Howdy, On Fri, May 21, 2010 at 11:21 AM, Tom Lane <t...@sss.pgh.pa.us> wrote: > Robert Haas <robertmh...@gmail.com> writes: >> So... can we get back to coming up with a reasonable >> definition, > > (1) no access to system calls (including file and network I/O) > > (2) no access to process memory, other than variables defined within the > PL. > > What else?
I ran across this comment in PL/Perl while implementing PL/Parrot, and I think it should be taken into consideration for the definition of trusted/untrusted: /* * plperl.on_plperl_init is currently PGC_SUSET to avoid issues whereby a * user who doesn't have USAGE privileges on the plperl language could * possibly use SET plperl.on_plperl_init='...' to influence the behaviour * of any existing plperl function that they can EXECUTE (which may be * security definer). Set * http://archives.postgresql.org/pgsql-hackers/2010-02/msg00281.php and * the overall thread. */ Duke -- Jonathan "Duke" Leto jonat...@leto.net http://leto.net -- Sent via pgsql-hackers mailing list (pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org) To make changes to your subscription: http://www.postgresql.org/mailpref/pgsql-hackers
