On 6/13/17 09:24, Stephen Frost wrote: > but there are > use-cases where it'd be really nice to be able to have PG doing the > encryption instead of the filesystem because then you can do things like > backup the database, copy it somewhere else directly, and then restore > it using the regular PG mechanisms, as long as you have access to the > key. That's not something you can directly do with filesystem-level > encryption
Interesting point. I wonder what the proper extent of "encryption at rest" should be. If you encrypt just on a file or block level, then someone looking at the data directory or a backup can still learn a number of things about the number of tables, transaction rates, various configuration settings, and so on. In the scenario of a sensitive application hosted on a shared SAN, I don't think that is good enough. Also, in the use case you describe, if you use pg_basebackup to make a direct encrypted copy of a data directory, I think that would mean you'd have to keep using the same key for all copies. -- Peter Eisentraut http://www.2ndQuadrant.com/ PostgreSQL Development, 24x7 Support, Remote DBA, Training & Services -- Sent via pgsql-hackers mailing list (pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org) To make changes to your subscription: http://www.postgresql.org/mailpref/pgsql-hackers
