Hi, PostgreSQL will be releasing new minor releases on Friday (usually around 14 UTC+-1, that should be a good time for the DSAs). The tarballs for the updates are not public yet, but the fixes are visible in the upstream git, so there's no need to treat this as embargoed, but there should still be a coordinated release.
As usual, we have half a dozen packages to update. Unless otherwise noted, the packages are all affected three CVEs. I'll push the 9.4/unstable update in Friday. I can push the other packages earlier for release on Friday if you permit. postgresql-9.4: unstable+testing: 9.4.2-1 jessie: 9.4.2-0+deb8u1 postgresql-9.1: unstable+testing: plperl-only compatibility package: rather than providing a fix I should use the opportunity to get the packages removed there jessie: plperl-only compatibility package, only affected by CVE-2015-3166 9.1.16-0+deb8u1 wheezy: 9.1.16-0+deb7u1 postgresql-8.4: (for reference, no security team action needed) unstable+testing+jessie: (not present) wheezy: plperl-only compatibility package, only affected by CVE-2015-3166 -> will not get fixed (EOL upstream) squeeze-lts: 8.4.22lts2-0+deb6u1 Here's the changelog I'm using: postgresql-9.4 (9.4.2-1) unstable; urgency=medium * New upstream version. + Avoid possible crash when client disconnects just before the authentication timeout expires (Benkocs Norbert Attila) If the timeout interrupt fired partway through the session shutdown sequence, SSL-related state would be freed twice, typically causing a crash and hence denial of service to other sessions. Experimentation shows that an unauthenticated remote attacker could trigger the bug somewhat consistently, hence treat as security issue. (CVE-2015-3165) + Improve detection of system-call failures (Noah Misch) Our replacement implementation of snprintf() failed to check for errors reported by the underlying system library calls; the main case that might be missed is out-of-memory situations. In the worst case this might lead to information exposure, due to our code assuming that a buffer had been overwritten when it hadn't been. Also, there were a few places in which security-relevant calls of other system library functions did not check for failure. It remains possible that some calls of the *printf() family of functions are vulnerable to information disclosure if an out-of-memory error occurs at just the wrong time. We judge the risk to not be large, but will continue analysis in this area. (CVE-2015-3166) + In contrib/pgcrypto, uniformly report decryption failures as Wrong key or corrupt data (Noah Misch) Previously, some cases of decryption with an incorrect key could report other error message texts. It has been shown that such variance in error reports can aid attackers in recovering keys from other systems. While it's unknown whether pgcrypto's specific behaviors are likewise exploitable, it seems better to avoid the risk by using a one-size-fits-all message. (CVE-2015-3167) + Protect against wraparound of multixact member IDs (Álvaro Herrera, Robert Haas, Thomas Munro) Under certain usage patterns, the existing defenses against this might be insufficient, allowing pg_multixact/members files to be removed too early, resulting in data loss. The fix for this includes modifying the server to fail transactions that would result in overwriting old multixact member ID data, and improving autovacuum to ensure it will act proactively to prevent multixact member ID wraparound, as it does for transaction ID wraparound. The 4th paragraph is not security-related, but a noteworthy fix (not necessarily noteworthy to be mentioned in the DSA). (Of course there's more fixes bundled.) Christoph -- c...@df7cb.de | http://www.df7cb.de/
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