The patch set of SE-PostgreSQL and related stuff were updated (r1460). [1/5] http://sepgsql.googlecode.com/files/sepostgresql-sepgsql-8.4devel-3-r1460.patch [2/5] http://sepgsql.googlecode.com/files/sepostgresql-utils-8.4devel-3-r1460.patch [3/5] http://sepgsql.googlecode.com/files/sepostgresql-policy-8.4devel-3-r1460.patch [4/5] http://sepgsql.googlecode.com/files/sepostgresql-docs-8.4devel-3-r1460.patch [5/5] http://sepgsql.googlecode.com/files/sepostgresql-tests-8.4devel-3-r1460.patch
I reviewed the patch set by myself, and updated the following items. However, I would like other hackers to review the code in honesty. SE-PostgreSQL need any volunteers to review and comment the patch set. Please give us your support! List of updates: - Rebased to the latest CVS HEAD, which includes the column-level privileges based on the SQL-standard. (The previous r1425 conflicts in some points.) - Security policy (sepostgresql-devel.pp) was updated to fit both of Fedora 10 and rawhide. Test cases are also modified to care the new security policy. - Cleanup: NUM_SELINUX_CATALOG was replaced by lengthof() macro to avoid code duplications. - Cleanup: sepgsqlCheckEmbeddedProcedure() is renamed to sepgsqlCheckProcedureInstall() due to its confusable naming. - Add a new permission: db_procedure:{install} It enables to prevent malicious user-defined functions are installed as a part of operators, conversions, types and so on. The default policy allows to install functions labeled as "sepgsql_proc_t" only, as an implementation of these facilities. Meanwhile, functions defined by unprivileged users are labeled as "user_sepgsql_proc_t" in default, and it is not allowed to install as an operator and so on. If DBA want to install user-defined functions for the purpose, he has to confirm its harmless and relabel it to "sepgsql_proc_t" at first. In the previous revision, it checked "db_procedure:{execute}" here, but it is not enough actually, because unprivilged user is allowed to execute self defined function. - Code revising: The previous revision always denied required permissions, when the kernel does not define them within its security policy. But it can make unexpected behavior when we work SE-PostgreSQL on a system with legacy security policy which lacks a part of newly added permissions. The revised one simply allows actions when these are undefined. - Fixbug: It required superfluous permissions when we try to update "security_label" system column but it does not change anything actually. For example: UPDATE t SET security_label = security_label; This query does not change security_label, so we don't need to check "db_tuple:{relabelfrom}" permission here. It is obvious we cannot know what tuples are actually relabeled on sepgsqlExecScan(), so any permission checks for write-operations are moved to sepgsqlHeapTuple(Insert|Update|Delete) hooks. - Fixbug: when we update pg_largeobject system catalog by hand, it has a possibility to create/drop specific largeobject, so we add a check on "db_blob:{create drop}" when pg_largeobject.loid is modified by UPDATE statement. For example: UPDATE pg_largeobject SET loid = loid::int + 10 WHERE loid = 1234; It is theoretically same as dropping a largeobject with loid:1234 and creating a largeobject with loid:1244. - Fixbug: Tome Lane pointed out a matter when a whole-row-reference on the relation with RTE_JOIN makes crash at the "Column-Level Privileges" thread. This revision added a special care for the situation. It recursively walks on refered JoinExpr and picks up its sources to check permission to them. - Code revising: T_SEvalItemRelation and T_SEvalItemAttribute nodes are integrated into T_SelinuxEvalItem node. In the previous revision, it simply chains all appeared tables and columns as a list of obsoleted node on Query->pgaceItem. But it has a trend the length of list grows long. T_SelinuxEvalItem contains required permissions on a table and an array of permissions for columns. It enables to keep the length of the list minimum. Related stuffs in sepgsql/proxy.c is also revised. - addEvalRelation() / addEvalAttribute() enhanced to handle T_SelinuxEvalItem. - Functions to handle inheritance tables and whole-row-reference are clearly sorted out. expandEvalItemInheritance() handles inheritance tables, and expandEvalItemWholeRowRefs() handles whole-row-reference. - Add a hook: pgaceExecuteTruncate() The previous revision checks permissions on truncated tables and tuples on pgaceProcessUtility(), but this approach need to extract all the target including cascaded ones, so it made code duplication. The new hook is deployed on ExecuteTruncate() and delivers a list of already opened relations with AccessExclusiveLock. A new sepgsqlExecuteTruncate() checks needed permission on the hook. - Cleanup: sepgsqlTupleName() always copied an identifier of tuple for audit record into its internal buffer, and returns its pointer to caller. But it is not necessary for most cases. It is revised to return a pointer within given tuple to avoid useless strcpy(), if possible. So, its valid duration is limited to the duration of tuple, but there is no real matter. In addition, callers of sepgsqlTupleName() are cleaned up, because its length of line tend to grow a bit long. - Add a check: CREATE/ALTER FOREIGN DATA WRAPPER has a capability to load a discretional shared library module, so it is necessary to check db_database:{install_module} permission. - Add source code comments: src/backend/security/sepgsql/avc.c Thanks, -- OSS Platform Development Division, NEC KaiGai Kohei <kai...@ak.jp.nec.com> -- Sent via pgsql-hackers mailing list (pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org) To make changes to your subscription: http://www.postgresql.org/mailpref/pgsql-hackers