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Southern Bank: A road towards a new financial architecture
Source: ALAI
Pablo Dávalos

http://www.choike.org/nuevo_eng/informes/5631.html

The neo-liberal model shows clear signs of erosion in Latin America.
This has been expressed in voter support for candidates who have been
critical of neo-liberalism, or who, anyhow, have built their political
and electoral discourse on the rejection of and criticism to
neo-liberal adjustment and stabilisation impositions, such as in the
cases of Ollanta Humala in Peru, López Obrador in Mexico, or the
governments of Chávez in Venezuela, Kirchner in Argentina, Vázquez in
Uruguay, Morales in Bolivia, Lula in Brazil, and more recently, Correa
in Ecuador and Ortega in Nicaragua.

Moreover, some governments need to keep not only a formal but also a
real distance from the IMF, as it was shown through decisions made by
Argentina and Brazil to fulfil their financial commitments to this
multilateral institution in advance. Therefore, there exists a Latin
American context in which – unlike previous decades – no government in
the region would publicly ascribe to IMF recommendations nor base
their public policies on IMF adjustment programmes.

Nevertheless, the persistence and presence of structural adjustment
and reform is quite strong in the region. The distance put by some
governments between themselves and the IMF does not imply that they
are launching a process to revert neo-liberal policies. The structural
reform promoted by the World Bank and IDB, which placed special
emphasis on bringing about strong institutional changes, has deeply
modified the institutional framework and has dismantled state
regulation capacities, while reinforcing financial groups and
monopolies, and multiplying the existence of clientele networks and
band-aid practices. These neo-liberal structural reforms have been so
strong that they have even hindered the creation of development
alternatives in the region.

Invisible conditionality and persistence of neo-liberal adjustment

Indeed, there is a void in which the criticism to the neo-liberal
model runs the risk of being a rhetoric aimed at political
legitimation before voter discontent with structural adjustment and
reform, rather than a proposal implying real changes in the
relationship among capital, labour, State and market.

This is why the IMF erosion in the region is not correlative to the
erosion that may be suffered by the IDB or the Andean Development
Corporation (CAF); and that, in the long run, the dynamics of
adjustment and stabilisation may still persist through something that
could be known as "invisible conditionality" (or implicit
conditionality), which has secured the presence of neo-liberalism in
the region.

Invisible conditionality is in fact the resource through which the
IDB, CAF or the World Bank itself, manage to create development
credits, while their disbursement remains subject to the country's
compliance with goals previously set by the IMF as regards fiscal
discipline (expressed in terms of fiscal surplus), trade
liberalisation, capital account opening and economic deregulation.
Thus, the IMF continues to be present in the region, under the
disguise of financing for development from multilateral banking.

In view of this, one of the most important initiatives among those
that have been recently launched by governments that are critical of
neo-liberalism, is the one proposing the creation of the Southern Bank
as a sub-regional bank that would change power relations within
multilateral development banking, and would reproblematise development
within a context in which the liberal ideology has blocked the way to
the major goals of humankind, particularly to critical and alternative
discourses and proposals.

Indeed, the creation of the Southern Bank would be fully drawn into
debate over the need for a new global financial architecture and the
search for new modalities of development financing within a context in
which the global casino economy has generated powerful institutional
frameworks to impose its decisions not only on certain countries but
also on the whole global economy, as it is evidenced by the
macroeconomic supremacy that intends to be awarded to country-risk
ratings of investment banks.

That explains why the creation of the Southern Bank should be regarded
from a political and epistemological perspective rather than a
financial or economic one. A political perspective should be adopted
since the creation of the Southern Bank implies a dispute at the core
of the world-system in neo-liberal times: financing and speculation as
gravitational centres of the global economy, which define new power
relationships and whose expressions represent the strategies of
dominion, imposition and colonialism characteristic of multilateral
development banking.

The "no-objection" mechanism and colonial control by multilateral banking

In fact, behind development project financing carried out by
multilateral banks, i.e. the IDB, CAF and World Bank, there are
colonialist practices that use the idea of development and economic
growth as figureheads to emphasize and strengthen both the conditions
of that which the ECLAC called as dependence in the 1970s as well as
the control, assimilation or breaking down of social resistance to
neo-liberalism.

It should be remembered that multilateral banks have created a control
mechanism that is applied to all development projects in the region,
which is known as the "no-objection" mechanism. This mechanism allows
absolute control over resources, methodologies, time-frames,
mechanisms, technical staff and the answers provided by societies upon
the development projects of multilateral banks.

The "no-objection" mechanism is part of a power exercise based on
certain goals that are set according to the dynamics of the
world-system and the struggle for world hegemony, rather than on the
characteristics of a certain development model. Consequently,
following the financing of a development project by this multilateral
banking, both the society and the State end up being further
dismantled and more vulnerable, and the social milieu appears to have
become more fragmented and prone to manipulation by clientele and
band-aid practices. The true role of multilateral banking is not so
much that of development financing but rather the exercise of colonial
power. This explains why its dynamics rely more on politics than on
economics or finance.

However, there is another dynamic, which is as important as those
exercises aimed at political imposition, which result from the
"no-objection" mechanism and refer to the episteme on which
development financing is built on. It is by virtue of this that
multilateral banks have worked hard to reconceptualise the theoretical
frameworks from which reality is understood and, so far, they have won
the epistemological battle. Maybe the time of defeat for critical
thinking is evidenced by ECLAC's adhesion to the epistemic contents of
neoclassical discourse.

Multilateral banking and the epistemology of power

Research institutes linked to multilateral banking and even surveys
funded by multilateral banks themselves, have firmly positioned
concepts that are useful for this new power relations, which has
resulted in a one-way debate, under only one theoretical framework:
neo-liberalism and its economic expression within the monetary and
neoclassical thinking.

Thus, for instance, we have the theoretical work on poverty carried
out by the World Bank, and the epistemological dispute over this
phenomenon, in which the Bank has managed to turn poverty into an
economic and individual phenomenon thanks to its "one dollar a day"
notion. As a result, that rich discussion where poverty was regarded
as a social and political phenomenon has been dissolved, being now
framed within the coordinates of the market and the homo economicus.

The broad panoply of concepts produced by multilateral banks has been
adopted by social sciences and economics without even including a
process of critical re-elaboration. For example, the concepts of
competitiveness, opening up, ethnic development, poverty, human
capital, social capital, local development, decentralisation and
autonomy, local powers, production chains, citizen participation,
labour flexibilisation, social dialogue, regionalisation and
communities, sustainable development, governance, gender and poverty,
citizenship, etc., form part of the discussion both of policy-makers
and social sciences themselves.

These aspects should be considered as relevant when it comes to
discuss the setting up of a Southern Bank, since this does not merely
imply the creation of a financial institution to grant development
finance loans, but a strategy aimed at recovering the concepts of
sovereignty and regulation and at establishing a new social contract
that would overcome the neo-liberal concept of "social market
economy".

The Southern Bank: challenges and opportunities

On account of the above, the creation of the Southern Bank should not
be considered from a financial point of view but rather from a
geopolitical and epistemological perspective, implying: the
reformulation of development finance contents; the possibilities for
integration under the criteria of complementarity and subsidiarity,
and the elaboration of an independent thinking that should remain
clearly detached from the theoretical frameworks of neo-liberalism.

In this way, the trap behind the creation of a Southern Bank would be
to turn it into an instrument aimed at financing development projects,
which would start to compete in this area with the IDB, World Bank,
CAF, or would fulfil the privatisation tasks projected by IIRSA, thus
complementing multilateral banking.

The idea to think, propose and set up a Southern Bank should be aimed,
in fact, at a reformulation of the global financial architecture, with
a view to protecting countries from the casino gambling practices of
financial speculators, getting rid of investment arbitration decisions
based on country risk ratings, and allowing an exchange and
integration based on new ideas regarding growth with equity,
interculturality and plurinationality.

That is to say, the Southern Bank should take part in those new
proposals aimed at protecting countries from the financial
globalisation and political meddling implied in the conditionality
attached by the IDB, CAF, World Bank and IMF, either implicitly as
invisible conditionality, or explicitly through the no-objection
mechanism.

For such purpose, the Southern Bank should be democratically made up;
a country representative to the Board of Directors should hold a vote
and such vote should have to be previously agreed with social
organisations and production sectors, that is to say, the Southern
Bank Board should always have an open, democratic, transparent, plural
and consensus agenda.

In the second place, the Southern Bank has the huge opportunity to
create a regional unit of account, i.e. the Latin American peso, which
could adopt a crawling peg against the euro. This could be a way out
for fixed exchange rates with the US dollar, particularly in the cases
of Ecuador and El Salvador; and it may allow a transition from the
dollar area – taking into account that nearly all regional currencies
are pegged to the dollar in one way or another – towards the rescue of
monetary sovereignty within the region.

Southern Bank credits would be granted in accordance with this common
unit, and shall be issued in euros, which is a world currency and has
the capacity to maintain its reserve status at least until the region
manages to implement a monetary integration strategy and finally
consolidates a common Latin American currency. However, at no time
should the Southern Bank thinks about maintaining its units of account
in US dollars, except as clearing house.

A key aspect of the Southern Bank lies in its relationship with
multilateral banks; a relationship that could be neither of
subordination nor of dependence. Multilateral banks, in fact, reflect
a situation of colonialism and imposition. Behind each loan granted by
multilateral banks there is a series of conditions that become
political instruments of dominion, blackmail, and even, as in the case
of the World Bank, of destruction of social and popular organisations.

In this sense, the Southern Bank can open several lines of credit as follows:

1) a fund transfer to cover the outstanding balances on IDB and World
Bank projects still pending in the region, particularly for the
construction of local infrastructure, which have implied the adoption
of onerous conditionalities, either explicit or implicit, such as for
example, the setting up of trust funds for multilateral debt payment,
using resources obtained from fees on public services which are
financed by these multilateral banks; or the public indebtedness with
the IDB or World Bank, provided that once the works are concluded they
will be transferred to the private sector. This transfer fund will
allow to complete ongoing projects that have been or are being
financed with IDB and World Bank resources, in order to alleviate the
burden of conditionality, undermine the political power of these
multilateral institutions and rescue national sovereignty from the
countries' own indebtedness, above all in the areas of health and
education which are sensitive issues and have been considered as
priorities by multilateral banks; this line of credits should allow
for the recovery of sovereignty with regards to development finance;

2) a line of credits for the reactivation of production, particularly
for those sectors that were worst hit by stabilisation and
macroeconomic adjustment policies, and that represented the bulk of
production and services of domestic economies; the idea is that the
Southern Bank will contribute to reinvigorate the savings-local
investment cycle with a view to reestablishing a domestic production
sector capable of forging trade integration alliances and strategies
within a common economic area;

3) lines of credit for R&D, that is, research and development, being
it possible to think of a bank research project with universities in
the region. This can bring about the need to coordinate and integrate
knowledge and technical production within the region, in a context in
which technology networks and the production of scientific knowledge
are controlled by the North. These lines of credits could be framed
within that known as investment risk although it implies the opening
up of new production areas as well as the creation of added value.

4) an emergency line to solve liquidity problems caused by current
account deficit of the balance of payments, and in order to avoid
competing with the Latin American Reserve Fund (FLAR), it would be
possible to think of syndicated lending mechanisms between the
Southern Bank and FLAR, so that such an important institution as FLAR
is maintained within the savings control mechanisms of the region.
These loans to the balance of payments account would definitely left
the region outside the area of IMF influence.

This implies that collaterals and guarantees should be different for
each one of the lines of credit. Nevertheless, that which should
radically differentiate the Southern Bank from multilateral banking is
the existence of conditionality expressed by means of the
"no-objection" mechanism. In this sense, the Southern Bank should
offer guarantees for each one of its lines of credit, but in no case
should it attach economic policy conditionalities to member countries.
Besides, collaterals should be radically separated from any attempted
imposition via conditionalities or "no-objection" mechanisms.

The resources that may be incorporated into the Southern Bank are:
government savings expressed in international reserves, government
pension funds, export surplus resulting from outstanding profits in
commodity prices, and bank membership quotas to be furnished by member
countries.

The Southern Bank could also establish partnerships with countries
from other regions in order to absorb short and medium-term liquidity
through financial instruments such as equity securities. For such
purpose, strategic partnerships may be established with other
financial institutions and central banks of friendly countries.

The Southern Bank should propose a reflection about the economic
policy of the region, aiming at recovering the epistemological
sovereignty which has been so far monopolised by the technocratic
discourse of multilateral banks. The concepts operating within the
notions of development, such as growth, income, poverty, equity, etc.,
are built around the need for theoretical legitimation of the centre
rather than around the needs for understanding the problems of the
periphery.

In this sense, the Southern Bank opens possibilities for challenging
neo-liberalism in previously forbidden fields: on the one side,
development financing with due respect for the sovereignty and
integration of peoples, and on the other hand, the theoretical
thinking on an equitable, intercultural, democratic, sovereign and
plurinational development.

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