Ellickson does not describe a commons, but rather the informal maintenance of private property relations.
Here is what I wrote in Transcending the Economy "Where people share values, litigation is less prevalent. For example, Robert Ellickson examined the effects of open- versus closed-range laws on cattle trespass disputes in Shasta County, California. Under open range laws, cattlemen are not usually responsible for accidental trespass damage, whereas they are strictly liable under closed-range laws. His point is that cattlemen and their neighbors cooperate to resolve their disputes regardless of who is liable. Following Robert Frost's dictum that "Good fences make good neighbors" (Frost 1977), Ellickson suggested that, rather than litigate, individuals in Shasta County seem to rely on community norms to determine their behavior (Ellickson 1991). Living near to Shasta County, I believe that Ellickson overstated the degree to which cooperation occurs. Although Ellickson did describe a few contentious conflicts, he tends to downplay their importance since he favors less government regulation. Even so, Ellickson performed a valuable service by showing how widely-accepted social norms can help to resolve problems that might otherwise end up in acrimonious litigation, which can lead to further conflict." On Fri, Jun 22, 2007 at 11:10:19AM -0400, ann li wrote: > Without trying to get into a fight here about what constitutes failure > or success, I would suggest that sub-optimal solutions are part of the > discourse semantics of commons theories and that they are not > necessarily "anti-dialectical". I agree that "commons tragedy" arguments > are anti-communistic, but the sustainability issues remain important > especially as they relate to modeling the informal social (control) > relations regulating resources. I recall Ellison's work on cattle > fencing which studied legal disputes among ranchers in Michael's neck of > the woods. > > Robert C. Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes > (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1991). > > Ann > > ------------ > > In reply to: > > Isn't market failure cost shifting success? > > Gene Coyle > > > On Jun 21, 2007, at 3:38 PM, Julio Huato wrote: > > > Jim Devine wrote: > > > >> It's a market failure as we > >> of the Econ tribe typically > >> use the term: a deviation of > >> the real-world market from the > >> idealized Walrasian world. > > > > I don't think that's the way economists understand a market failure. > > A market failure is the inability of a market proper (i.e. with duly > > stipulated private-ownership rights) to turn out an optimal or > > efficient allocation. > > > > The "tragedy of the commons" is the exact opposite. It's an argument > > against communism. It's about the inefficiency of communism. So, > > obviously, the "neoclassicals" don't need to respond to it. > > > > A Marxist response to this argument is, however, implicit in Gotha. > > The mode of distribution cannot be ahead of the mode of production. > > The mode of distribution cannot be ahead of the level of > > public-mindedness of the producers. Etc. The evolution of them all > > is, well, dialectical. > > > > It's not semantics. -- Michael Perelman Economics Department California State University Chico, CA 95929 Tel. 530-898-5321 E-Mail michael at ecst.csuchico.edu michaelperelman.wordpress.com
