On Dec 29, 2010, at 6:52 PM, TR Shaw wrote:
>
> On Dec 29, 2010, at 12:56 PM, Joshua Kehn wrote:
>
>> On Dec 29, 2010, at 12:37 PM, tedd wrote:
>>
>>> At 11:06 AM +0200 12/29/10, Dotan Cohen wrote:
>>>> Also, change them {passwords} frequently.
>>>
>>> I've always wondered about that -- if your password works, then why change
>>> it? Where's the logic in that?
>>>
>>> From my perspective, it looks like "Hey, the crackers have not been able to
>>> crack this, so let's give them another chance". That doesn't sound logical.
>>>
>>> There are things we "think" are right, but is this practice supported in
>>> some way that's provable?
>>>
>>> Cheers,
>>>
>>> tedd
>>>
>>> --
>>> -------
>>> http://sperling.com/
>>
>> An attacker manages to obtain the hashes and starts an attack. You change
>> your password. The attacker now has to restart the attack.
>>
>> Changing your passwords prevents an attack from continuing past the length
>> of time between password changes.
>>
>> Also if they _have_ managed to crack the password changing it forces them to
>> crack it again, thus also limiting the time the account is compromised.
>
>
> Gosh. Think about it. Lets not take the "your machine is compromised case"
> and/or your password is moronic and/or you are not passing your password
> cleartext.
>
> So the threat is external. Now there are 2 types of external: one in house
> and one on the 'net.
>
> The one in house is simply detected by an IDS like snort looking for very
> rapid login attempts. Slow walkers are no risk at all. Further if your
> password is computationally hard your GigE LAN is not fast enough to support
> cracking a computationally hard password before you retire. So there is no
> threat that your computationally hard password will be cracked so your
> password is safe.
>
> For a 'net threat, the bandwidth is even more constrained so you could live 9
> lives and still not have your computationally hard password cracked. Further,
> log checking at the firewall and on internal machines can easily detect
> cracking attempts. I detect about 4 per day on our mailserver looking for
> pop logons and about 25 a day against ssh where we don't even use passwords.
> ftp is not used.
>
> So an external threat against your machine as defined above, is not a risk.
>
> So now lets look at the case where there is malware on your machine which
> will try to brute force your computationally hard password and is smart
> enough to use your graphics engine to increased computational power. Folks
> at MIT and Carnegie Mellon have already numerically proved that a 12
> character password is not crackable using brute force in any reasonable
> timeframe. In fact an 8 character one has strength of years. I would contend
> that using that much power will make its existence known to you and coupled
> with the fact that you restart your computer every now and again and that you
> run an antivirus periodically that will eventually find it even if you don't
> notice the slow down.
>
> As you can see, cracking a password on your machine is so fruitless that no
> one would even try to since if you have access to the machine a keylogger,
> for example, is faster and more reliable. To thwart this you might want to
> run tripwire or equivalent and institute exfiltration detection.
>
> The big problem today is that "security" people in IT and security wannabee's
> quote cracking numbers not based in the real world but mathematically based
> on quasi "real" preconditions. They and some crazy guys who I know at
> Microsoft along with some NIST guys are pushing 12 character minimums of
> upper, lower, numbers and specials, changed every 60 days and no reuse for 2
> years in business settings. They say this will make the corporate machines
> safe. This is utter BS. And, in fact, makes corporate networks even more
> vulnerable due to the fact that people can't remember all these password so
> they write them down or make them relatively easy thus increasing social
> engineering break-in opportunities.
>
> The best solution is to select a computationally hard password and then don't
> change it unless you have to. I also recommend that you select another that
> is different and use it for all 'net based logins with a extension
> concatenated for each service.
>
> This comment about "if they _have_ managed to crack the password changing it
> forces them to crack it again, thus also limiting the time the account is
> compromised" is ridiculous. First, I assume you really mean stealing rather
> than cracking for the reasons above. Notwithstanding the fact that the site
> broken into should immediately lock down all accounts. Whats to say that the
> bad guys brake-in right after you have changed your password and they are not
> noticed. You are still at risk until you change it maybe 30, 60 90, 120 days
> later. So what is the real good of changing password routinely? Nada! The
> probability that your change matches the threat is miniscule. It just make
> people feel good. In fact ,if the bad guys broke in to a financial system
> they wouldn't steal your password; they would institute immediate bank
> transfers. Not only would they; they do constantly today.
>
> As for the "black helicopters", Carnivore was never finished by the FBI and
> is part of fokelore. Its much easier to do packet replication at a router in
> an ISP and send it to disk for offline analysis. This also has another
> effect of having evidence that can be used in a court of law.
>
> Other "issues" to be addresses later.
>
> Tom
tl;dr
Thanks for the essay, however I'm not suggesting that there is actual benefit.
I'm listing the said benefits of changing your passwords.
Regards,
-Josh
____________________________________
Joshua Kehn | josh.k...@gmail.com
http://joshuakehn.com
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