Restrict lo_import()/lo_export() via SQL permissions not hard-wired checks.

While it's generally unwise to give permissions on these functions to
anyone but a superuser, we've been moving away from hard-wired permission
checks inside functions in favor of using the SQL permission system to
control access.  Bring lo_import() and lo_export() into compliance with
that approach.

In particular, this removes the manual configuration option
ALLOW_DANGEROUS_LO_FUNCTIONS.  That dates back to 1999 (commit 4cd4a54c8);
it's unlikely anyone has used it in many years.  Moreover, if you really
want such behavior, now you can get it with GRANT ... TO PUBLIC instead.

Michael Paquier

Discussion: 
https://postgr.es/m/cab7npqrhmnoybetnc_2ejsuzsm00z+bwkv9sy6tnvsd5gwt...@mail.gmail.com

Branch
------
master

Details
-------
https://git.postgresql.org/pg/commitdiff/5ecc0d738e5864848bbc2d1d97e56d5846624ba2

Modified Files
--------------
src/backend/catalog/system_views.sql     | 10 ++++++++++
src/backend/libpq/be-fsstubs.c           | 16 ----------------
src/include/catalog/catversion.h         |  2 +-
src/include/pg_config_manual.h           | 10 ----------
src/test/regress/expected/privileges.out | 10 ++++++----
src/test/regress/sql/privileges.sql      |  2 ++
6 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)


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