On the Methodology of The Methodology of Positive Economics
By James Devine
at http://maxspeak.org/devine.html
on January 29, 2007.

When people talk back to the new breed of laissez-faire (neoliberal)
economists, they are often told that the policy recommendations - the
imposition of free markets, privatization, etc. - are based on
positive economics, not on normative judgments. That is, it's based on
"just the facts ma'am" and not on blatant free-market biases.

These economists always base their assertions on models. But they do
not want to get high on modeling glue (like abstract economists of the
Gérard Debreu sort). Instead, they defend their models on the basis of
the claim that they predict events in the economy.

Models always and everywhere involve unrealistic assumptions. Some
simplification is needed, to emphasize what's important. But Milton
Friedman - the guru of the neoliberals - went far too far down this
road. He lost sight of the need for models to be reasonable. That is,
the assumptions that form the basis for model-building must approach
fitting that's true in the real world.

For him, the validity of assumptions are totally secondary to the
model's ability to predict.[1] A good model may involve assumptions
that are "wildly inaccurate descriptive representations of reality."
Friedman suggests a model of tree behavior based on the conscious
decisions of leaves. If this model consistently predicts better than
one based on another explanation, the former is to be preferred.[2]
The only proof of the assumption is in the prediction.

This creates a Green Zone around the free-market assumptions such as
that people are totally greedy and markets work perfectly. Criticism
of these assumptions is totally irrelevant as long as the model that
they add up to predicts well.

But no model can be treated as a unified whole. Each assumption should
be treated separately. Each implies predictions. If leaves are
conscious, for example, that implies a specific result for an EEG.

This has some truth to it, but not much. You can create a model that
predicts (fits the data) pretty well, despite an unrealistic
assumption, if you add in another unrealistic assumption! The EEG
suggests that we dump the conscious leaves assumption, no matter how
well the model as a whole predicts. But Friedman can save the model by
assuming that leaves think in a different way than we do. Similarly,
the Ptolemaic Earth-centered model of the solar system can be made to
predict the movement of planets better than the Copernican one -- by
assuming new epicycles (unrealistic complications).

Friedman, of course, assumed that free markets always produce the best
of all possible worlds. But then people pointed to poverty, pollution,
or pestilence. He defended the model with another assumption: when
markets don't do a good job, it's because the government meddled with
them.

Similarly, the assumption that each of us is totally individualistic
does not to fit with experience. But the added assumption that each is
operating within market institutions makes models based on the first
one much more accurate in their predictions. This is because trying to
survive in markets encourages people to act in an individualistic way
(a fact that Friedman ignored).

Instead of Friedman's view, we must ask: is the cost of an
unreasonable assumption (consciously-calculating leaves) worth the
value of the resulting prediction? Crucially, it's a judgment call.
Thus, our value judgments help us to decide which assumptions to make.

Friedman and his followers make assumptions based on laissez-faire
ideology, which is heavily based on value judgments. They then use his
imprimatur to defend their unreasonable assumptions. This transforms
their normative views into "positive economics." But this is merely
legerdemain.

[1] 1953. The Methodology of Positive Economics. In his Essays in
Positive Economics. U. of Chicago, pp. 3-43.
http://members.shaw.ca/compilerpress1/Anno%20Friedman%20Positive.htm,
as of Jan. 26, 2007.
[2]  "I suggest the hypothesis that the leaves are positioned as if
each leaf deliberately sought to maximize the amount of sunlight it
receives, given the position of its neighbors, as if it knew the
physical laws determining the amount of sunlight that would be
received in various positions and could move rapidly or
instantaneously from any one position to any other desired and
unoccupied position." (Friedman, p. 19.)
--
Jim Devine / "Doubt is uncomfortable, but certainty is ridiculous." -- Voltaire.

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