Max B. Sawicky wrote:
I don't know if/how much JKG generalized on that. Haven't read him in a
while.
Where did Galbraith move from the bombing study to a question about
bottlenecks in general?
<snip>
I flipped through Parker's bio of Galbraith to see if he was explicit
about this. Parker's pretty good about tying Galbraith's experiences to
his later analysis. But I haven't found anything explicit. Yet.
Parker does describe at some length the Bombing Study and its impact on
Galbraith's career. And what seems to me to be the connection is this:
Galbraith and other researchers (quite a list of economists involved)
concluded that strategic bombing of Germany was NOT very effective.
Parker goes on about the struggle over the drafts of the report, for
other interests wanted to report that the bombing played a major role in
the defeat of Germany.
Galbraith, according to Parker, learned that bottlenecks were quite
easily overcome. For instance, after a raid, machinery was recovered
from a damaged factory, moved to a school or other building, and quickly
back in production. Production rose quite sharply during the years of
bombing. There were areas of effectiveness, like bombing railroads.
Gene Coyle
