> > 1. Under standard neoclassical assumptions, the profit of a given firm is > increasing, *other things equal*, in the labor hours or labor intensity of > its workers, and a given worker's payoff to employment is strictly > decreasing, other things equal(including labor income), in labor hours or > labor intensity. Thus in this ceteris paribus sense, capitalists "have an > incentive" to increase labor hours and/or intensity, and workers "have an > incentive" to resist this. These claims are unremarkable in the > neoclassical context and certainly not "situation"-al.
The rub is "other things being equal." Depending on how competitive markets for labor are, the capitalist may not be able to increase the intensity of work without losing some of the workforce, having to pay higher wages. Same thing with workers trying to resist, depending on how competitive the supply side is, workers risk losing wages or employment from trying to reduce the intensity of work. You get at this in #2, of course. > 2. In the real world, whether or not a *given* capitalist firm can > profitably require its workforce to increase hours and/or intensity will > surely depend on market conditions such as the number and availability of > alternative employers for workers in the market and bargaining power of > incumbent workers. Neoclassical--or more precisely, mainstream-- theory > addresses the entire gamut of such possibilities from the case in which an > individual firm has pure monopsony power to the case of bilateral monopoly > to the case of competitive labor buyers. Which case obtains is an > empirical matter and varies from labor market to labor market. Real-world > labor market surveys confirm that individual firms do not typically > perceive that they can cut wages or increase hours or intensity > unilaterally without suffering costs from increased turnover or reduced > hiring rates. But whatever the empirical case is, there's a mainstream > model that addresses it in terms of degree of competitiveness. Well, from my reading of history, it seems like firms try to increase intensity in highly competitive markets. I admit I haven't read any of the surveys you mention. What are some articles on this I could read? > 3. Not so Marxian value theory, because values are based on "socially > necessary labor time" (SNLT). And whether this is determined on the basis > of "average" magnitudes, per Marx's own representation in V.I, chapter 1, > or "some randomly determined point *within* the range", as you suggest, > the > fact that capitalists *as a whole* would gain by increasing the length of > the working day, other things equal, or reducing the labor embodied in the > wage bundle, other things equal, is necessarily *silent* with respect to > the question of whether, given empirically relevant competitive conditions > in markets for labor power, it would pay *individual* capitalists to do > this. And if it's not profitable for any individual capitalist to pursue > such strategies, it's not clear how Marx's value theory offers any > empirically relevant insights. So on one hand, neoclassical theory > places no *a priori* "limits to how much the capitalist *wants to* push > the > laborer, [or] limits to how much the laborer *wants to* resist", contrary > to your suggestion, but does have the capacity, *unlike* Marxian value > theory, to specify market conditions which limit how much a given > capitalist *can* profitably push laborers, and how much given laborers > *can* effectively resist. To the extent that such considerations are > empirically relevant, this is an argument for the comparative superiority > of mainstream theory over Marxian theory. This is a good point. > What's wrong with the existing mainstream theories of labor market > segmentation? What empirical regularities with respect to this phenomenon > are demonstrably better explained by Marxian theory relative to > neoclassical theories based, e.g., on efficiency wages or bargaining > power? For example, in the extensive empirical work of Dickens and Lang > on > dual labor markets, what part of their empirical results *requires* an > explanation unique to Marxian value theory? Well, Botwinick's argument is that neoclassical theories of labor maket segmentation require some degree of monopoly power, but that segmentation exists in highly competitive markets. There is no better explanation in classical Marxian economic theory, but Botwinick develops his own theory based on Marxian economics to explain this. I'll be honest, I am just taking Botwinick's word for it that NC theories of segmentation *require* imperfect competition. And actually, his criticism of efficiency wage theory is just awful (he basically argues that capitalists have other ways of eliciting effort, and that therefore efficiency wages mustn't exist. The thing is, Marxists like Botwinick use a different theory of competition from most neoclassicals. They call the perfect-imperfect-monopolistic competition theories "quantity theories of competition" as they seem to be based, at some level (even monopolistic competition- and obviously the perfct- imperfect spectrum), on the number of firms relative to the size of the market. Marxists like Weeks, Botwinick, Semmler, and Dumenil and Levy have constructed non-quantity theories of competition. These have the advantage of being more intuitive because, say, Coke and Pepsi seem extremely competitive with each other but these industries would probably be considered monopolistic competition of imperfect competition by the quantity theories. It also seems more empirically correct because (as per Mark Glick's research) in the very long run, average profit rates for industries equalize, even if one industry is more concentrated than another over the whole period. Of course, it may be very well be that the non-quantity theories of competition can be satisfactorally superimposed on neoclassical theory. Dumenil and Levy seem to argue that they require "classical" economic theory, but I'm not sure. The same is true for Ben Fine's theories of segmentation. Unlike Botwinick, he doesn't have some overarching theory of why the NC explanation is wrong, but offers scattershot critiques of various empirical studies. In his books on consumption, Fine developed the "systems of provision" approach where each commodity has a different system of provision (and with each sop a different value of LP), and this provides the basis for an alternative theory of segmentation. Of course, it may very well be that the systems of provision approach is compatible with NC theory, despite it being developed by a Marxian economist. I actually hope that NC theory can provide a better description of empirical observations than value theory, because the former has a much stronger theoretical basis (and thus I don't have to compromise between sounder theory and explanatory power). >>Of course, I'm sure Gil will disagree with me on most of this.... > > I'll be interested to hear what it is about the "law of value" that has > unique explanatory power with respect to the phenomena discussed above. >
