by Greg Palast
They got him -- the big, bad, beheading berserker in Iraq. But,
something's gone unreported in all the glee over getting Zarqawi …
who invited him into Iraq in the first place?
If you prefer your fairy tales unsoiled by facts, read no further.
If you want the uncomfortable truth, begin with this: A phone call
to Baghdad to Saddam's Palace on the night of April 21, 2003. It was
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld on a secure line from Washington
to General Jay Garner.
The General had arrives in Baghdad just hours before to take charge
of the newly occupied nation. The message from Rumsfeld was not a
heartwarming welcome. Rummy told Garner, Don't unpack, Jack --
you're fired.
What had Garner done? The many-starred general had been sent by the
President himself to take charge of a deeply dangerous mission. Iraq
was tense but relatively peaceful. Garner's job was to keep the
peace and bring democracy.
Unfortunately for the general, he took the President at his word.
But the general was wrong. "Peace" and "Democracy" were the slogans.
"My preference," Garner told me in his understated manner, "was to
put the Iraqis in charge as soon as we can and do it in some form of
elections."
But elections were not in The Plan.
The Plan was a 101-page document to guide the long-term future of the
land we'd just conquered. There was nothing in it about democracy or
elections or safety. There was, rather, a detailed schedule for
selling off "all [Iraq's] state assets" -- and Iraq, that's just
about everything -- "especially," said The Plan, "the oil and
supporting industries." Especially the oil.
There was more than oil to sell off. The Plan included the sale of
Iraq's banks, and weirdly, changing it's copyright laws and other odd
items that made the plan look less like a program for Iraq to get on
its feet than a program for corporate looting of the nation's
assets. (And indeed, we discovered at BBC, behind many of the odder
elements -- copyright and tax code changes -- was the hand of
lobbyist Jack Abramoff's associate Grover Norquist.)
But Garner didn't think much of The Plan, he told me when we met a
year later in Washington. He had other things on his mind. "You
prevent epidemics, you start the food distribution program to prevent
famine."
Seizing title and ownership of Iraq's oil fields was not on Garner's
must-do list. He let that be known to Washington. "I don't think
[Iraqis] need to go by the U.S. plan, I think that what we need to do
is set an Iraqi government that represents the freely elected will of
the people." He added, "It's their country … their oil."
Apparently, the Secretary of Defense disagreed. So did lobbyist
Norquist. And Garner incurred their fury by getting carried away
with the "democracy" idea: he called for quick elections -- within
90 days of the taking of Baghdad.
But Garner's 90-days-to-elections commitment ran straight into the
oil sell-off program. Annex D of the plan indicated that would take
at least 270 days -- at least 9 months.
Worse, Garner was brokering a truce between Sunnis, Shias and Kurds.
They were about to begin what Garner called a "Big Tent" meeting to
hammer out the details and set the election date. He figured he had
90 days to get it done before the factions started slitting each
other's throats.
But a quick election would mean the end of the state-asset sell-off
plan: An Iraqi-controlled government would never go along with what
would certainly amount to foreign corporations swallowing their
entire economy. Especially the oil. Garner had spent years in Iraq,
in charge of the Northern Kurdish zone and knew Iraqis well. He was
certain that an asset-and-oil grab, "privatizations," would cause a
sensitive population to take up the gun. "That's just one fight you
don't want to take on right now."
But that's just the fight the neo-cons at Defense wanted. And in
Rumsfeld's replacement for Garner, they had a man itching for the
fight. Paul Bremer III had no experience on the ground in Iraq, but
he had one unbeatable credential that Garner lacked: Bremer had
served as Managing Director of Kissinger and Associates.
In April 2003, Bremer instituted democracy Bush style: he canceled
elections and appointed the entire government himself. Two months
later, Bremer ordered a halt to all municipal elections including the
crucial vote to Shia seeking to select a mayor in the city of Najaf.
The front-runner, moderate Shia Asad Sultan Abu Gilal warned, "If
they don't give us freedom, what will we do? We have patience, but
not for long." Local Shias formed the "Mahdi Army," and within a
year, provoked by Bremer's shutting their paper, attacked and killed
21 U.S. soldiers.
The insurgency had begun. But Bremer's job was hardly over. There
were Sunnis to go after. He issued "Order Number One: De-
Ba'athification." In effect, this became "De-Sunni-fication."
Saddam's generals, mostly Sunnis, who had, we learned, secretly
collaborated with the US invasion and now expected their reward found
themselves hunted and arrested. Falah Aljibury, an Iraqi-born US
resident who helped with the pre-invasion brokering, told me, "U.S.
forces imprisoned all those we named as political leaders," who
stopped Iraq's army from firing on U.S. troops.
Aljibury's main concern was that busting Iraqi collaborators and
Ba'athist big shots was a gift "to the Wahabis," by which he meant
the foreign insurgents, who now gained experienced military
commanders, Sunnis, who now had no choice but to fight the US-
installed regime or face arrest, ruin or death. They would soon link
up with the Sunni-defending Wahabi, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who was
committed to destroying "Shia snakes."
And the oil fields? It was, Aljibury noted, when word got out about
the plans to sell off the oil fields (thanks to loose lips of the US-
appointed oil minister) that pipelines began to blow. Although he
had been at the center of planning for invasion, Aljibury now saw the
greed-crazed grab for the oil fields as the fuel for a civil war that
would rip his country to pieces:
"Insurgents," he said, "and those who wanted to destabilize a new
Iraq have used this as means of saying, 'Look, you're losing your
country. You’re losing your leadership. You're losing all of your
resources to a bunch of wealthy people. A bunch of billionaires in
the world want to take you over and make your life miserable.' And we
saw an increase in the bombing of oil facilities, pipelines, of
course, built on -- built on the premise that privatization [of oil]
is coming."
General Garner, watching the insurgency unfold from the occupation
authority's provocations, told me, in his understated manner, "I'm a
believer that you don't want to end the day with more enemies than
you started with."
But you can't have a war president without a war. And you can't have
a war without enemies. "Bring 'em on," our Commander-in-Chief said.
And Zarqawi answered the call.
**********
Greg Palast is the author of Armed Madhouse out this week from
Penguin Dutton, from which this is adapted.