On 12/13/06, Paul <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Yoshi writes:
>The White House would rather listen to King Abdullah, who is telling
>it what it is already thinking, than the Iraq Study Group or a
>majority of the American people who desire rapid withdrawal from Iraq....
Just one point: I think it is important to keep in mind that the ISG does
NOT urge a rapid withdrawal from Iraq (if that is what Yoshie was
saying). One the contrary, the ISG urges that only half the troops leave
by 2008 and the rest stay indefinitely to achieve U.S. purposes in Iraq
(those purposes are also somewhat redefined).
I was not saying that the Iraq Study Group is recommending rapid
withdrawal. Regarding the Iraq Study Group, I was referring to its
Iran plan. A few in high places in Washington are certainly making
the Israeli power elite nervous, though they remain a minority who
probably won't get their way:
<blockquote>Israeli officials were shocked by Robert Gates' statement
to Congress that Israel has nuclear weapons, and they are worrying
over why the U.S. secretary of defense-designate made this statement.
In particular, they want to know two things: First, whether this
statement was a private initiative by Gates, or whether he coordinated
it with the top levels of the American administration. And second,
whether he was implying that since Israel has nuclear weapons, it can
deal with any nuclear threat from Iran on its own.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Israeli officials were also shocked by Gates' expression of
understanding for Iran's desire to obtain nuclear weapons: He listed
all the states near Iran that do have nuclear weapons - Pakistan,
India and Israel - and noted that not long ago, Saddam Hussein's Iraq
also attempted to acquire the bomb. Furthermore, he said, the United
States is a nuclear power, and its forces are deployed in Iran's
vicinity throughout the Middle East, and Russia, another nuclear
power, is also nearby." (Ze'ev Schiff, "Gates Testimony / Preserving
Nuclear Ambiguity," 10 December 2006,
<http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/798771.html>)</blockquote>
No doubt many "moderate" Democrats and "moderate" Republicans will broadly
back the Baker Plan and their seeming opposition to Bush will draw in some
more liberal elements. Unless there is a strong mass pressure AGAINST a
Baker Plan-like time line we will be left with a debate between that and
whatever Bush proposes.
The steps the ISG lays out mean 80,000 troops in Iraq in 2008 at which time
a review and debate will then begin -- in that spirit one doesn't even have
a chance for U.S. troops to be out before 2010 (with a new Administration
taking office in 2009).
The right-wing Democrats are determined to have their shot at managing
the Iraq War from both the executive and legislative branches of the
government. If we can't build any organized Left in America under
_that_ condition, we might as well close shop and move to Venezuela!
On 12/13/06, Jim Straub <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
After reporting rumors that the
Sunni insurgency was confident they could take out the green zone in a
frontal assault, and was merely biding its time, Juan went on to say that
among acquaintances in Iraq there was consensus agreement that the Sunni
ex-Baath insurgency could handily militarily defeat the Shia militias in a
straight up war (if openly funded and armed by the Saudis on the greater
level threatened, I would imagine their chances get even better). I was
surprised that such hypothetical speculation would produce unanimous
agreement among any group of folks in the know over there, and a little
dubious. After all the Sunni are such a small minority. Even with superior
arms and training, what would they do with Sadr City?
Darling, think like a Henry Kissinger or a Zbigniew Brzezinski.
One, when you can't win, what do you want to do? Deny your enemy
victory. The enemy in this case is Sadr and the populist and
anti-imperialist faction of Iran.
Two, Riyadh and Washington can exploit multiple divisions among Shi'i
Iraqis and give their Sunni clients Shi'i allies.
Terrifying, that reality-based contingents of the imperial machine
in the middle east are already starting to maneuver with respect
to a potential Arab Rwanda.
You understand them better once you remind yourself that all "reality"
they care about is the reality of their power and wealth. The Saudi
plan can very well blowback on the rulers of the Gulf states and
Washington, though; certainly it will have as profound an impact on
geopolitics as the anti-Soviet jihad, backed by Washington and Riyadh
among others, in Afghanistan did during the Cold War. The Gulf states
have a lot of Shi'is. The estimates of Shi'is among the Saudi
population range from 10 to 20 percent. According to Vali Nasr, "some
70 percent of the people living in the Persian Gulf region" are Shi'is
("When the Shiites Rise," Foreign Affairs, July/August 2006,
<http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20060701faessay85405/vali-nasr/when-the-shiites-rise.htmll>).
POSTSCRIPT:
The radioactive Holocaust revisionist conference in Iran makes me
nostalgic for the ruthlessness of the Soviet leaders*. The Russians
today are unlikely to warn the President of Iran: "Stop that
foolishness, or eat polonium and die." Democracy and republicanism
have their drawbacks.
* <blockquote>In September [1979], the question became completely
academic for Noor Mohammed Taraki, for he was ousted (and his death
soon announced) in an intra-party struggle and replaced by his own
deputy prime minister, Hafizullah Amin. Although Taraki had sometimes
been heavy-handed in implementing the reform program, and had created
opposition even amongst the intended beneficiaries, he turned out to
be a moderate compared to Amin who tried to institute social change by
riding roughshod over tradition and tribal and ethnic autonomy.
The Kremlin was unhappy with Amin. The fact that he had been involved
in the overthrow and death of the much-favored Taraki was bad enough.
But the Soviets also regarded him as thoroughly unsuitable for the
task that was Moscow's sine qua non: preventing an anti-communist
Islamic state for arising in Afghanistan. Amin gave reform an
exceedingly bad name. The KGB station in Kabul, in pressing for Amin's
removal, stated that his usurpation of power would lead to "harsh
repressions and, as a reaction, the activation and consolidation of
the opposition"{20} Moreover, as we shall see, the Soviets were highly
suspicious a bout Amin's ideological convictions.
Thus it was, that what in March had been unthinkable, in December
became a reality. Soviet troops began to arrive in Afghanistan around
the 8th of the month -- to what extent at Amin's request or with his
approval, and, consequently, whether to call the action an "invasion"
or not, has been the subject of much discussion and controversy.
On the 23rd the Washington Post commented "There was no charge [by the
State Department] that the Soviets have invaded Afghanistan, since the
troops apparently were invited"{21} However, at a meeting with
Soviet-bloc ambassadors in October, Amin's foreign minister had openly
criticized the Soviet Union for interfering in Afghan affairs. Amin
himself insisted that Moscow replace its ambassador.{22} Yet, on 26
December, while the main body of Soviet troops was arriving in
Afghanistan, Amin gave "a relaxed interview" to an Arab journalist.
"The Soviets," he said, "supply my country with economic and military
aid, but at the same time they respect our independence and our
sovereignty. They do not interfere in our domestic affairs." He also
spoke approvingly of the USSR's willingness to accept his veto on
military bases.{23}
The very next day, a Soviet military force stormed the presidential
palace and shot Amin dead.{24}
He was replaced by Babrak Karmal, who had been vice president and
deputy prime minister in the 1978 revolutionary government.
("AFGHANISTAN 1979-1992 America's Jihad," William Blum
<http://members.aol.com/bblum6/afghan.htm>)</blockquote>
--
Yoshie
<http://montages.blogspot.com/>
<http://mrzine.org>
<http://monthlyreview.org/>
