OK guys, I would never have thought about modifying libpq to steal confidential data, and I have never used debuggers in this respect at all.
So super gurus can yet do the bad thing. Nevertheless 99% of users are not super gurus who could do such nasty things but a few of them could use an unencrypted private key. These few at least would have been frustrated if libpq could manage an encrypted private key. The server can manage such a key and the admin starting the server is prompted for the password. Ironically, it is generally accepted that it's better that the server private key be unencrypted so that any admin can start the server anytime. Thank you. -- Sent via pgsql-general mailing list (pgsql-general@postgresql.org) To make changes to your subscription: http://www.postgresql.org/mailpref/pgsql-general
