On 08/19/2014 05:48 PM, Stephen Frost wrote:
* Heikki Linnakangas (hlinnakan...@vmware.com) wrote:
server_cert_valid: Did the server present a valid certificate?
"yes" or "no"
server_cert_matches_host: Does the Common Name of the certificate
match the host connected to? "yes" or "no"
Aren't these questions addressed by sslmode?
Sort of. In sslmode=verify-ca, libpq checks that the server cert was
valid (the first attribute) and rejects the connection if not. In
verify-full mode, it also checks that the hostname matches (the second
attribute). But in sslmode=require, it's possible to connect to a server
with an invalid server cert. (to be precise in sslmode=require mode
libpq checks the server cert if a root CA cert was given, but if no root
CA cert is configured it will allow connecting anyway).
I think it would be nice to be able to query those attributes
explicitly, rather than just expect libpq to reject the connection if
something's wrong. For example, I'm thinking that an interactive client
might present an annoying pop-up window to the user if the server cert
is not valid, asking if he wants to connect anyway, and perhaps remember
the certificate and not ask again (TOFU).
We don't actually have such functionality today; you can query the
OpenSSL structs for those things, but the checks that libpq performs are
not exactly the same that OpenSSL does. We have our own function to
check if a wildcard cert matches a hostname, for example, and libpq
knows that "host" and "hostaddr" can be different. So this would
actually be a new feature, probably best to be implemented as a separate
patch. (I grabbed the idea for those attributes from Martijn's ancient
gnutls patch.)
Exposing the SSL information as generic key/value pairs allows
adding more attributes in the future, without breaking the ABI, and
it also allows exposing implementation-specific information in a
generic way. The attributes listed above cover the needs of psql.
What else do we need?
At first blush, I'd say a whole bunch.. Off the top of my head I can
think of:
For all certificates:
(client, server, cert that signed each, any intermediate CAs, root CAs)
Certificate itself (perhaps in DER, PEM, X509 formats..)
Fingerprint
Signed-By info
Common Name
Organization (et al)
Alternate names
Issue date, expiration date
CRL info, OCSP info
Allowed usage (encryption, signing, etc)
Hmm. That seems a bit too much. Perhaps provide just the certificate
itself in DER/PEM format, and have the client parse it (using OpenSSL or
something else) if it wants more details.
CRL checking done?
I guess, although you know implicitly that it was if the sslcrl option
was given.
OCSP used?
We don't support OCSP.
I think it would also be nice to get more information from the
server's certificate, like the hostname and the organization its
issued to, and expiration date, so that an interactive client like
pgAdmin or even psql could display that information like a web
browser does. Would it be best to add those as extra attributes in
the above list, perhaps with a "server_cert_*" prefix, or add a new
function for extracting server cert's attributes?
This really shouldn't be for *just* the server's certificate but rather
available for all certificates involved- on both sides.
Ok, but why? All the other stuff is readily available in the
configuration you use to connect. I guess it doesn't hurt to expose them
through this interface as well, but I can't immediately think of an
example that would use them.
Have you looked at how this change will play out with the ODBC driver..?
Especially on Windows with the SSL library you're proposing we use
there.. I recall that at one point the ODBC driver simply used libpq to
handle the authentication and set everything up, and then switched to
talking directly without libpq. In any case, it'd probably be good to
make sure the attributes you're suggesting are sufficient to meet the
needs of the ODBC driver too.
Indeed, the ODBC driver only uses libpq for authentication, then calls
PQgetssl(), and takes over the whole show calling SSL_read() and
SSL_write() itself. Ideally, we'd modify psqlodbc to stop doing that,
but that's not an easy job. In the short-term, I think we need to export
pqsecure_read() and pqsecure_write() functions in libpq, so that the
ODBC driver can use those instead of SSL_read() and SSL_write().
- Heikki
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