Andrew Dunstan wrote:
Andrew Chernow wrote:
I think what is missing is a way to deny the execution of queries that
don't operate on an object (like a table, sequence, role, schema,
etc...), OR queries not covered by the priv system. Object-based
queries can be locked down using the existing priv system. Not sure
if denying non-object related queries would work; what happens when
you call "SELECT NOW()" within an allowed function?
What exactly are you trying to protect against?
In general, my attitude is that databases should not allow direct access
from untrusted sources. The API restriction you are talking about is
something that is trivially easy to build into middleware, and only the
middleware should be allowed access to the database.
cheers
andrew
Why must this be done in middleware? Middleware wouldn't be needed as
protection against untrusted sources if random queries could be denied. My
little hack in PostgresMain() made it impossible to execute queries unless they
are on a white list (there could be better ways of doing this). Now add in SSL
and verification of certificates and things are tightly nailed down; as much as
the classic application server (middleware) would be ... no?
--
Andrew Chernow
eSilo, LLC
every bit counts
http://www.esilo.com/
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