Could I put this in my blog, perhaps attributing it to "a friend"? or to you if you prefer.
On Mon, Oct 02, 2006 at 12:05:29PM -0400, Paul wrote: > In previous Pen-l postings I characterized Landes as part of the "cultural > superiority" school (his early work on Egypt, and "Wealth and Poverty of > Nations"), although Jim D. saw merit in "Unbound Prometheus". Just after > the extract Michael P. cites, Landes attributes much to > "Judeo-Christianity" (including..."Judeo-Christian respect for manual > labor", citing Noah's ark -- I am not kidding). > > But focusing on this extract I wonder whether Landes isn't just falling in > the usual traps: history only from the perspective of the elite along with > a failure to include the political/intellectual perspectives in looking at > economic history. > > So, 'Rome was good times; the Middle Ages were bad times' -- with no > mention of those who went from slave (40% of Italy were) to serf (with a > few customary rights), nor mention of the vast conquered peoples (Pope > Benedict is quite wrong about why Islam so readily took over and converted > the territories occupied of the Byzantine Roman Empire). > > The howler is when Landes cites the water power improvements made at the > Abbey of Clairvaux and how they helped promote progress in Europe. At this > time Clairvaux was perhaps the most powerful political force in > Europe. The improvements made around the elite, small headquarters Abbey > (using known, well established technologies) were funded by the vast far > flung holdings of feudal estates legated to the Abbey by devoted nobles > (which received no improvements). Looking at the entire economy of the > Abbey shows only a classic elite enclave enjoying the fruits of its > exploitation, not an independent dynamic new economic model replicable on a > larger scale. > > Landes' blinders also include the political and intellectual factors that > promote progress. As all students of the Sorbonne know, at this time > Clairvaux Abbey was arguably the single greatest conservative force > *holding back* the emerging forces of progress in Europe. Abelarde and the > emerging Sorbonne school of thought (logic and reason, drawing on > Aristotle) were put on trial for heresy by none other than St. Bernard the > famous head of Clairvaux. St. Bernard and Clairvaux likewise played a key > role in the launching and sustaining of the Second Crusade (deflecting > pressures for social change while also defeating the "popularist" elements > of the first crusade). Clairvaux was also a key political player in > European continental politics helping to ensure the centrality of > conservative forces such as those centered around the Holy Roman Emperor, > the selection of Pope's who were disciples of Clairvaux, the Lateran > Councils and the defeat of the Norman empire in Sicily. > > Paul > > > Michael P. writes: > >David Landes recently published an article explaining why the West > >prospered more than China. You can read the whole thing and scroll > >down. Landes finds the usual -- that China lacked the proper market > >arrangements that makes capitalism work. But then he goes further, > >suggesting that the monasteries (hardly what one might think of as a > >free market) were a major factor in European success. > > > > > >Landes, David S. 2006. "Why Europe and the West? Why Not China?" > >Journal of Economic Perspectives, 20: 2 (Spring): pp. 3-22. > > 3: As late as the end of the first millennium of our era, the > >civilizations of Asia were well ahead of Europe in wealth and > >knowledge. The Europe of what we call the Middle Ages (say, tenth > >century) had regressed from the power and pomp of Greece and Rome, had > >lost much of the science it had once possessed, had seen its economy > >retreat into generalized autarky. It traded little with other > >societies, for it had little surplus to sell, and insofar as it wanted > >goods from outside, it paid for them largely with human beings. > >Nothing testifies better to deep poverty than the export of slaves or > >the persistent exodus of job-hungry migrants." > > 5: "The one civilization that was in a position to match and even > >anticipate the European achievement was China. China had two chances: > >first, to generate a continuing, self-sustaining process of scientific > >and technological advance on the basis of its indigenous traditions and > >achievements; and second, to learn from European science and technology > >once the foreign "barbarians" entered the Chinese domain in the > >sixteenth century. China failed both times." > > 5: "The China specialists tell us, for example, that in a number of > >areas of industrial technique, China long anticipated Europe: in > >textiles, where the Chinese had a power-driven spinning machine in the > >thirteenth century, some 500 years before the England of the Industrial > >Revolution knew water frames and mules; or in iron manufacture, where > >the Chinese early learned to use coal and probably coke (as against > >charcoal) in blast furnaces for smelting iron and were turning out > >perhaps as many as 125,000 tons of pig iron by the later eleventh > >century-a figure not achieved by Britain until 700 years later (Elvin, > >1973, p. 85). In general, one can establish a long list of instances > >of Chinese priority: the wheelbarrow, the stirrup, the rigid horse > >collar (to prevent choking), the compass, paper, printing, gunpowder, > >porcelain. (But not the horse-shoe, which implies that the Chinese did > >not make use of the horse for transport.)" > > 6: "But Chinese industrial history offers a number of examples of > >technological regression and oblivion. The machine to spin hemp was > >never adapted to the manufacture of cotton; cotton spinning was never > >mechanized; and coal/coke smelting was allowed to fall into disuse, > >along with the iron industry. Why, asks Elvin?" Elvin, Mark. 1973. The > >Pattern of the Chinese Past Stanford: Stanford University Press): pp. > >297-298. > > 6: "Almost every element usually regarded by historians as a major > >contributory cause to the Industrial Revolution in north-western Europe > >was also present in China. There had even been a revolution in the > >relations between social classes, at least in the countryside; but this > >had had no important effect on the techniques of production. Only > >Galilean-Newtonian science was missing; but in the short run this was > >not important. Had the Chinese possessed, or developed, the > >seventeenth-century European mania for tinkering and improving, they > >could easily have made an efficient spinning machine out of the > >primitive model described by Wang Chen. A steam engine would have been > >more difficult; but it should not have posed insuperable difficulties > >to a people who had been building double-acting piston flame-throwers > >in the Sung dynasty. The crucial point is that nobody tried. In most > >fields, agriculture being the chief exception, Chinese technology > >stopped progressing well before the point at which a lack of scientific > >knowledge had become a serious obstacle." > > 6: "Why indeed? Sinologists have put forward several partial > >explanations. Those that I find most persuasive are the following. > >First, China lacked a free market and institutionalized property > >rights. The Chinese state was always stepping in to interfere with > >private enterprise -- to take over certain activities, to prohibit and > >inhibit others, to manipulate prices, to exact bribes." > > 9: "The Europeans knew much less of these interferences. Instead, > >they entered during these centuries into an exciting world of > >innovation and emulation that challenged and tempted vested interests > >and kept the forces of conservatism scrambling. Changes were > >cumulative, news of novelty spread fast and a new sense of progress and > >achievement replaced an older, effete reverence for authority. This > >intoxicating sense of freedom touched (infected) all domains. These > >were years of heresies in the church, of popular initiatives that, we > >can see now, anticipated the rupture of the Reformation; of new forms > >of expression and collective action that challenged the older > >organization of society and posed a threat to other polities; of new > >ways of doing and making things that made newness a virtue and a source > >of delight." > > 9: Important in all this was the role of the Christian church in > >Europe as custodian of knowledge and school for technicians. One might > >have expected otherwise: that organized spirituality, with its emphasis > >on prayer and contemplation, would have had little interest in > >technology; and that with its view of labor as penalty for original > >sin, it would have had no concern to save labor. And yet everything > >seems to have worked in the opposite direction: The desire to free > >clerics from time-consuming earthly tasks led to the introduction and > >diffusion of power machinery and, beginning with the Cistercians in the > >twelfth century, to the hiring of lay brothers (conversi) to do the > >dirty work, which led in turn to an awareness of and attention to time > >and productivity. All of this gave rise on monastic estates to > >remarkable assemblages of powered machinery-complex sequences designed > >to make the most of the water power available and distribute it through > >a series of industrial operations. A description of the abbey of > >Clairvaux in the mid-twelfth century (cited in White, 1978, p. 245-246) > >exults in this versatility: "coquendis, cribrandis, vertendis, > >terendis, rigandis, lavandis, molendis, molliendis, suum sine > >contradictione praestans obsequium." The author, clearly proud of > >these achievements, further tells his readers that he will take the > >liberty of joking (the medieval clerical equivalent of, "if you'll > >pardon the expression"): the fulling hammers, he says, seem to have > >dispensed the fullers of the penalty for their sins; and he thanks God > >that such devices can mitigate the oppressive labor of men and spare > >the backs of their horses." -- Michael Perelman Economics Department California State University Chico, CA 95929 Tel. 530-898-5321 E-Mail michael at ecst.csuchico.edu michaelperelman.wordpress.com
