http://pnews.org/ - http://up-yours.us
Progressive (Post-Liberal) News & Views (since 1982)
Neither Left nor Right - Seeking Truth and Justice
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Ninety-five percent of the Jews I have known are:
1. Smarter than I am, 2. More experienced, 3. better
educated, 4. better organized, 5. have more social
contacts.
Are you telling me that slaughter, revenge,
repression, responding to provocation, and backing
bush's play in the world are the best tactics that the
Jews can come up with to solve the problems we are
facing? -- that god was wrong in picking the Jews for
the Chosen People? I can't believe that. Do better
than that. Don't tell me you can't.
How are the Murderous Muslim Old Men betraying
their people? What tactic would make the rank and
file see that and cut the ground from under the MMOM?
Don't ask me -- what the hell am I?
Is this fair? Of course not. When were the
Jews ever treated fairly?
Warren
--- Hank Roth <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> http://pnews.org/ - http://up-yours.us
> Progressive (Post-Liberal) News & Views (since
> 1982)
> Neither Left nor Right - Seeking Truth and Justice
>
>
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>
>
> Islamization of the Palestinians
>
>
> "Israel will be established and will stay
> established until Islam
> nullifies it as it nullified what was before it."
> Imam Hasan al-Banna - taken from introduction to
> Hamas charter
>
> The following is excerpted from Chapter One
> (Social Roots and
> Institutional Development) of The Palestinian Hamas:
> Vision, Violence, and
> Coexistence, by Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela,
> Columbia University Press,
> published in 2000 - and presented here in compliance
> with Fair Use, for
> educational purposes.
>
> Much of the politics of Hamas can be explained in
> terms of the tension
> between the movement's dogmatic ideology and its
> pragmatic approach to
> political and institutional survival. This tension
> is between Hamas's
> adherence to the Islamic vision of holy war (jihad)
> against Israel as the
> most effective instrument of mass mobilization and
> its awareness of the
> necessity of reckoning with political considerations
> without abandoning
> the armed struggle. The origins of this tension and
> its impact on Hamas's
> political behavior are intimately bound up with the
> historical development
> of the Palestinian national movement.
>
> Palestinian nationalism emerged as a construction of
> British colonialism,
> its ideology and strategy shaped by its
> confrontation with the Zionist
> movement and the state of Israel, as well as by its
> interaction with the
> surrounding Arab states. As in similar cases of
> constructed nationalism,
> the Palestinian national movement sanctified
> territorial boundariesin this
> case, those demarcated by the British Mandate from
> the Jordan River to the
> Mediterranean Seaand gave them the symbolic
> political status of a historic
> homeland. And like other national movements in which
> a religion based on
> scriptures and universal ends played a role, Islam
> was an instrument, not
> a key factor, in constructing the Palestinian
> national identity, both
> before 1948 and afterward.
>
> Since the early 1920s, the legitimacy of any
> political leadership in the
> Arab-Palestinian community has been conditioned on
> its adherence to an
> unequivocal rejection of the Zionist enterprise and
> a commitment to the
> just cause of Palestinian Arabs. This approach
> characterizes the Arab
> Palestinian national movement and its political
> institutions, of which the
> most conspicuous has been the PLO from its advent in
> 1964 but mainly after
> 1967. In addition to its demand for the total
> reversal of the outcomes of
> the 1948 war reclamation of the lost land of
> Palestine from which Israel
> was created and repatriation of the Arab refugeesthe
> PLO also articulated
> essential values and symbols underpinning
> Palestinian nationalism. In its
> National Charter, the PLO defined the Palestinian
> people, asserted its
> inalienable links to the national homeland within
> its Mandatory borders,
> and sanctioned armed struggle as the only way to its
> liberation.
>
> After the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, the PLO was
> known for its popular
> mobilization for a military struggle against Israel
> and its uncompromising
> political goals. Indeed, the PLO's National Charter
> of 1968 defined these
> goals as the liberation of all of Palestine by armed
> struggle and the
> establishment of an independent Palestinian state
> with a negligible
> minority of Jewish citizens. However, years of
> frustrated hope of total
> Arab mobilization for the sake of Palestine,
> military debacles suffered at
> the hands of Arab regimes and Israel, political
> constraints, and growing
> involvement in international diplomacy induced the
> PLO to retreat from its
> goal of a Palestinian state in all Palestine.
> Instead, the PLO has been
> forced to acquiesce in the political reality by
> adopting a two-state
> solution - Israel within its 1967 borders and a
> Palestinian state in the
> West Bank and Gaza Strip. By the late 1970s, the
> two-state solution had
> won the support of the Palestinian leadership in the
> occupied territories
> as well as that of most Arab states and other
> members of the international
> community.
>
> The PLO's loss of its autonomous territorial base in
> Lebanon as a result
> of the Israeli incursion into that country in 1982
> generated mounting
> ideological and structural crises within the
> organization, which had
> effectively been deprived of its military option and
> had its political
> options severely curtailed by being forced out of
> Lebanon. A deep sense of
> hopelessness gripped the Palestinians, who perceived
> a widening gap
> between their expectations for the imminent removal
> of the Israeli
> occupation and the PLO's state of fragmentation and
> political weakness. It
> was under these circumstances that the national
> discourse began to change,
> prompted by marginal Islamic groups. By presenting
> an alternative
> orientation and strategy that seemed to address the
> needs of the people,
> these groups were able to break through to the
> center stage of the
> Palestinian political community. Deriving their
> political thought,
> terminology, and values from radical Islam, the
> upstart groups offered a
> different perspective on the collective reality and
> a redefinition of the
> Palestinians' national goals and means to achieve
> them. At the same time,
> they identified themselves with the history of
> Palestinian struggle and
> its symbols and myths, appropriating them from the
> national-secular stream
> led by the PLO.
>
> One such group was Hamas, a product of the Intifada,
> the Palestinian
> uprising in the Israeli-occupied territories that
> erupted at the end of
> 1987. At the time and place of its emergence, Hamas
> appeared to address
> more authentically and appropriately the
> expectations of many, if not
> most, Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza
> Strip, thereby
> supplementing the usual Islamic interpretation of
> essential elements of
> Palestinian nationalism, such as people, territory,
> history, and
> interrelations with the Arab-Muslim world. At a time
> when the PLO appeared
> to have abandoned the armed struggle and to be
> willing to accept a
> territorial compromise that would leave the
> Palestinians only a small
> fragment of Mandatory Palestine, Hamas clung to
> established national
> values, which were encapsulated in the notion of
> relentless armed struggle
> until the complete liberation of Palestine.
> Moreover, Hamas conferred an
> Islamic meaning on its version of Palestinian
> nationalism. That is, the
> Palestinian state envisioned by Hamas would come
> into being through a holy
> war (jihad ), encompass all of Palestine, and
> implement the Islamic law
> (shari'a).
>
> Hamas thus confronted the PLO's secular nationalism
> with an Islamic
> national concept, which needed no alteration of the
> PLO's
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