Sorry, I couldn't help myself... Is there a 12 step group for perverse
headline writers?
.
ravi wrote:
Since you both asked ;-) ... my 2 cents ...
I think what would interest me is the rarely reported item, typically
giving the other side of the standard story. The outlet could still be a
mainstream one (BBC or AP often let some non-establishment message slip
through).
.
How about WHY all those warships are visiting HK?
[Courtesy of a tip from the A-team]
US plan for defending Taiwan disclosed
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2006/06/05/2003311784
BE PREPARED: Though familiar to military specialists in Washinton, details
about an operational plan for a US response to an attack on Taiwan were
recently made public By Charles Snyder STAFF REPORTER Monday, Jun 05,
2006,Page 3 The US military has developed a comprehensive operational plan
to fight China and defend Taiwan in case of a Chinese attack, according to
a recent news article and comments by Taipei Times sources.
The plan, which is overseen by the US Pacific Command headquartered in
Honolulu, involves not only US Pacific forces, but also US troops and
equipment worldwide, according to military experts.
And, while the plan, officially designated "Oplan 5077-04," includes
provisions for the possible use of nuclear weapons, the focus of that
section of the plan is that nuclear weapons should be avoided.
The Pentagon refused to comment on Oplan 5077, whose details remain top
secret.
"It is [Department of Defense] policy to not comment on the specifics of
operational plans," Pentagon spokesman Brian Maka told the Taipei Times.
While the existence of Oplan 5077 has long been known among military
specialists in Washington, details were first made public in a recent
article by military affairs journalist and former intelligence agent
William Arkin in an article posted on the Washington Post Web site. Other
details were supplied to the Taipei Times by military specialists in
Washington.
While Oplan 5077 has been around since the Reagan presidency, it was
elevated from a conceptual plan to an operational plan with assigned forces
and detailed annexes in 2001, shortly after the [George W.] Bush
administration took office, according to Arkin.
"The Pacific command developed a new `strategic concept' for the Taiwan
contingency in December 2002, and an updated plan was produced in July
2003. Last year, based upon new 2004 guidance from Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld and the Joint Chiefs of Staff ... a final Taiwan defense
plan was published," Arkin wrote.
The plan now includes "air, naval, ground amphibious, and missile defense
forces and `excursions' to defend Taiwan. Options include maritime
intercept operations in the Taiwan straits [sic], attacks on Chinese
targets on the mainland, information warfare and `non-kinetic' options,
even the potential use of American nuclear weapons," Arkin wrote.
While the elevation of the plan to an operational component of the Pacific
Command's mandate coincided with the installation of the Bush
administration, many credit its current status as a final strategy for
dealing with a Chinese attack with former commander in chief of the US
Pacific Command, Admiral Dennis Blair.
"It was Admiral Blair who said, `Let's get serious about the defense of
Taiwan,'" said retired Admiral Eric McVadon, a leading military consultant
in Washington.
Blair had two aims when he took over, McVadon says. One was to develop good
military relations with China. The other was to boost Taiwan's defense.
Despite his several trips to China to improve relations, Blair "hedged" his
relations with Chinese, feeling that "it is prudent for us to realize that
things might go badly, and we need to let them know the consequences of
it," McVadon said.
There is no reason to believe that Blair's successor as Pacific commander,
Admiral William Fallon, is not continuing with Blair's philosophy, McVadon
says.
Blair was credited with opening up greater military to military channels
between the US and Taiwan, greatly expanding communications between the two
countries' armed forces.
This came despite hesitation in Washington about such steps among people
who felt the cooperation would anger China. The US Senate has repeatedly
rejected legislation passed by the House to enhance US-Taiwan
military-to-military ties.
And, while China complained about Blair's activities, the protests were
relatively muted.
Significantly, in recent years, Blair has become the regular senior US
observer to Taiwan's annual Han Kuang military exercises.
"Blair knows what went on with 5077, so when he observes the exercises, he
is able to evaluate it in light of his knowledge about what the
coordination is likely to be and what the goals are," one source noted.
"So, even if he does not mention it, when he says something, astute people
in Taiwan know that he's speaking from a position of authority with respect
to knowledge about the Oplan," the source said.
Taiwan's supporters in Washington welcomed the disclosure of Oplan 5077.
"It is at least a relief to discover that the US government has taken very
seriously the requirement to be able to react to an attack on Taiwan and
that it has recently been updated to factor in, I assume, China's
constantly expanding level of capability," said Richard Fisher, an expert
on China's military and vice president of the International Assessment and
Strategy Center.
Fisher sees the plan as stemming from the Taiwan Relations Act's mandate
that the US maintain the capability to help Taiwan defend itself in case of
a Chinese military attack. Fisher noted that the former conceptual plan was
turned into the Oplan only after Bush was elected in 2000.
"George Bush's [April] 2001 statements [that the US would do `whatever it
takes' to defend Taiwan] would have constituted an indirect order to the
Pacific Command to prepare, or at least to update, existing plans and
preparations for a possible conflict over Taiwan," Fisher says.
Arkin, however told the Taipei Times that work on the plan was deflected by
the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks and Bush's concentration on Iraq, and that
the work on the plan in late 2002 and 2003 actually reflected a return to a
focus on dealing with Chinese military action.
A potential war with China had been a major focus in the eight years before
Sept. 11, Arkin says. He also sees 5077 as a response to a military-wide
contingency planning guidance issued by Rumsfeld earlier.
Arkin says that the administration has put a greater emphasis recently on
missile defense, maritime intercept and to some degree on air defense
issues, all of which could be main components of any battle in the Taiwan
Strait.
He also notes that in the case of Taiwan, US global military capabilities
would be brought into play. These would include a better computer network,
a finer-tuned capability to go after China's air defense network, a
"well-oiled maritime intercept capability and an improved naval missile
defense capability which would allow the United States to interpose itself
between Taiwan and China."
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