On Tue, Jun 1, 2010 at 1:02 PM, Tom Lane <t...@sss.pgh.pa.us> wrote: > Robert Haas <robertmh...@gmail.com> writes: >> On Tue, Jun 1, 2010 at 10:57 AM, Tom Lane <t...@sss.pgh.pa.us> wrote: >>> CREATE SECURITY VIEW, anyone? > >> That may be the best approach, but I think it needs more than one line >> of exposition. The approach I proposed was to test whether the user >> has privileges to execute the underlying query directly without going >> through the view. If so, we needn't be concerned. If not, then we >> start thinking about which functions/operators we trust. > > Ummm ... that makes semantics dependent on the permissions available at > plan time, whereas what should matter is the permissions that exist at > execution time. Maybe that's all right for this context but it doesn't > seem tremendously desirable.
Ugh. I hope there's a way around that problem because AFAICS the alternative is a world of hurt. If we're not allowed to take the security context into account during planning, then we're going to have to make worst-case assumptions, which sounds really unpleasant. >> Perhaps there is some value to having a knob that goes the opposite >> directions and essentially says "I don't really care whether this view >> is leaky from a security perspective". But presumably we don't want >> to deliver that behavior by default and require the user to ask for a >> SECURITY VIEW to get something else - if anything, we'd want CREATE >> VIEW to create the normal (secure) version and add CREATE LEAKY VIEW >> to do the other thing. > > -1 on that. We will get far more pushback from people whose application > performance suddenly went to hell than we will ever get approval from > people who actually need the feature. Considering that we've survived > this long with leaky views, that should definitely remain the default > behavior. Eh, if that's the consensus, it doesn't bother me that much, but it doesn't really answer the question, either: supposing we add an explicit concept of a security view, what should its semantics be? -- Robert Haas EnterpriseDB: http://www.enterprisedb.com The Enterprise Postgres Company -- Sent via pgsql-hackers mailing list (pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org) To make changes to your subscription: http://www.postgresql.org/mailpref/pgsql-hackers
