizens are not met. The new policy saves insurgents the trouble of destroying infrastructure since it will already be in a shambles and they can concentrate on attacking the occupiers who don't even try to help.
April 8, 2006 Give Rebuilding Lower Priority in Future Wars By JOEL BRINKLEY WASHINGTON, April 7 As factions in the Bush administration continue their bitter infighting over the reconstruction program in Iraq, the State Department has produced a draft planning document saying that after any future conflicts, the United States should not immediately begin a major rebuilding program. Instead, it says, the first priorities should be to establish a secure, stable environment and begin political reconciliation. Otherwise, officials said, Washington and any local government that is formed are likely to suffer major political repercussions by making promises that cannot be kept. In Iraq, "We set it up to fail," said Andrew S. Natsios, who was director of the United States Agency for International Development until January. He and some White House and State Department officials say they argued early on that a large-scale reconstruction program could never succeed in a hostile environment. "We certainly have not done as much as we originally had hoped for," acknowledged James Jeffrey, who is the State Department's senior coordinator for Iraq. Some senior officials say they fear that the failures of the reconstruction program will pose a serious threat for officials of the new Iraqi government, once it is formed. "They will be vulnerable to complaints and hostility for their inability to provide electricity or clean water," one senior official said. Carlos Pascual, who until recently headed the Office for Reconstruction and Stabilization at the State Department, which prepared the draft plan, said this problem "was in part self-generated we came in and said we would restore the country, make it whole." Under the new plan, the United States would first establish public security and order, and then encourage small-scale economic activity while promoting political reconciliation. "If that is not done, then the society will unravel at some point," Mr. Pascual said. After that, banks, political parties and other institutions would be established, followed by news media, private aid organizations and civilian advocacy groups. Physical reconstruction would begin "only when it seems to fit into the other priorities," said Mr. Pascual, who is now a vice president of the Brookings Institution. "But the ability to build large-scale infrastructure before you have established order and stability is nil because it will be blown up." The draft plan reads like a refutation of almost everything the United States has done in Iraq. It also reads like another chapter in the prolonged and bitter debate between the State Department and Pentagon that began during the months before the invasion of Iraq more than three years ago. The Iraq Working Group at the State Department spent more than a year preparing a detailed study on how to manage the country once Saddam Hussein was driven from power. It anticipated many of the problems that developed, including the widespread violence and looting that American forces faced after the invasion and the badly deteriorated state of the country's electrical and water systems. But the Pentagon won control of reconstruction, over the objections of the State Department and the Agency for International Development, and Pentagon officials refused to use the study, saying it was too superficial. The Pentagon also blocked the appointment of Tom Warrick, the State Department official in charge of the study, to a position in the military's reconstruction office. State Department officials say the Pentagon was consulted in the drafting of the new plan. But the document has a clear diplomatic stamp, and seems like a pre-emptive move by the State Department to reassert its authority in any future reconstruction efforts. Bryan Whitman, a Pentagon spokesman, said that no one would argue with the notion that reconstruction was easier in a stable environment, but that "we can't look at this too simplistically. It is hard to establish a robust political environment if the people do not have electricity or clean drinking water. These are parallel lines of operation that complement each other." Marcia Wong, deputy director of the reconstruction and stabilization office, said the draft plan should not be viewed as an immutable template because "a lot of it will be driven by events on the ground." Officials will have to go in with "Plan B, Plan C and Plan D" as well, she added. No project since the Marshall Plan after World War II even approached the scope and ambition of the American reconstruction effort in Iraq. Over three years the United States spent more than $20 billion in taxpayer money and roughly $40 billion in Iraqi money to rebuild electrical power plants, water and sewer systems and energy infrastructure. Scores of smaller projects were intended to improve education, health care, agriculture, governance and criminal justice. Many of those did produce important and positive results. But stymied by a vicious insurgency and surprised by the Iraqis' inability to operate the sophisticated new equipment, the United States has scrapped scores of projects and now intends to reduce the program's budget drastically. A withering assessment by government auditors last month found that by almost every measure, Iraqi utility services, the central focus of the reconstruction aid, are now worse than before the United States invaded. Late last year, as the administration was devising its 2007 budget, officials said they initially planned to request money to finish some of the projects that were not completed or ever begun. But by then, the administration had given up on the large-scale construction projects and intended instead to spend money on agriculture, education and good-governance projects, among others, several officials said. "We decided to draw the line and start focusing on traditional forms of aid," Mr. Jeffrey said. Asked in an interview what lesson he had learned from the reconstruction effort, Mr. Jeffrey said, "Certainly, that doing massive reconstruction in the midst of an insurgency drives up costs and diverts funds." Mr. Natsios, who was still in office throughout the budget debate, said, "They realized they made a mistake." Mr. Pascual and others noted that Congress made it clear that it would not support additional large-scale financing for reconstruction or rehabilitation programs in Iraq. As a result, starting with the proposed 2007 budget, which is to take effect on Oct. 1, the administration is asking for only about $771 million, and has reduced its new construction aspirations to little more than refurbishing fruit stands and shoe stores. Mr. Natsios and others said they argued at the start against the large-scale building projects, in part because their experience in other countries over 50 years had shown that it was not the most useful way to spend money. Officials still in the government confirmed that he had made that case. James R. Kunder, an assistant administrator at the Agency for International Development, said in an interview that the most important priority was "to build Iraq's capacity to run its own affairs." An important example, Mr. Natsios said, was strong support for farming and agriculture, which was Iraq's second-largest employment sector. "If the rural economy collapses, the young men will be the first to leave for the city and join the insurgency, and that's what happened," Mr. Natsios said. The American aid package provided some money for agricultural assistance, but when money was taken from the budget for other purposes, primarily security, that was one of the first programs cut.
