* Heikki Linnakangas ([email protected]) wrote: > On 05/13/2015 06:07 AM, Stephen Frost wrote: > >This does change the XLOG functions to require pg_monitor, as discussed > >on the other thread where it was pointed out by Heikki that the XLOG > >location information could be used to extract sensitive information > >based on what happens during compression. > > That seems like an orthogonal issue, not something that should be > bundled in this patch. IIRC we didn't reach a consensus on what to > do about the compression-leaks-information issue. One idea was to > make it configurable on a per-table basis, and if we do that, > perhaps we don't need to restrict access to > pg_current_xlog_location() and friends.
Alright, I'll pull it out. I see it's already been added to the
open-items list, so we shouldn't forget about it.
For my 2c, I'd much rather have the information restricted to a
privileged role instead of having to disable the feature. Further, all
tables need to be considered as having privileged information, not just
systems ones like pg_authid, as the user might not have rights on the
other columns or rows in the table.
Thanks!
Stephen
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