On 02/11/2015 11:30 PM, Claudio Freire wrote:
On Wed, Feb 11, 2015 at 5:25 PM, Heikki Linnakangas
<hlinnakan...@vmware.com> wrote:
On 02/11/2015 06:35 AM, Claudio Freire wrote:
Usually because handshakes use a random salt on both sides. Not sure
about pg's though, but in general collision strength is required but
not slowness, they're not bruteforceable.
To be precise: collision resistance is usually not important for hashes used
in authentication handshakes. Not for our MD5 authentication method anyway;
otherwise we'd be screwed. What you need is resistance to pre-image attacks.
AFAIK, if I find a colliding string to the MD5 stored in pg_authid, I
can specify that to libpq and get authenticated.
Am I missing something?
If you know the MD5 stored in pg_authid, you can use that directly to
authenticate. No need to find the original password, or another
colliding string, that hashes to the same MD5.
- Heikki
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