Magnus Hagander wrote:
> I notice our docs have:
>
> If you are at all concerned about password
> <quote>sniffing</> attacks then <literal>md5</> is preferred, with
> <literal>crypt</> to be used only if you must support pre-7.2
> clients. Plain <literal>password</> should be avoided especially for
>
>
> At what point do we just remove the support and say that people need to
> upgrade their clients? Sure, it's up to ppl not to configure it that
> way, but security-wise it's a foot-gun that I think is completely
> unnecessary.
Here's a patch that does this. Will apply unless there are objections.
//Magnus
*** a/doc/src/sgml/client-auth.sgml
--- b/doc/src/sgml/client-auth.sgml
***************
*** 316,339 **** hostnossl <replaceable>database</replaceable> <replaceable>user</replaceable>
</varlistentry>
<varlistentry>
- <term><literal>crypt</></term>
- <listitem>
- <note>
- <para>
- This option is recommended only for communicating with pre-7.2
- clients.
- </para>
- </note>
- <para>
- Require the client to supply a <function>crypt()</>-encrypted
- password for authentication.
- <literal>md5</literal> is now recommended over <literal>crypt</>.
- See <xref linkend="auth-password"> for details.
- </para>
- </listitem>
- </varlistentry>
-
- <varlistentry>
<term><literal>password</></term>
<listitem>
<para>
--- 316,321 ----
***************
*** 705,734 **** omicron bryanh guest1
<primary>MD5</>
</indexterm>
<indexterm>
- <primary>crypt</>
- </indexterm>
- <indexterm>
<primary>password</primary>
<secondary>authentication</secondary>
</indexterm>
<para>
The password-based authentication methods are <literal>md5</>,
! <literal>crypt</>, and <literal>password</>. These methods operate
similarly except for the way that the password is sent across the
! connection: respectively, MD5-hashed, crypt-encrypted, and clear-text.
! A limitation is that the <literal>crypt</> method does not work with
! passwords that have been encrypted in <structname>pg_authid</structname>.
</para>
<para>
If you are at all concerned about password
! <quote>sniffing</> attacks then <literal>md5</> is preferred, with
! <literal>crypt</> to be used only if you must support pre-7.2
! clients. Plain <literal>password</> should be avoided especially for
! connections over the open Internet (unless you use <acronym>SSL</acronym>,
! <acronym>SSH</>, or another
! communications security wrapper around the connection).
</para>
<para>
--- 687,707 ----
<primary>MD5</>
</indexterm>
<indexterm>
<primary>password</primary>
<secondary>authentication</secondary>
</indexterm>
<para>
The password-based authentication methods are <literal>md5</>,
! and <literal>password</>. These methods operate
similarly except for the way that the password is sent across the
! connection: respectively, MD5-hashed and clear-text.
</para>
<para>
If you are at all concerned about password
! <quote>sniffing</> attacks then <literal>md5</> is preferred.
! Plain <literal>password</> should always be avoided if possible.
</para>
<para>
*** a/doc/src/sgml/protocol.sgml
--- b/doc/src/sgml/protocol.sgml
***************
*** 296,314 ****
</varlistentry>
<varlistentry>
- <term>AuthenticationCryptPassword</term>
- <listitem>
- <para>
- The frontend must now send a PasswordMessage containing the
- password encrypted via crypt(3), using the 2-character salt
- specified in the AuthenticationCryptPassword message. If
- this is the correct password, the server responds with an
- AuthenticationOk, otherwise it responds with an ErrorResponse.
- </para>
- </listitem>
- </varlistentry>
-
- <varlistentry>
<term>AuthenticationMD5Password</term>
<listitem>
<para>
--- 296,301 ----
***************
*** 1533,1593 **** AuthenticationCleartextPassword (B)
<varlistentry>
<term>
- AuthenticationCryptPassword (B)
- </term>
- <listitem>
- <para>
-
- <variablelist>
- <varlistentry>
- <term>
- Byte1('R')
- </term>
- <listitem>
- <para>
- Identifies the message as an authentication request.
- </para>
- </listitem>
- </varlistentry>
- <varlistentry>
- <term>
- Int32(10)
- </term>
- <listitem>
- <para>
- Length of message contents in bytes, including self.
- </para>
- </listitem>
- </varlistentry>
- <varlistentry>
- <term>
- Int32(4)
- </term>
- <listitem>
- <para>
- Specifies that a crypt()-encrypted password is required.
- </para>
- </listitem>
- </varlistentry>
- <varlistentry>
- <term>
- Byte2
- </term>
- <listitem>
- <para>
- The salt to use when encrypting the password.
- </para>
- </listitem>
- </varlistentry>
- </variablelist>
-
- </para>
- </listitem>
- </varlistentry>
-
-
- <varlistentry>
- <term>
AuthenticationMD5Password (B)
</term>
<listitem>
--- 1520,1525 ----
*** a/doc/src/sgml/user-manag.sgml
--- b/doc/src/sgml/user-manag.sgml
***************
*** 215,222 **** CREATE USER <replaceable>name</replaceable>;
<para>
A password is only significant if the client authentication
method requires the user to supply a password when connecting
! to the database. The <option>password</>,
! <option>md5</>, and <option>crypt</> authentication methods
make use of passwords. Database passwords are separate from
operating system passwords. Specify a password upon role
creation with <literal>CREATE ROLE
--- 215,222 ----
<para>
A password is only significant if the client authentication
method requires the user to supply a password when connecting
! to the database. The <option>password</> and
! <option>md5</> authentication methods
make use of passwords. Database passwords are separate from
operating system passwords. Specify a password upon role
creation with <literal>CREATE ROLE
*** a/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
--- b/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
***************
*** 230,236 **** auth_failed(Port *port, int status)
errstr = gettext_noop("Ident authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
break;
case uaMD5:
- case uaCrypt:
case uaPassword:
errstr = gettext_noop("password authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
break;
--- 230,235 ----
***************
*** 373,383 **** ClientAuthentication(Port *port)
status = recv_and_check_password_packet(port);
break;
- case uaCrypt:
- sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_CRYPT);
- status = recv_and_check_password_packet(port);
- break;
-
case uaPassword:
sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_PASSWORD);
status = recv_and_check_password_packet(port);
--- 372,377 ----
***************
*** 426,433 **** sendAuthRequest(Port *port, AuthRequest areq)
/* Add the salt for encrypted passwords. */
if (areq == AUTH_REQ_MD5)
pq_sendbytes(&buf, port->md5Salt, 4);
- else if (areq == AUTH_REQ_CRYPT)
- pq_sendbytes(&buf, port->cryptSalt, 2);
#if defined(ENABLE_GSS) || defined(ENABLE_SSPI)
--- 420,425 ----
*** a/src/backend/libpq/crypt.c
--- b/src/backend/libpq/crypt.c
***************
*** 53,66 **** md5_crypt_verify(const Port *port, const char *role, char *client_pass)
if (shadow_pass == NULL || *shadow_pass == '\0')
return STATUS_ERROR;
- /* We can't do crypt with MD5 passwords */
- if (isMD5(shadow_pass) && port->hba->auth_method == uaCrypt)
- {
- ereport(LOG,
- (errmsg("cannot use authentication method \"crypt\" because password is MD5-encrypted")));
- return STATUS_ERROR;
- }
-
/*
* Compare with the encrypted or plain password depending on the
* authentication method being used for this connection.
--- 53,58 ----
***************
*** 106,119 **** md5_crypt_verify(const Port *port, const char *role, char *client_pass)
pfree(crypt_pwd2);
}
break;
- case uaCrypt:
- {
- char salt[3];
-
- strlcpy(salt, port->cryptSalt, sizeof(salt));
- crypt_pwd = crypt(shadow_pass, salt);
- break;
- }
default:
if (isMD5(shadow_pass))
{
--- 98,103 ----
*** a/src/backend/libpq/hba.c
--- b/src/backend/libpq/hba.c
***************
*** 791,798 **** parse_hba_line(List *line, int line_num, HbaLine *parsedline)
parsedline->auth_method = uaReject;
else if (strcmp(token, "md5") == 0)
parsedline->auth_method = uaMD5;
- else if (strcmp(token, "crypt") == 0)
- parsedline->auth_method = uaCrypt;
else if (strcmp(token, "pam") == 0)
#ifdef USE_PAM
parsedline->auth_method = uaPAM;
--- 791,796 ----
*** a/src/backend/postmaster/postmaster.c
--- b/src/backend/postmaster/postmaster.c
***************
*** 323,329 **** static int initMasks(fd_set *rmask);
static void report_fork_failure_to_client(Port *port, int errnum);
static enum CAC_state canAcceptConnections(void);
static long PostmasterRandom(void);
! static void RandomSalt(char *cryptSalt, char *md5Salt);
static void signal_child(pid_t pid, int signal);
static void SignalSomeChildren(int signal, bool only_autovac);
--- 323,329 ----
static void report_fork_failure_to_client(Port *port, int errnum);
static enum CAC_state canAcceptConnections(void);
static long PostmasterRandom(void);
! static void RandomSalt(char *md5Salt);
static void signal_child(pid_t pid, int signal);
static void SignalSomeChildren(int signal, bool only_autovac);
***************
*** 1808,1814 **** ConnCreate(int serverFd)
* fork, not after. Else the postmaster's random sequence won't get
* advanced, and all backends would end up using the same salt...
*/
! RandomSalt(port->cryptSalt, port->md5Salt);
}
/*
--- 1808,1814 ----
* fork, not after. Else the postmaster's random sequence won't get
* advanced, and all backends would end up using the same salt...
*/
! RandomSalt(port->md5Salt);
}
/*
***************
*** 3910,3958 **** dummy_handler(SIGNAL_ARGS)
{
}
-
- /*
- * CharRemap: given an int in range 0..61, produce textual encoding of it
- * per crypt(3) conventions.
- */
- static char
- CharRemap(long ch)
- {
- if (ch < 0)
- ch = -ch;
- ch = ch % 62;
-
- if (ch < 26)
- return 'A' + ch;
-
- ch -= 26;
- if (ch < 26)
- return 'a' + ch;
-
- ch -= 26;
- return '0' + ch;
- }
-
/*
* RandomSalt
*/
static void
! RandomSalt(char *cryptSalt, char *md5Salt)
{
! long rand = PostmasterRandom();
!
! cryptSalt[0] = CharRemap(rand % 62);
! cryptSalt[1] = CharRemap(rand / 62);
/*
- * It's okay to reuse the first random value for one of the MD5 salt
- * bytes, since only one of the two salts will be sent to the client.
- * After that we need to compute more random bits.
- *
* We use % 255, sacrificing one possible byte value, so as to ensure that
* all bits of the random() value participate in the result. While at it,
* add one to avoid generating any null bytes.
*/
md5Salt[0] = (rand % 255) + 1;
rand = PostmasterRandom();
md5Salt[1] = (rand % 255) + 1;
--- 3910,3929 ----
{
}
/*
* RandomSalt
*/
static void
! RandomSalt(char *md5Salt)
{
! long rand;
/*
* We use % 255, sacrificing one possible byte value, so as to ensure that
* all bits of the random() value participate in the result. While at it,
* add one to avoid generating any null bytes.
*/
+ rand = PostmasterRandom();
md5Salt[0] = (rand % 255) + 1;
rand = PostmasterRandom();
md5Salt[1] = (rand % 255) + 1;
*** a/src/include/libpq/hba.h
--- b/src/include/libpq/hba.h
***************
*** 22,28 **** typedef enum UserAuth
uaTrust,
uaIdent,
uaPassword,
- uaCrypt,
uaMD5,
uaGSS,
uaSSPI,
--- 22,27 ----
*** a/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
--- b/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
***************
*** 123,129 **** typedef struct Port
*/
HbaLine *hba;
char md5Salt[4]; /* Password salt */
- char cryptSalt[2]; /* Password salt */
/*
* Information that really has no business at all being in struct Port,
--- 123,128 ----
*** a/src/include/libpq/pqcomm.h
--- b/src/include/libpq/pqcomm.h
***************
*** 153,159 **** extern bool Db_user_namespace;
#define AUTH_REQ_KRB4 1 /* Kerberos V4. Not supported any more. */
#define AUTH_REQ_KRB5 2 /* Kerberos V5 */
#define AUTH_REQ_PASSWORD 3 /* Password */
! #define AUTH_REQ_CRYPT 4 /* crypt password */
#define AUTH_REQ_MD5 5 /* md5 password */
#define AUTH_REQ_SCM_CREDS 6 /* transfer SCM credentials */
#define AUTH_REQ_GSS 7 /* GSSAPI without wrap() */
--- 153,159 ----
#define AUTH_REQ_KRB4 1 /* Kerberos V4. Not supported any more. */
#define AUTH_REQ_KRB5 2 /* Kerberos V5 */
#define AUTH_REQ_PASSWORD 3 /* Password */
! #define AUTH_REQ_CRYPT 4 /* crypt password. Not supported any more. */
#define AUTH_REQ_MD5 5 /* md5 password */
#define AUTH_REQ_SCM_CREDS 6 /* transfer SCM credentials */
#define AUTH_REQ_GSS 7 /* GSSAPI without wrap() */
*** a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-auth.c
--- b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-auth.c
***************
*** 40,49 ****
#include <pwd.h>
#endif
- #ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_H
- #include <crypt.h>
- #endif
-
#include "libpq-fe.h"
#include "fe-auth.h"
#include "libpq/md5.h"
--- 40,45 ----
***************
*** 787,800 **** pg_password_sendauth(PGconn *conn, const char *password, AuthRequest areq)
}
break;
}
- case AUTH_REQ_CRYPT:
- {
- char salt[3];
-
- strlcpy(salt, conn->cryptSalt, sizeof(salt));
- crypt_pwd = crypt(password, salt);
- break;
- }
case AUTH_REQ_PASSWORD:
/* discard const so we can assign it */
crypt_pwd = (char *) password;
--- 783,788 ----
***************
*** 938,945 **** pg_fe_sendauth(AuthRequest areq, PGconn *conn)
#endif
- case AUTH_REQ_MD5:
case AUTH_REQ_CRYPT:
case AUTH_REQ_PASSWORD:
conn->password_needed = true;
if (conn->pgpass == NULL || conn->pgpass[0] == '\0')
--- 926,937 ----
#endif
case AUTH_REQ_CRYPT:
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("Crypt authentication not supported\n"));
+ return STATUS_ERROR;
+
+ case AUTH_REQ_MD5:
case AUTH_REQ_PASSWORD:
conn->password_needed = true;
if (conn->pgpass == NULL || conn->pgpass[0] == '\0')
*** a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
--- b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
***************
*** 1674,1688 **** keep_going: /* We will come back to here until there is
return PGRES_POLLING_READING;
}
}
- if (areq == AUTH_REQ_CRYPT)
- {
- if (pqGetnchar(conn->cryptSalt,
- sizeof(conn->cryptSalt), conn))
- {
- /* We'll come back when there are more data */
- return PGRES_POLLING_READING;
- }
- }
#if defined(ENABLE_GSS) || defined(ENABLE_SSPI)
/*
--- 1674,1679 ----
*** a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
--- b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
***************
*** 340,346 **** struct pg_conn
int be_pid; /* PID of backend --- needed for cancels */
int be_key; /* key of backend --- needed for cancels */
char md5Salt[4]; /* password salt received from backend */
- char cryptSalt[2]; /* password salt received from backend */
pgParameterStatus *pstatus; /* ParameterStatus data */
int client_encoding; /* encoding id */
bool std_strings; /* standard_conforming_strings */
--- 340,345 ----
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