On Wed, Aug 15, 2012 at 11:37:04AM -0400, Andrew Dunstan wrote: > > On 08/15/2012 11:22 AM, Joe Conway wrote: > >On 08/15/2012 06:48 AM, Tom Lane wrote: > >>>On Wed, Aug 15, 2012 at 6:11 AM, Bruce Momjian <br...@momjian.us> wrote: > >>>>Is there a TODO here? > >>If anybody's concerned about the security of our password storage, > >>they'd be much better off working on improving the length and randomness > >>of the salt string than replacing the md5 hash per se. > >Or change to an md5 HMAC rather than straight md5 with salt. Last I > >checked (which admittedly was a while ago) there were still no known > >cryptographic weaknesses associated with an HMAC based on md5. > > > > > > Possibly. I still think the right time to revisit this whole area > will be when the NIST Hash Function competition ends supposedly > later this year. See > <http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/hash/timeline.html>. At that time we > should probably consider moving our password handling to use the new > standard function.
Are we really going to be comforable with a algorithm that is new? -- Bruce Momjian <br...@momjian.us> http://momjian.us EnterpriseDB http://enterprisedb.com + It's impossible for everything to be true. + -- Sent via pgsql-hackers mailing list (pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org) To make changes to your subscription: http://www.postgresql.org/mailpref/pgsql-hackers
