Why Real Exchange Rates? 
Luis A.V. Catão

IMF Finance & Development, September 2007, Vol. 44, No. 3

How does one determine whether a currency is fundamentally undervalued or
overvalued? This question lies at the core of international economics, many
trade disputes, and the new IMF surveillance effort.
George Soros had the answer once—in 1992—when he successfully bet $1 billion
against the pound sterling, in what turned out to be the beginning of a new
era in large-scale currency speculation. Under assault by Soros and other
speculators, who believed that the pound was overvalued, the British
currency crashed, in turn forcing the United Kingdom's dramatic exit from
the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), the precursor to the common
European currency, the euro, to which it never returned.

But in the ensuing years, neither Soros nor fellow speculators have repeated
the feat consistently, and the economics profession itself lacks a foolproof
method of establishing when a currency is properly valued. This failure is
striking given that the exchange rate is a central price in economics and
that there is a measure potentially capable of delivering the answer and for
which plenty of data exist: the real exchange rate (RER).

What things really cost

Most people are familiar with the nominal exchange rate, the price of one
currency in terms of another. It's usually expressed as the domestic price
of the foreign currency. So if it costs a U.S. dollar holder $1.36 to buy
one euro, from a euro holder's perspective the nominal rate is 0.735. But
the nominal exchange rate isn't the whole story. The person, or firm, who
buys another currency is interested in what can be bought with it. Are they
better off with dollars or euros? That's where the RER comes in. It seeks to
measure the value of a country's goods against those of another country, a
group of countries, or the rest of the world, at the prevailing nominal
exchange rate.

One can measure the real exchange rate between two countries in terms of a
single representative good—say, the Big Mac, the McDonald's sandwich of
which a virtually identical version is sold in many countries. If the real
exchange rate is 1, the burger would cost the same in the United States as
in, say, Germany, when the price is expressed in a common currency. That
would be the case if the Big Mac costs $1.36 in the United States and 1 euro
in Germany. In this one-product world (in which the prices equal the
exchange rates), the purchasing power parity (PPP) of the dollar and the
euro is the same and the RER is 1 (see box). In this case, economists say
that absolute PPP holds.

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What is the real exchange rate? 

The RER between two currencies is the product of the nominal exchange rate
(the dollar cost of a euro, for example) and the ratio of prices between the
two countries. The core equation is RER=eP*/P, where, in our example, e is
the nominal dollar-euro exchange rate, P* is the average price of a good in
the euro area, and P is the average price of the good in the United States.

In the Big Mac example, e = 1.36. If the German price is 2.5 euros and the
U.S. price is $3.40, then (1.36) x (2.5) ÷ 3.40 yields an RER of 1. But if
the German price were 3 euros and the U.S. price $3.40, then the RER would
be 1.36 x 3 ÷ 3.40 = 1.2.

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But suppose the burger sells for 1.2 euros in Germany. That would mean it
costs 20 percent more in the euro area, suggesting that the euro is 20
percent overvalued relative to the dollar. If the real exchange rate is out
of whack, as it is when the cost is 1.2, there will be pressure on the
nominal exchange rate to adjust, because the same good can be purchased more
cheaply in one country than in the other. It would make economic sense to
buy dollars, use them to buy Big Macs in the United States at the equivalent
of 1 euro, and sell them in Germany for 1.2 euros. Taking advantage of such
price differentials is called arbitrage. As arbitrageurs buy dollars to
purchase Big Macs to sell in Germany, demand for dollars will rise, as will
its nominal exchange rate, until the price in Germany and the United States
is the same—the RER returns to 1. 

In the real world, there are many costs that get in the way of a straight
price comparison—such as transportation costs and trade barriers. But the
fundamental notion is that when RERs diverge, the currencies face pressure
to change. For overvalued currencies, the pressure is to depreciate; for
undervalued currencies, to appreciate. It can get more complicated if
factors such as government policies hinder normal equilibration of exchange
rates, often an issue in trade disputes.

Overvalued or undervalued?

How about comparing purchasing power when countries sell more than one
product? To do this, economists usually measure the real exchange rate in
terms of a broad basket of goods. Because the price of such a basket
normally takes the form of an index number—such as the consumer price index
(CPI), which includes both goods and services—the RER is also typically
expressed as an index that can be benchmarked to any chosen time period.
Going back to the dollar-euro example, if an RER index is 1.2, the average
consumer prices in Europe are 20 percent higher than in the United States,
relative to the chosen benchmark. Indexes don't measure absolute prices
(such as the price of the Big Mac), but changes in overall prices relative
to a base year (if, say, the index is 100 in the year 2000 and 120 in 2007,
average prices are 20 percent higher than in 2000). In this case, if RER
indexes between countries don't change over time, we say that relative PPP
holds.

RER indexes between two countries can be important. The massive U.S. trade
deficit with China has become a political and economic issue, and whether
its roots are in a fundamentally misaligned exchange rate is a point of
contention.
But, for the most part, economists and policymakers are more interested in
the real effective exchange rate (REER) when measuring a currency's overall
alignment. The REER is an average of the bilateral RERs between the country
and each of its trading partners, weighted by the respective trade shares of
each partner. Being an average, a country's REER may be in "equilibrium"
(display no overall misalignment) when its currency is overvalued relative
to that of one or more trading partners so long as it is undervalued
relative to others.

To establish when a currency is misvalued, and, if so, by how much, a rough
assessment can be obtained by the REER series over time. Under either
absolute or relative PPP, there should be no change in REERs over time if
currencies are in equilibrium. But because consumption patterns can change
faster than the market baskets statisticians construct—as can trade policies
and tariffs and transportation costs—deviations in REERs don't necessarily
indicate fundamental misalignment.

Yet, even though transportation costs and tariffs have declined sharply over
the past century and national consumption baskets have grown more uniform,
fluctuations of REERs have intensified. A century ago, among advanced
economies, REER fluctuations were within a 30 percent band. In the 1980s,
the United States experienced swings in its REER as wide as 80 percent!
Other countries have had similar experiences.
Tough calls

But not all large REER fluctuations should be interpreted as indications of
misalignment. Some large REER adjustments are remarkably smooth, suggesting
that there may be factors besides transportation costs, tastes, and tariffs
that play a key role in moving about the REER of a currency that is not
misaligned.

Technological progress leading to productivity increases in goods commonly
traded, called tradables, is thought to be one of those factors. Higher
productivity lowers production costs, thus lowering prices of such tradable
goods in the higher-productivity country, which then translates into lower
tradable goods prices elsewhere through international competition. But not
all goods are tradables. Nontradable sectors, such as housing and many
personal services, face minimal international price competition. So the
prices of tradable goods will tend to fall relative to those of nontradable
goods. To the extent that nontradable goods have a large weight in the
country's consumption basket, the country's consumer price index will rise
relative to the international consumer basket; hence, its REER will tend to
appreciate. This mechanism is often referred to as the "Balassa-Samuelson
effect." Both theory and data support that much of the REER variations
across countries are accounted for by fluctuations in the prices of
nontradables relative to those of tradables, and particularly so among
developing countries.

Persistent changes in terms of trade (such as oil producers usually
experience) and differences in fiscal policies, tariffs, and even financial
development can also help explain why REERs can differ across countries. The
IMF and economic analysts take such real exchange rate fundamentals into
account in estimating the "equilibrium" REER, around which the actual REER
should hover if there is no misalignment.

Estimating equilibrium REERs can be difficult because prices are somewhat
sticky in the short run and the nominal exchange rate is not (at least in
countries where exchange rates are market determined). So REERs typically
display considerable short-run volatility in response to news and noise
trading, and it's not surprising that many market participants and
policymakers get things wrong—sometimes very wrong. That can lead to massive
realignments with devastating consequences—such as the 1992 ERM crisis.
Imperfect though they may be, REERs have signaled large exchange rate
overvaluations in the run-up to many financial crises, making it important
for the IMF and others to monitor bilateral RERs and multilateral REERs.


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Jayson Funke

Graduate School of Geography
Clark University
950 Main Street
Worcester, MA 01610
 

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