For once, I am delighted that the LinkedIn authentication URL embedded in their emails to me never works... (the redirect to LinkedIn seems to work, but then the site goes into a tight loop for some reason I am really not motivated to figure out).
Incidentally, if I understood Nick's analysis correctly, steps (b) and ( c ) are a good example of why I distrust app-based clients for services like LinkedIn - because it seems far harder to stop them using replayable long-term tokens than it is to stop a browser from doing so. R Robin Wilton Technical Outreach Director - Identity and Privacy Internet Society email: [email protected] Phone: +44 705 005 2931 Twitter: @futureidentity On 12 Nov 2013, at 16:37, Nicholas Weaver wrote: > > On Nov 12, 2013, at 8:05 AM, Phillip Hallam-Baker <[email protected]> wrote: > >> The biggest weakness in Internet protocols is relying on passwords for >> authentication. What can we do to make the password mechanisms more secure >> and to wean the Internet off passwords? >> >> I don't want to start an NSA rathole here, but I need evidence to support >> the above assertion and until the GRU or MOSSAD or PLA or whatever have >> their Snowden event, I am limited to using the NSA. >> >> 1) NSA using Password sniffing in Attack: >> http://boingboing.net/2013/11/11/gchq-used-fake-slashdot-linke.html > > Thats false. They didn't use password sniffing in this attack. And overall > reporting on that was pretty dismal. > > This was targeting information for a QUANTUMINSERT attack [1], aka packet > injection/Man-on-the-Side for exploitation. And there was no fake slashdot > page, just fake packets. I wish they were just password sniffing. > > > The goal is victim browser exploitation, using one of the two following > possibilities (i'd bet the former, but both mechanisms effectively do the > same thing): > > a) The NSA identifies those individuals it wants to target (in this case, > technical employees at telco/internet firms in allied countries.) > > b) The NSA's wiretap waits for a Slashdot or LinkedIn page [1] indicating > that the intended victim is logged in by examining page contents. Once it > has identified an intended victim, it now has the cookies for the victim. > > c) On the next fetch from the victim to the targeted site (ideally for some > inconsequential element, but with some tricks you can do it for a main-page), > "shoot" a packet injection attack to have some inconsequential element > redirect the victim to an exploit server (NSA calls this FOXACID, we > civilians can do the same thing with Metasploit's HTTP server). > > OR > > b) Look for DNS requests for Slashdot or Linkedin from possible victims, and > packet inject a DNS reply to your proxy server... > > > Packet injection in either case is used instead of a traditional MITM because > its effectively as powerful for anything w/o cryptography, yet much safer to > install and use, since failures don't result in communication cuts, if you > can't keep up you don't disrupt the network, its easier to install both with > and without consent (after all, its 'just' a wiretap), etc. > > > > The NSA has now created a world where any plaintext traffic isn't just an > information leakage, but a potential vehicle for exploitation! > > And by attacking allies as well as enemies, using a mechanism that is > available (albeit without quite as much targeting precision) to effectively > any adversary with a tap (France, China, Russia, Brazil, Israel, pretty much > anybody can play these games [3]), the network backbone just became an > incredibly hostile place. > > > If you are lucky, your adversary is any country your traffic passes through > you other than your own. If you are lucky. > > > > [1] QUANTUM is the code-word/program for packet injection, and this is > confirmed by Schneier's analysis of Snowden documents. In Schneier's > analysis he specifically linked to public speculation I made months earlier. > > [2] ANY cleartext site which identifies logged in users will do, as long as > the NSA has a sufficient parser to map page reply to user identification. > > [3] Please contact your local Gamma International, hackingteam.it, and Vulpen > sales representatives for details. > > -- > Nicholas Weaver it is a tale, told by an idiot, > [email protected] full of sound and fury, > 510-666-2903 .signifying nothing > PGP: http://www1.icsi.berkeley.edu/~nweaver/data/nweaver_pub.asc > > _______________________________________________ > perpass mailing list > [email protected] > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/perpass
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