Thank you, Tom. You’re absolutely right―this change is not necessary. I’ve updated the patch accordingly. Best regards, Haibo
________________________________ 发件人: Tom Lane <t...@sss.pgh.pa.us> 发送时间: 2025年6月16日 12:46 收件人: Yan Haibo <haibo....@hotmail.com> 抄送: Peter Eisentraut <pe...@eisentraut.org>; pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org> 主题: Re: 回复: 回复: Fix potential overflow risks from wcscpy and sprintf Yan Haibo <haibo....@hotmail.com> writes: > Regarding the use of wcsncpy with LOCALE_NAME_MAX_LENGTH - 1, it is a > precaution in case the input string is not null-terminated. I don't think it's a "precaution". I think it's introducing a real bug (that is, failure on a locale name of exactly the max allowed length) to prevent a hypothetical bug. regards, tom lane
0001-Mitigate-potential-overflow-risks-from-wcscpy.patch
Description: 0001-Mitigate-potential-overflow-risks-from-wcscpy.patch