On 06/14/2016 09:59 PM, Jim Nasby wrote:
On 6/12/16 2:13 AM, Ants Aasma wrote:
On Fri, Jun 10, 2016 at 5:23 AM, Haribabu Kommi
<kommi.harib...@gmail.com> wrote:
> 1. Instead of doing the entire database files encryption, how about
> providing user an option to protect only some particular tables that
> wants the encryption at table/tablespace level. This not only
provides
> an option to the user, it reduces the performance impact on tables
> that doesn't need any encryption. The problem with this approach
> is that every xlog record needs to validate to handle the encryption
> /decryption, instead of at page level.
Is there a real need for this? The customers I have talked to want to
encrypt the whole database and my goal is to make the feature fast
enough to make that feasible for pretty much everyone. I guess
switching encryption off per table would be feasible, but the key
setup would still need to be done at server startup. Per record
encryption would result in some additional information leakage though.
Overall I thought it would not be worth it, but I'm willing to have my
mind changed on this.
I actually design with this in mind. Tables that contain sensitive
info go into designated schemas, partly so that you can blanket move
all of those to an encrypted tablespace (or safer would be to move
things not in those schemas to an unencrypted tablespace). Since that
can be done with an encrypted filesystem maybe that's good enough.
(It's not really clear to me what this buys us over an encrypted FS,
other than a feature comparison checkmark...)
the reason why this is needed is actually very simple: security
guidelines and legal requirements ...
we have dealt with a couple of companies recently, who explicitly
demanded PostgreSQL level encryption in a transparent way to fulfill
some internal or legal requirements. this is especially true for
financial stuff. and yes, sure ... you can do a lot of stuff with
filesystem encryption.
the core idea of this entire thing is however to have a counterpart on
the database level. if you don't have the key you cannot start the
instance and if you happen to get access to the filesystem you are still
not able to fire up the DB.
as it said: requirements by ever bigger companies.
as far as benchmarking is concerned: i did a quick test yesterday (not
with the final AES implementation yet) and i got pretty good results.
with a reasonably well cached database in a typical application I expect
to loose around 10-20%. if everything fits in memory there is 0 loss of
course. the worst I got with the standard AES (no hardware support used
yet) I lost around 45% or so. but this requires a value as low as 32 MB
of shared buffers or so.
many thanks,
hans
--
Hans-Jürgen Schönig
Cybertec Schönig & Schönig GmbH
Gröhrmühlgasse 26
A-2700 Wiener Neustadt
Web: http://www.postgresql-support.de, http://www.cybertec.at
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