Paul wrote:


Are these people beings alarmist?

PINR's guest analyst thinks that the militarization of the U.S/Mexican
border is a destabilizing factor for any Mexican government, no matter
the party. Jephraim Gundzik, CEO of Condor Advisers points out:

"The primary factor driving the staggering growth in social unrest is
declining real incomes. Real incomes for workers in Mexico's
manufacturing sector declined by a cumulative 2.6 percent between 1995
and 2005."

Which will be exacerbated by a decline in remittances flowing back to
Mexico from "guest" workers in the U.S., adding to economic uncertainty
and social unrest.

In Full:

Power and Interest News Report (PINR)

http://www.pinr.com
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
+1 (312) 242-1874
------------------------------

07 June 2006

Today's contributing analyst, Jephraim Gundzik, is the CEO of Condor
Advisers, a company that provides independent analysis on emerging
markets and country risks. Condor Advisers can be accessed at
http://www.condoradvisers.com.

------------------------------

As Elections Approach, Mexico Faces Internal Instability
Drafted By: Jephraim P. Gundzik
http://www.pinr.com

Weak governance and deteriorating social conditions have steadily
increased political and social instability in Mexico during the past
several years. Rather than soothing the country's rocky political and
social environments, the results of Mexico's upcoming general elections
will heighten this instability. More concerning, however, are tightening
U.S. border security and immigration reforms. These measures may provoke
economic instability in Mexico, further destabilizing the country's
political and social environments in the months ahead.

Political Instability

Hailed as a democratic leap forward, general elections in Mexico in 2000
ended the Institutional Revolutionary Party's (P.R.I.) 70-year long
political monopoly. However, the country's new president, Vicente Fox,
and his National Action Party (P.A.N.) were unable to gain a legislative
majority, winning only 224 seats in the 500-seat lower house and 53
seats in the 128-seat senate. Mid-term elections, held in 2003, further
undermined President Fox's legislative position, leaving P.A.N. with
only 148 seats in the lower house and 47 seats in the senate.

While P.A.N. had captured the presidency, its weak position in the lower
house and senate, especially after 2003, prevented the Fox government
from advancing its legislative agenda. Initiatives seeking to liberalize
the country's energy sector, reform public finances and labor laws and
privatize state-owned industries all foundered. The only substantial
legislation that was passed by Mexico's congress in the past six years
was social security reform, which came in 2004. This reform was met with
widespread social unrest.

Although multi-party politics has replaced Mexico's one-party political
system, governance has weakened dramatically, overshadowing the
country's democratic gains. The Fox government's inability to legislate
fundamental economic reforms, especially fiscal and energy sector
reforms, has darkened the country's long-term economic outlook. It has
also contributed to deteriorating social conditions, which have sparked
rising social unrest. The results of Mexico's upcoming general elections
are unlikely to reverse the weakening trend in governance seen during
the last several years.

On July 2, 2006, Mexico will hold general elections. In addition to a
new president, voters will also choose new representatives for all 500
seats in congress and all 128 seats in the senate. Governorships in
three states, including the Federal District, and 365 mayorships will
also be contested. Until recently, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, the
Democratic Revolutionary Party's (P.R.D.) presidential candidate,
maintained a wide lead over all other potential candidates in public
opinion polls. In May, public opinion polls indicated that Felipe
Calderon, the candidate of P.A.N., overtook Lopez Obrador.

The increasingly pro-P.A.N. bias of Mexico's media and corporate sector
is behind Calderon's surge in public opinion polls. This bias ensures
that the presidential race will be closely fought. It also raises the
prospect of old-style electoral fraud claims -- claims that could
quickly produce widespread social unrest. Apart from the increasing
potential for post-election social unrest, which candidate assumes the
presidency is not especially significant as no party is expected to gain
a legislative majority in the simultaneous congressional elections.

Opinion polls conducted to gauge party support in Mexico's congressional
elections have been fairly uniform in recent months. Although the lead
party has changed often, these polls have consistently shown that no
single party will be able to amass a legislative majority. With no party
likely to gain more than one-third of the popular vote, Mexico's next
government will be no stronger than was the Fox government. Further
deterioration in governance will invite increasing social unrest.

Social Instability

Mexico's democratic transition and resulting deterioration in governance
opened the door to social unrest. Protests against government policies
and labor strikes have increased dramatically in scope and frequency
since Fox took office in 2000. In 2002 and 2003 social protests,
organized by numerous campesino groups, marshaled tens of thousands of
supporters for anti-government demonstrations. In late 2002, many of
these groups combined to form El Campo No Aguanta Mas (The Countryside
Can't Stand it Anymore). In January 2003, El Campo led Mexico's largest
campesino protest since the 1930s.

In late 2004, campesino protests again gathered steam. In September
2004, campesino rallies drew tens of thousands of protesters. They were
joined by 200,000 striking health care workers protesting against
recently passed pension reforms. In addition, workers from the
state-owned power company demonstrated against Fox's proposal to
privatize the electricity sector. These protests became violent outside
of congress where demonstrators battled riot police. Major campesino and
public sector employee protests continued in 2005. These were joined by
private sector employee protests and strikes.

Members of the Mexican Miners and Metal Workers Union (S.N.T.M.M.R.M.)
staged several large and lengthy strikes in 2005 calling for higher
wages and benefits and improved safety conditions. These strikes
snowballed in early 2006 following an accident at the Pasta de Conchos
mine in Coahuila that killed 65 miners. In early March, strikes by
S.N.T.M.M.R.M. members impacted more than 70 different companies
involving about 250,000 workers, paralyzing Mexico's mining and metal
works industries. This was Mexico's largest union-led strike since the
1950s.

Though the wider strikes ended after two days, Grupo Mexico employees
have remained on strike, sharply reducing output from Mexico's largest
copper and zinc mines. Employees of steel maker Villacero have also
remained on strike in Michoacan. Failed government efforts to break this
strike in early April resulted in the deaths of two employees and many
gunshot injuries. In addition to these strikes, violent protests have
also recently erupted near Mexico City. Finally, drug-related violence
has also soared higher in the past several years.

The primary factor driving the staggering growth in social unrest is
declining real incomes. Real incomes for workers in Mexico's
manufacturing sector declined by a cumulative 2.6 percent between 1995
and 2005. It is a safe bet that the contraction of real incomes
economy-wide, including Mexico's sizable informal economy, during the
past 11 years has been much deeper than the contraction of real incomes
in the manufacturing sector.

A significant factor driving real income growth lower has been the
government's tight control over the minimum wage. Although the number of
employees earning the minimum wage in Mexico is quite small, a large
portion of overall employee wages are derived from multiples of the
minimum wage. Along with declining incomes, Mexicans have also suffered
from rising unemployment, erosion of benefits, falling educational
standards and increasingly unsafe working conditions.

In addition to unrest, deteriorating social conditions in Mexico have
also sparked a surge in illegal immigration to the United States. The
flow of illegal immigrants across the Mexico-U.S. border has increased
from less than 100,000 annually in the late 1990s to over 500,000
annually in the past two years. Without this immigration and the return
flow of remittances it provides, social and political instability in
Mexico would probably be exponentially greater now. For this reason,
militarization of the U.S.-Mexico border and immigration reforms in the
United States will have far-reaching negative political, social and
economic consequences for Mexico.

Economic Instability

Remittances from illegal immigrants in the United States are Mexico's
second largest source of foreign exchange earnings and have become the
backbone of Mexico's economy. In 2005, these remittances surpassed US$20
billion or 2.7 percent of G.D.P. By comparison, Mexico earned $35
billion from oil exports and about $12 billion from tourism revenue in
2005. Much of Mexico's oil revenue is diverted toward the federal
government's budget or used to service the massive debt of the country's
state-owned oil company, Pemex.

The inflow from remittances is an important source of income for the
family members in Mexico of Mexicans working in the United States. This
income, along with booming consumer credit growth, has been the primary
factor behind strong real private consumption growth in Mexico, which
reached 4.1 percent in 2004 and 5.4 percent in 2005. The growth of
private consumption has, in turn, prevented real G.D.P. growth from
weakening.

In contrast to private consumption, Mexico's corporate sector has
weakened during the past two years. Non-oil export growth declined to
10.6 percent in 2005 from 12.4 percent in 2004. Industrial production
growth also slowed in 2005 to 2.7 percent from 4.7 percent in 2004.
Falling industrial output and exports have been accompanied by
contracting commercial credit. The weakness of the corporate sector has
contributed to contracting real incomes, has prevented employment growth
and has encouraged the rising tide of illegal immigration to the United
States.

The militarization of the U.S.-Mexico border, which began on June 1,
includes the deployment of 6,000 U.S. National Guard troops. These
troops will be joined by 4,000 additional Border Patrol agents in the
next two years. In addition to more manpower and equipment for policing
the border, the United States will also begin constructing hundreds of
miles of security fencing and automobile barriers along the border. This
will significantly reduce the flow of illegal Mexican immigrants to the
United States beginning this year, capping the flow of remittances back
to Mexico.

The flow of remittances back to Mexico will probably decline
substantially beginning in 2007 as deportations of illegal immigrants
increase. Impending changes to U.S. immigration laws will drive
deportations. Although moderates in the U.S. House and Senate and
President Bush support the legalization of many illegal immigrants in
the United States, conservatives in both houses stand strongly opposed.
These conservatives, who are overwhelmingly Republican, far outweigh the
moderates, suggesting that immigration reform legislation will
inevitably include a degree of criminalization for employers of illegal
immigrants and stepped-up deportation efforts.

Conclusion

Declining remittances will deal a severe blow to Mexico's economy,
aggravating social and political instability that is already becoming
acute. Depending on U.S. economic developments and the outcome of
immigration reform efforts, Mexico's economy could dip into recession as
early as 2007, sparking a significant increase in social unrest. Perhaps
this unrest will trigger economic reforms that will improve social
conditions in Mexico. If not, Mexico's long-term political, social and
economic outlooks are bleak.

Report Drafted By:
Jephraim P. Gundzik

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