Pardon the intervention, but when you scrape
some traitor's stolen material from Washington's
tabloid press as your use case, it is embarking far
into WTF territory.
The activity described in the material appears
not only to be perfectly legal, but consonant
with the fundamental purpose of the agencies
and communities involved. It is consonant
with activities with a continuum over many
decades. It is also essential to discovering
active planning designed to bring about
substantial harm to people and infrastructure.
One gets the feeling that if an Al-Shabaab IT
guy sent a Dear PERPASS email, asking if
the IETF could be its service bureau for secure
communications to plan its next mass killing
at a shopping centre, the answer would be
"sure enough" as we're concerned about your
privacy rights.
On 11 Sep 2001, as fate had it, I was on one
of the suspect planes in the air. So perhaps
you can understand the interest in preventing
a similar event - which was coordinated via
Internet messages - as well as a certain
disdain for what seems to be ensuing here.
--tony
On 10/15/2013 6:26 AM, Stephen Farrell wrote:
Following up on my own point - not stylish but I think
in this case justified:-)
On 10/15/2013 12:41 AM, Stephen Farrell wrote:
>I don't
>see why we shouldn't be equally comfortable in saying "don't
>send cleartext" -*if* that's an IETF consensus position - as
>we have seen sending cleartext is also just broken when one
>consideres pervasive monitoring.
I guess this Washington Post story [1] that I saw this
morning would appear to provide a relevant example.
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