Can I ask a question coming from a completely NON raptor person? Can I assume correctly that in essence, the raptor itself handle all of the "open port" connections. In other words, if port 21, 23, 80, etc all show up as open ports when running a portscan, in addition to the fact that anyone from the outside can connect to this port on the firewall. Does this present a potential DOS say for example if a potential intruder decided to exploit one or many of these open ports and overload them with half scans or spoofed syns etc....or can does the raptor have built in syn defender capability or is it designed to handle a large payload of port DOS's etc ? Thanks for any answers
-----Original Message----- From: Johann van Duyn [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] Sent: Wednesday, January 09, 2002 1:07 AM To: Mike Shaw Cc: Josh; [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Raptor Firewall 6.5 Config Amen to Mike's response. A pen-tester normally smiles very broadly when first portscanning a network protected by a Raptor box, but often ends up pulling his/her hair out when they are unable to actually do anything with the results from the scans... I used to look after a site that sat behind a Raptor box, and would get calls from security companies wanting our business and offering to do a free 'light test' of our network, basically rattling our doors. They would often claim that they found numerous ports open, but when I challenged them to do something with those ports, they went away. I loved it. :-) Sloppy patching procedures do not necessarily reflect on the quality of the ruleset. If the Raptor ruleset is any good, you'll have your work cut out actually exploiting anything on the inside of the network you're testing, outside of what the unpatched HTTP proxy server vulnerability lets you do. Cheers ----------------------------------------- Johann van Duyn, CISSP E:mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED] ----------------------------------------- "We see things as we are, not as they are." -- Leon Rosten |------------------------+------------------------> | | Mike Shaw | | | <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> | | | | | | 2002/01/08 19:12 | | | | |------------------------+------------------------> >------------------------| | | | � � � � To: | | Josh <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,| | pen-test@securityfocu| | s.com | | � � � � cc: | | (bcc: Johann van | | Duyn/Stellenbosch/ZA/| | BATCo) | | � � � � Subject: | | Re: Raptor Firewall | | 6.5 Config | >------------------------| [IMAGE] I worked with raptor for several years, and what you are observing are the infamous "Raptor false positives". It's been few months since I worked with a Raptor box, but my understanding is this. �Once raptor has a standard proxy or GSP enabled, it 'opens' that port on all interfaces. �It allows you to make the connection to the outside interface, and then uses the rules to allow or deny the subsequent proxied connection. �Thus, you can 'connect' to all those ports, but you won't actually connect to the host unless there is a rule allowing it. So the only real danger is if they have misconfigured their rules. �If they put an "http universe - universe" rule in there, then yes--you'll be able to hit any box on the inside. �However, if they have a well designed ruleset you will only be able to hit the boxes they've explicitly allowed. �And if they've done it *right*, you will only be able to initiate connections from the outside (thereby eliminating any shoveled prompts, mailed pwdump output, etc). However, the fact that they have not patched the firewall indicates a high probability of over-permissive rules. Another thing to watch out for. �If they used a GSP (generic proxy) on those high ports (7070, 8080, etc) instead of the regular HTTP proxies, then you can do things that the normal HTTP proxy would have blocked. �I *think* this is true for FTP too if they used a redirection instead of the normal proxy method (normal being log in to the outside interface then use username@hostname to be forwarded). It's no fun for an auditor/pen-tester, because a plain ol' port scan won't give you the intelligence you're looking for. �Instead, you have to look through manually or do some creative scripting. �On the other hand, you can instantly tell certain things, since an open port other than the default list means a rule from 'somewhere to somewhere' which probably wouldn't be there unless it's in use. �For instance, you know they are using PCAnywhere and MSSQL. �That's something you may or may not have known before. Remember too that they can do port redirection, so even if you do see a particular service running on all hosts, that could mean that they've redirected several or all IP:ports to a single internal box. -Mike At 02:37 AM 1/8/2002 +0000, Josh wrote: >Hello, > >I am conducting a blind penetration test for a client >and have identified the firewall to be Raptor 6.5. It >appears to be loosely configured as the Raptor HTTP >proxy server vulnerability >(http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/2517) exists, and I >can reach internal addresses, etc. > >The port scan on the network revealed that many >TCP ports were open on the firewall and on the hosts >behind it. What seems strange to me is that the >results of the nmap scan show the same ports open >for every "active" host identified behind the Raptor. > >Is it possible that Raptor is talking to nmap and >opening ports based on a single ruleset for any host >behind the firewall? I can confirm that the hosts are >separate machines using other techniques. For >example, I don't see why the Raptor has port >1433/TCP open for the Solaris machine I can see in >addition to several NT 4.0 hosts that might be running >MS SQL Server. > >The nmap scan shows the following ports open for >ANY host that I can ping or confirm as being alive and >behind the Raptor: > >Port � � � State � � � Service (RPC) >21/tcp � � open � � � �ftp >23/tcp � � open � � � �telnet >25/tcp � � open � � � �smtp >70/tcp � � open � � � �gopher >80/tcp � � open � � � �http >110/tcp � �open � � � �pop-3 >119/tcp � �open � � � �nntp >139/tcp � �open � � � �netbios-ssn >443/tcp � �open � � � �https >444/tcp � �open � � � �snpp >445/tcp � �open � � � �microsoft-ds >512/tcp � �open � � � �exec >513/tcp � �open � � � �login >514/tcp � �open � � � �shell >554/tcp � �open � � � �rtsp >1433/tcp � open � � � �ms-sql-s >1720/tcp � open � � � �unknown >5631/tcp � open � � � �pcanywheredata >7070/tcp � open � � � �unknown >8080/tcp � open � � � �http-proxy >8181/tcp � open � � � �unknown > >Can anyone with Raptor 6.5 experience speak to >this? Does this match up to some default >configuration for 6.5? > >It seems to me that the firewall is misconfigured. For >example, a developer could put a vanilla install of IIS 4 >on one of my client's NT machines and unknowlingly >open up the whole network to attack since port 80 is >opened by Raptor for the host even though it isn't >currently running an HTTP service. > >Josh <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > >-------------------------------------------------------------------------- -- >This list is provided by the SecurityFocus Security Intelligence Alert (SIA) >Service. For more information on SecurityFocus' SIA service which >automatically alerts you to the latest security vulnerabilities please see: >https://alerts.securityfocus.com/ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- - This list is provided by the SecurityFocus Security Intelligence Alert (SIA) Service. 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