* Craig James ([email protected]) wrote: > A far better approach is an escalating delay. Check the number of failed > login attempts N and delay (for example) N^2 seconds before responding > again. Legitimate users are mildly inconvenienced, and hackers are > severely hampered.
Sadly, in certain environments (US Federal organizations which are
required to follow FISMA), a lock-after-X-attempts control is required.
We dealt with this by utilizing the PAM authentication method with
pam_tally. It's kind of ugly, but it can be made to work. Other
alternatives are using Kerberos or Certificate-based authentication
where the user has to acquire initial credenials through some other
mechanism and then those have a limited time of usefulness (eg: Kerberos
tickets only last 10 hours). By using those credentials instead of
having database-based password requirements, you can avoid the entire
problem (along with password ageing, etc..).
Thanks,
Stephen
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