The latest financial downturn is the final nail in the coffin of the
conservative free-market world-view

by Will Hutton

The Observer (November 04 2007)

http://www.observer.co.uk


I have been following the financial markets for more than thirty
years.
Crises have come and gone, but the one unfolding since August and
which
intensified last week is the most serious. It is not just that its
impact is cascading around the world because of the new
interconnectedness of global finance, it is that the authorities,
particularly in Britain and America, have lost control and do not have
the means to regain it as quickly as we might hope. With an oil price
approaching $100 a barrel, we are in an uncharted and dangerous place.

After more than fifteen years of extraordinarily benevolent economic
conditions worldwide - cheap oil, cheap money, growing trade, the Asia
boom, rising house prices - things are unravelling at bewildering
speed.
The system might be able to handle one shock; it is undoubtedly too
fragile to handle so many simultaneously.

The epicentre is the hegemonic London and New York financial system.
No
longer are these discrete financial markets; financial deregulation
and
the global ambitions of American and European banks have made them
intertwined. They are one system that operates around the same
principles, copying each other's methods, making the same mistakes and
exposing themselves to each other's risks. Thus the collapse of the
American housing market, the explosive growth of American home
repossessions and the discovery that 'structured investment vehicles'
(SIVs), the toxic newfangled financial instruments that own as much as
$350 billion of valueless mortgages, are not American problems. They
are
ours too.

The recent departure of the CEOs of two of the biggest investment
banks
- UBS and Merrill Lynch - after unexpected losses and loan write-offs
running into many billions of dollars is not just an American problem,
it's ours. It is also our problem that Credit Suisse last week
announced
more billions of write-offs, and Citigroup was rumoured to be
following
suit with even bigger losses. When banks take hits as big as this, it
hurts their capacity to lend, because prudence demands they have up to
eight dollars or pounds of their own capital to support every hundred
dollars or pounds that they lend. If they don't, they have to lend
less
- and that is called a credit crunch.

This crunch is already upon us - hence the massive selling of bank
shares at the end of last week and the extraordinary news that the
taxpayer, one way or another, now has supplied GBP 40 billion to the
stricken mortgage lender Northern Rock, a sum that could climb to GBP
50
billion by Christmas. Stunningly, that represents five per cent of
GDP.
The bank got into trouble because it thought, under the chairmanship
of
free-market fundamentalist Viscount Ridley, that it could escape
trivial
matters like having savers' deposits to finance its adventurous
lending.
Instead, it could copy the Americans and sell SIVs to banks in London
-
most of them the same banks that bought from New York - and it could
steal a march on its competitors.

But in the London/New York financial system, when things went wrong in
the US they immediately went wrong for Northern Rock in Britain. The
banks announcing those epic write-offs no longer wanted to buy
Northern
Rock's loans - and neither did anybody else. The Bank and Treasury
hoped
to get by with masterly inactivity, but instead, as we know, there was
a
run on the bank. The government had to step in by guaranteeing GBP 20
billion of small savers' deposits - but also, we now learn, by
supplying
GBP 30 billion of finance that the financial system will no longer
supply itself.

This is testimony to the degree of fear that characterises today's
credit crunch - and it bodes ill. What is worse, the Ridleyite maxims
that got Northern Rock into trouble have also disabled the rescue,
protracting rather than limiting the crisis.

What should have happened, of course, is that when the Bank of England
found that it could not find a secret buyer for Northern Rock in the
summer, it should have done what it did in the 1974 secondary banking
crisis. It should have taken Northern Rock into the Bank of England's
ownership. Individual depositors and the City institutions alike would
have been quickly reassured, and when the crisis passed the bank could
have been sold back into the private sector.

But in 2007, the Ridley view of how to run a bank is also the
authorities' view of how to respond to a crisis. There is a
prohibition
on even short-term public ownership. In a free-market fundamentalist
world, this, like regulation, is regarded as wrong. Instead, the most
expensive and riskier route has been taken so that Northern Rock
remains
part of the problem rather than the solution.

For when a central bank supplies rescue finance on this epic scale, it
has wider implications. In effect it is printing money to bail out
Northern Rock; good for the financial system, but bad for the rest of
us
because it will make it harder for the Bank to cut interest rates.
Already the British property market is in trouble. Given the absurd
prices it is all too possible that we could follow the American
market,
with huge bad debts and mortgage repossessions. The way Northern Rock
has been rescued will make it hard for the Bank to cut interest rates
and revive the property market, while remaining wedded to its
inflation
target. And if there are more Northern Rocks rescued in the same way,
the dilemma will get worse.

Last week David Cameron proudly pronounced that the Tories were
winning
the battle of ideas. He could not be more wrong. The credit crunch is
testimony to the exhaustion of a conservative free-market world-view.
To
get through this crisis, the American and British governments are
going
to have to think what hitherto has been unthinkable. Already the
Americans are cutting interest rates careless of the inflationary
consequences. Britain may have to follow suit. Both governments will
have to devise new forms of regulation and control. Banks may have to
be
taken into public ownership.

For thirty years we have been suckered into thinking that public
authority has no business intervening in the wealth-generating,
free-market financial system. This is the year when reality resurfaced
with a vengeance.

will.hutton at observer.co.uk

http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/story/0,,2205121,00.html

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