Bruce Momjian <br...@momjian.us> writes:
> Let me update my list of possible improvements:
> 1) MD5 makes users feel uneasy (though our usage is mostly safe)
> 2) The per-session salt sent to the client is only 32-bits, meaning
> that it is possible to reply an observed MD5 hash in ~16k connection
> attempts.
> 3) Using the user name for the MD5 storage salt allows the MD5 stored
> hash to be used on a different cluster if the user used the same
> password.
> 4) Using the user name for the MD5 storage salt allows the MD5 stored
> hash to be used on the _same_ cluster.
> 5) Using the user name for the MD5 storage salt causes the renaming of
> a user to break the stored password.
What happened to "possession of the contents of pg_authid is sufficient
to log in"? I thought fixing that was one of the objectives here.
regards, tom lane
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